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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the district court have jurisdiction to enter 
the orders upon which it found Mr. Malouf in contempt? 
2. Were the orders lawful? 
3. Did Mr. Malouf understand what was required of him 
by the court's orders? 
4. Did Mr. Malouf have the ability to comply with the 
court's orders? 
5. Did Mr. Malouf willfully and knowingly fail and 
refuse to comply with the court's orders? 
6. Were the orders of the district court moot so as 
to excuse Mr. Malouffs refusal to obey them? 
7. Were the sanctions imposed by Judge Wahlquist, 
after finding Mr. Malouf in contempt, within his discretion? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b): 
Notwithstanding any act of Congress that 
confers exclusive jurisdiction on a court or 
courts other than the district courts, the 
district courts shall have original but not 
exclusive jurisdiction of all civil 
proceedings arising under Title 11, or 
arising in or related to cases under Title 
11. (Emphasis added). 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4: 
The district court shall have original 
jurisdiction in all matters civil and 
criminal, not excepted in the Constitution 
and not prohibited by law . . . That 
district courts, or judges thereof, shall 
have power to issue writs of habeas corpus, 
mandamus, injunction, quo warranto, 
certiorari, prohibition, and other writs 
necessary to carry into effect their orders, 
judgments, and decrees. . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-1 (1953): 
The following acts or omissions in respect 
to a court or proceedings therein are 
contempts of the authority of the court: 
* * • 
(3) Misbehavior in office or other 
willful neglect or violation of duty by an 
attorney, counsel, clerk, sheriff, or other 
person appointed or elected to perform a 
judicial or ministerial service. 
(4) Deceit, or abuse of the process or 
proceedings of the court by a party to an 
action or special proceeding. 
(5) Disobedience of any lawful 
judgment, order or process of the court. 
Rule 7(b)(2), Ut. R. Civ. P.: 
An order includes every direction of the 
court including a minute order made and 
entered in writing and not included in a 
judgment. (Emphasis added). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the final order of the First 
District Court finding Raymond N. Malouf, Defendant's counsel, 
in contempt after an evidentiary hearing. In November 1985, 
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Mr. Malouf was held in contempt for unlawfully converting to 
his own use $21,260.12 held in his trust account or otherwise 
under his control, contrary to a writ of garnishment served 
upon him and contrary to a separate order by Judge VeNoy 
Christoffersen directing Mr. Malouf to hold and safely keep 
money in his possession for the benefit of the trustee 
appointed in the Defendant's individual bankruptcy cases. (R. 
253-258, 422-423, 444-445, 560-564). A finding of contempt was 
issued by Judge John F. Wahlquist who sat by special 
appointment to hear the matter. (R. 494). Upon finding Mr. 
Malouf in contempt, Judge Wahlquist ordered that Mr. Malouf be 
confined in the county jail for thirty (30) days (25 days of 
which were suspended), pay a $100.00 fine, reimburse parties 
injured by his contumacious conduct and pay PCA's attorneys' 
fees incurred in the contempt proceedings of $2,200.00. (R. 
560-564). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In August of 1982, Utah Farm Production Credit 
Association ("PCA") commenced this action to, inter alia, 
foreclose its trust deed against the Labrums' farm and enforce 
PCA's security interest in the Labrums' farming equipment, 
accounts receivable, general intangibles and other personal 
property. (R. 1). Under PCA's First Cause of Action, PCA 
alleged the existence of a promissory note, mortgage and 
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security agreement, encumbering virtually all of the Labrums1 
personal property and requested that the court enter a money 
judgment against the Labrums (the individual Defendants in the 
case) and for an order of sale under the mortgage* (R. 8). 
PCA's Amended Complaint also contained a Second and Third Cause 
of Action for conversion and fraud. (R. 8-9). Soon after this 
action was commenced, the Labrums filed a petition in 
bankruptcy seeking to reorganize their farming operations under 
Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. The bankruptcy 
action was styled in the name of the Labrums' partnership, 
Labrum Bothers Diary. (R. 405). While in bankruptcy they 
secretly accumulated a large fund of money which was held by 
their attorney, Raymond N. Malouf. (R. 407). The existence of 
the fund was not disclosed to the bankruptcy court or to 
creditors. (R. 407). The fund consisted for the most part of 
proceeds derived from the United States Government Milk 
Diversion Program (the "Milk Diversion Proceeds"), a government 
milk regulation and subsidy program. (R. 405-409). 
Almost two years after filing the complaint in this 
case, in July of 1984, PCA obtained relief from the bankruptcy 
stay and filed a motion for summary judgment in this case with 
accompanying affidavits and memorandum. (R. 71-79). The 
affidavit of Thad Allen, PCA's Assistant Vice President, 
specified the exact balance of the debt as of the time of the 
motion. (R. 78). On August 21, 1984, Judge Christoffersen 
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granted PCAfs motion for summary judgment upon its First Cause 
of Action. (R. 102). Approximately four weeks later, on 
September 20, 1984, a money judgment was entered in accordance 
with Judge Christoffersen's order granting summary judgment. 
(R. 111-112). 
Immediately upon entry of the money judgment, PCA 
requested the clerk of the court to issue writs of execution 
upon the Labrums1 real and personal property and obtained an 
order in supplemental proceedings signed by Judge 
Christoffersen for the purpose of satisfying the judgment. (R. 
141) . 
Three weeks later, on October 3, 1984, the Labrums 
obtained an order from Judge Christoffersen staying all actions 
to execute upon the judgment including "supplemental 
proceedings, garnishments and attachments." (R. 52). 
Approximately two weeks later on October 22, 1984, upon 
Labrums' motion to reconsider the summary judgment, Judge 
Christoffersen denied Labrums1 motion, vacated the stay and 
expressly authorized PCA to avail itself of such process as was 
necessary to collect on the judgment from PCA's collateral. (R. 
156, 213). On November 19, 1984, all of the real estate 
encumbered by PCA's mortgage was sold at a sheriff's execution 
sale. (R. 232). The sale was conducted after Judge 
Christoffersen heard and denied Labrums' motion for a stay of 
the sale. (R. 185, 213) . 
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Meanwhile in the bankruptcy proceedings, the existence 
of the secret fund of money had come to the attention of PCA 
and the United States Bankruptcy Court and on December 13, 
1984, a hearing was held before the Honorable John H. Allen, 
United States Bankruptcy Judge, to consider dismissal of the 
bankruptcy case, (R. 405)- At that hearing, Judge Allen ruled 
as follows: 
This court . . . has had no reason to 
question the motives [of the Labrums] until 
this morning, at which time the evidence 
shows that proceeds from the milk diversion 
payments are being held in the trust account 
of Counsel [Mr. Maloufl for the debtors with 
no explanation as to what is going to happen 
except the argument these are no longer or 
never have been property of the estate, (R. 
407; Transcript of contempt hearing p. 
15-19) . 
This concerns me as much as i t does counsel 
for PCA in that i t appears that the debtor 
is using some method to protect those assets 
and not pay them to its creditors* I frown 
upon this, and there's been some suggestion 
that counsel fees have been paid from these. 
I make no finding on that, but other—but I 
do make the comment if that is the case, its 
prohibited by law, its prohibited by the 
order of this court, and it shouldn't occur. 
(R. 407-408; Transcript of contempt hearing 
p. 15-19). 
• * * 
There are no assets left. Thus, the debtor 
can't effectuate a plan of—a plan of any 
kind, even a plan of liquidation without 
assets. All of this has been prejudicial to 
creditors, particularly the evidence that 
came out today as to the position on the 
milk diversion payments. (R. 408; 
Transcript of contempt hearing p. 15-19). 
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• * * 
So this court concludes that it will order a 
dismissal of the case unless within ten (10) 
days the debtor consents to a conversion to 
a case under Chapter 7 or moves for and 
consents to the appointment of a trustee. In 
absence of one of those two items occurring 
within ten (10) days from today, the court 
will order the case dismissed. (R. 409; 
Transcript of contempt hearing p. 15-19). 
The Chapter 11 case was dismissed in accordance with 
Judge Allen's order (Transcript of contempt hearing p. 20, 
lines 5-13) and on December 31, 1984, a writ of garnishment was 
issued in this case charging Raymond N. Malouf as garnishee. 
(R. 253). The writ was issued upon the affidavit of Doug 
Kohler, one of PCA's officers as required by Rule 64D, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure (R. 239), and was served upon Mr. 
Malouf on January 2, 1985. (R. 258). The writ instructed Mr. 
Malouf as follows: 
You are commanded not to pay any debt due or 
to become due to Defendants and to retain 
possession and control of all personal 
property, effects and choses of action of 
Defendants until further order of this 
court. (R. 253). 
Eight days later, on January 10, 1985, Labrums filed a motion 
requesting Judge Christoffersen to dissolve or strike the writ 
of garnishment served on Mr. Malouf. (R. 268). On January 21, 
1985, PCA moved the court to enter its order requiring 
Defendants to show cause why the Milk Diversion Proceeds should 
not be turned over to PCA as part of PCA's collateral and 
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temporarily restraining the Labrums and their attorney from 
disposing of the Milk Diversion Proceeds. (R. 277). Judge 
Christoffersen's order granting PCAfs motion was entered the 
same day. (R. 346-348). The effect of the temporary 
restraining order was extended to February 8, 1985, by 
stipulation of the parties dated January 28, 1985. (R. 373). 
The parties' stipulation and the order of January 31, 1985, as 
signed and approved by counsel for PCA, was unilaterally 
altered by Mr. Malouf before being filed with the district 
court so as to make them apply only to some of the Defendants 
in the case and to Milk Diversion Proceeds to be received at a 
future date, all without prior or subsequent notice to PCA's 
counsel. (R. 372-375). 
On February 8, 1985, counsel for PCA and Mr. Malouf 
appeared before Judge Christoffersen at the time scheduled to 
hear, inter alia, both the debtor's motion to dissolve PCA's 
garnishment and PCA's motion for a preliminary injunction and 
order requiring turnover of the Milk Diversion Proceeds. (R. 
422). At the hearing Mr. MaJouf informed the court that three 
(3) days earlier, on February 5, 1985, all of the individual 
Labrums had filed for protection under Chapter 7 of the United 
States Bankruptcy Code (February 8 transcript at 2, lines 
2-11). In light of the Labrums1 bankruptcies, Judge 
Christoffersen did not ruJe on PCA's motions. However, he 
denied the Labrums' motion for an order dissolving the writ of 
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garnishment served on Mr. Malouf; ordered Mr, Malouf, as 
garnishee, to answer the interrogatories served upon him with 
the writ of garnishment; ordered that no execution be had upon 
the answers of the garnishee in light of the automatic stay 
imposed by the Labrums' bankruptcies and ordered Mr. Malouf to 
"hold and safely keep any and all property in his possession 
belonging to the Defendants herein for the benefit of the 
trustee appointed in the bankruptcy cases of said Defendants." 
(R. 423). The court articulated its ruling several times 
during the course of the hearing as follows: 
The court: [I] don't know what effect that's 
going to have except that I will allow you 
to ask questions to find out where other 
assets may be, and that any of those assets 
are to be held for the trustee to make an 
adjudication under the bankruptcy of 
whether—or as to how those assets may be 
used, who's the creditor that should be 
paid, and if there's surplus it goes back, I 
assume, to the people. . . . (Transcript at 
p. 17, lines 19-25; p. 18, line 1). 
The court: To make a determination of what 
to do with it. I guess it depends on the 
results of his answers what you proceed to 
do except that the money as part of the 
order is not to be disbursed to anybody, 
whether they file bankruptcy or not. It 
either goes to the trustee, or if you want 
to argue about whether they are partnership 
assets, whether you can proceed against 
them. (Transcript at p. 19, lines 11-17). 
The court: Okay. So what you need now is 
an order requiring him [Mr. Malouf] to 
answer the writ he has been served with 
within ten (3 0) days and that if there are 
any funds held by reason of the answers to 
the writ, that they cannot be executed upon, 
they must be he id for — the benefit of the 
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trustee for decision as to what should 
happen to the funds, since the bankruptcies 
of all the parties named, whether its a 
partnership or not, individually have been 
filed. I don't know that you have to put 
that language in, but at least that it be 
held for the trustee. (Transcript at p. 23, 
lines 6-11, 13-18). 
Mr. Zundel: I will prepare an order. 
The court: With those three issues. 
Mr. Zundel: Yes. 
The court: Well, Jet's see. To answer 
within ten (10) days, that the answers 
reveal assets being held, that there be no 
execution on them but that they be held for 
the benefit of the trustee. That way you 
protect the money and the trustee can—I 
assume, since the bankruptcies are filed, 
that they have jurisdiction to make a 
determination of what happens to the assets 
anyway. (Transcript at p. 25, lines 18-25; 
p. 26, lines 1-2). 
On February 22, 1985, the written order was 
simultaneously mailed to Mr. Malouf and the court. (R. 224). 
Three days later on February 25, 1985, Mr. Malouf gave 
$1,500,00 of the money in his control to his client, Duane 
Labrum, and $300.00 to Ross Labrum. (R. 468-470; Transcript of 
contempt hearing p. 42-43). Two days after that, on February 
27, 1985, Mr. Malouf paid himself $6,000.00 from the funds in 
his control. (R. 468-470? Transcript of contempt hearing p. 
42-43). 
On March 4, 1985, the order was signed by the court 
and, according to Mr. Malouf, he received the order on March 6, 
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1985. (R. 428). Six days later, on March 12, 1985, Mr. Malouf 
executed his motion to amend the order and objected to the form 
of the order as overbroad. (R. 426). That motion was mailed 
to PCA's counsel three days later and PCA responded on March 
20, 1985. (R. 431). In its response PCA argued that 
The order at issue here, as executed by the 
court, accurately reflects the court's 
ruling of February 8, 1985. The 
modificatons proposed by Defendants increase 
the likelihood that some of Defendants1 
property in Mr. Malouf's possession will be 
lost to the trustee of Defendants' 
bankruptcies and to PCA. (R. 435). 
On April 1, 1985, Judge Christoffersen denied 
Mr.Malouf's motion to modify the order and thereby reaffirmed 
the breadth of the order. (R. 444-445). 
Meanwhile, in the Labrums' bankruptcy cases, on or 
about April 2, 1985, the bankruptcy trustee requested that Mr. 
Malouf not disburse any of the funds in his possession and that 
he turn the funds over to the trustee, which Mr. Malouf 
declined to do. (Transcript of contempt hearing p. 109, lines 
9-25 and p. 110, lines 1-9). 
On April 3, 1985, two days after Judge Christoffersen 
reaffirmed his February 8 Order, and one day after the 
bankruptcy trustee's demand for turnover of the fund in Mr. 
Malouf's possession, Mr. Malouf disbursed another $1,500.00 to 
his client, Duane Labrum. Thirteen days after that, on April 
16, 1985, Mr. Malouf took another $3,000.00 for his law firm. 
(R. 468-470; Transcript of contempt hearing p. 42-43). 
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On May 6, 1985, Mr. Malouf disbursed another $3,000.00 
to his client, Ross Labrum. (R. 468-470; Transcript of 
contempt hearing p. 42-43). 
M€>anwhile, in the Labrums' bankrutpcy cases, Mr. 
Malouf appeared before Judge Allen who ruled that Mr. Malouf 
was diqualified to represent the Labrums in their Chapter 7 
cases, ordered that Mr. Malouf was to receive no fee for his 
services in either the Chapter 11 or Chapter 7 cases and 
ordered that Mr. Malouf turnover to the trustee all Milk 
Diversion Proceeds and rents in his possession. (Transcript of 
contempt hearing p. 82, lines 16-25, p. 83, lines 17-25, p. 84, 
lines 1-20, p. 113, lines 5-25, p. 114, lines 1-21). On or 
about June 18, 1985, Mr. Malouf finally turned over to the 
trustee of the Labrums1 bankruptcy cases $41,299.88, which was 
$5,360.12 less than what he actually held. (R. 468-470; 
Transcript of contempt hearing p. 42-43, 116-117, 123). The 
$5,360.12 was retained by Mr. Malouf for the payment of 
attorney's fees. (Transcript of contempt hearing p. 138). 
On October 21, 1985, PCA filed its verified motion for 
order to show cause why Raymond N. Malouf should not be held in 
contempt of the order served upon him contained in the writ of 
garnishment and Judge ChristoFfersen's order requiring him to 
hold the funds in his possession pending resolution in the 
bankruptcy court as to who was entitled to the funds. (R. 
465-472). On October 26, 1985, the bankruptcy trustee joined 
in PCA's motion. (R. 458-459). 
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On November 25, 1985, an evidentiary hearing was held 
upon the court's order to Mr. Malouf to show cause why he 
should not be held in contempt. (R. 512). During the hearing, 
Judge Wahlquist made three separate sets of findings. 
(Transcript of contempt hearing at p. 50, lines 15-23, p. 
157-159, 174-178). Only part of the court's rulings from the 
bench are included in the Addendum to Mr. Malouf's Brief on 
Appeal or in the Docketing Statement filed in this case. A 
complete transcript of Judge Wahlquistfs rulings is submitted 
in the Addendum to this Brief. In pertinent part Judge 
Christoffersen ruled from the bench as follows: 
The court has also heard the testimony here 
given and finds that in truth Mr. Malouf 
knew this was a complete freeze and knew it 
throughout. He struggled for some way to 
avoid it, and he has a hodgepodge of 
half-reasoned through explanations, but none 
of which avoid the basic conclusion that 
those orders from the resident judge were a 
complete freeze. 
The court finds further that there have been 
hearings under Chapter 11 in which 
specifically no attorney's fees were paid. 
The court further finds that there have been 
hearings under Chapter 7 in which no 
attorney's fees were to be paid. 
The court finds that payment of attorney's 
fees on these matters is—constitutes a 
violation of those orders, and is no defense 
insofar as violations of—alleged violations 
of the resident judge's order here. This 
was a complete freeze. 
Insofar as the explanation involving the 
difference between the so-called $46,000 
plus and the $41,000 plus, I have heard two 
things: I have heard one thing that all 
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monies that were owed were paid over, and 
that he did—Mr. Malouf does not know what 
the other $5,000 was for. Then I have heard 
the development of an explanation which 
seems to violate the ruLes of the IRS and 
the rules of logic, and the court does 
believe him. The court finds this to be a 
falsehood. (Transcript of contempt hearing 
p. 158-159). 
At the conclusion of all of the evidence, the trial 
court found Mr. Malouf in contempt for willfully violating the 
garnishment order and Judge Christoffersen1s February 8 Order. 
(R. 520-525). The trial court granted a money judgment in 
favor of the trustee in the amount of $21,260.12 (R. 524) and 
assessed attorneys1 fees in favor of PCA in the amount of 
$2,200.00. (R. 524). The trial court noted that in 30 years on 
the bench it had never encountered a case of lawyer misconduct 
of this magnitude (Transcript of November 26, 1985, lines 3-5) 
and sentenced Mr. Malouf to pay a $100.00 fine and serve thirty 
(30) days in the county jail, twenty-five (25) days of which 
were suspended upon condition that Mr. Malouf return all sums 
which he still held from the Labrums1 accounts to the trustee 
and that he answer questions truthfully concerning his 
resources and ability to pay the judgments granted against him. 
(R. 524) . 
This appeal was commenced in December of 1985. 
Thereafter the Labrums and Mr. Malouf filed a motion for 
summary disposition and PCA filed motions to dismiss the appeal 
for summary disposition and a suggestion of mootness. The 
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court has reserved ruling on the motions for plenary 
presentation of the case. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
PCA argues on appeal that the trial court's findings 
and order of contempt should be affirmed and that all other 
orders sought to be appealled are interlocutory and not 
appealable or are moot in light of the Labrums1 bankruptcy 
cases. The myriad issues raised by Mr. Malouf respecting the 
correctness of the issuance of the writ of garnishment or Judge 
Christoffersen1s February 8 Order have no bearing on Mr. 
Malouf's duty to comply with the orders of the lower court to 
hold and safely keep the property in his possession for the 
benefit of the trustee in the Labrums' bankruptcy cases. PCA 
argues that whether an order be right or wrong it must be 
obeyed until reversed by orderly and proper proceedings. That 
whenever the court has both personal jurisdiction and subject 
matter jurisdiction, the orders of the court should not be 
considered void by disgruntled litigants but only voidable on 
appeal. 
Appellants argue that the money judgment upon which 
the writ of garnishment in this case was based is improperly 
entered and therefore all orders and writs flowing therefrom 
were void and, therefore, Mr. Malouf cannot be held in 
contempt. PCA responds first by pointing out that Judge 
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Christoffersen's February 8 Order was not dependent on any 
prior order, writ or judgment entered in the case but was 
issued with the intent of preserving the status quo pending the 
resolution of a dispute between the parties in the bankruptcy 
court, which had assumed jurisdiction over the fund of money in 
Mr. Malouf's possession. Secondly, PCA responds by arguing 
that any alleged procedurally defects in the issuance of the 
writ of garnishment at issue are not such as to make the writ 
void. 
The facts of this case show an attempt by Mr. Malouf 
and his clients to jump between the jurisdiction of the 
bankruptcy and the state courts as the proceedings in either of 
those courts begin to close in on their assets. That the 
Labrums and their counsel attempted to take advantage of a 
practical, if not theoritical, hiatus in the jurisdiction 
between those courts to secret away substantial assets. Judge 
Christoffersenfs February 8 Order was intended to ensure that 
neither the Labrums nor their attorney had any opportunity to 
abscond with PCA's collateral until the issues respecting the 
collateral could be resolved in the bankruptcy court. PCA 
argues that Mr. Malouf understood the duty imposed upon him by 
that order and that he willfulJy and maliciously refused to 
obey the order for his own gain and, therefore, the trial 
court's finding and order of contempt and imposition of 
sanctions should be affirmed. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED PURSUANT TO 
RULES 9(e) AND 24(k), UTAH RULES OF 
APPELLATE PROCEDURE. 
Deficient Docketing Statement 
The Docketing Statement filed in this appeal is 
deficient in that none of the many orders and findings of fact 
from which Mr. Malouf seeks to appeal is attached to it as 
required by Rule 9, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rather, 
Mr. Malouf has attached only a partial transcript of the 
contempt proceedings. The statement of facts is not concise 
and is not limited to the facts material to review of the order 
of contempt. 
Burdensome Brief 
Rule 24(k) requires that all briefs on appeal be 
concise, presented with accuracy, logically arranged with 
proper headings and free from burdensome, irrelevant, 
immaterial or scandalous matter. PCA respectfully submits that 
Appellants1 brief filed in this appeal is rambling, confusing, 
not presented with accuracy or logically arranged and that 
these defects in the brief make the brief extremely burdensome 
to understand and respond to. 
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Mr. Malouf1s failure to follow the Rules of Appellate 
Procedure makes the litigalion of this appeal overly burdensome 
to Respondent and the Court. Many additional hours have been 
required of PCAfs counsel to extract what appears to be the 
salient points from Mr. Malouf1s rambling brief. Therefore, 
PCA respectfully requests that this court dismiss this appeal 
or in the alternative assess attorneys' fees to compensate PCA, 
all as contemplated by Rules 9(e) and 24(k), Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO ENTER 
THE ORDERS MR. MALOUF REFUSED TO OBEY. 
Of the two orders Mr. Malouf refused to obey, only 
Judge Christoffersen*s February 8 Order (the "February 8 
Order") instructing Mr. Malouf to hold the money in his 
possession for the benefit of the bankruptcy trustee was issued 
after the Labrums1 bankruptcy cases were begun. The bankruptcy 
cases were begun three days earlier. PCA argues that so long 
as Judge Christoffersen had jurisdiction over the person of Mr. 
Malouf and the controversy between PCA and the Labrums, he had 
jurisdiction to issue the order requiring Mr. Malouf to hold 
the money in his possession for the benefit of the trustee in 
the Labrums' bankruptcy cases. PCA contends that it was not 
necessary that Judge Christoffersen have jurisdiction over the 
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Labrums1 property in Mr. Maloufs possession to issue his 
February 8 Order. 
Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
Former Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4 (which was subsequently 
amended in 1986) provided in pertinent part as follows: 
The district court shall have original 
jurisdiction in all matters civil and 
criminal, not excepted in the Constitution 
and not prohibited by law . . . That 
district courts, or judges thereof, shall 
have power to issue writs of habeas corpus, 
mandamus, injunction, quo warranto, 
certiorari, prohibition, and other writs 
necessary to carry into effect their orders, 
judgments, and decrees. . . . 
Judge Christoffersen was not divested of jurisdiction 
over the dispute between PCA and the Labrums by the Labrums 
initiation of bankruptcy proceedings. The jurisdiction granted 
to the federal district courts over civil proceedings "related 
to cases under Title 11" is not exclusive. Title 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1334(b) provides as follows: 
Notwithstanding any act of Congress that 
confers exclusive jurisdiction on a court or 
courts other than the district courts, the 
district courts shall have original but not 
exclusive jurisdiction of all civil 
proceedings arising under Title 11, or 
arising in or related to cases under Title 
11. (Emphasis added). 
This court's recent decision in the case of Rogers v. 
Rogers, 671 P.2d 160 (Utah 1983) holding, under former 28 
U.S.C. § 1471, that the state courts do not have jurisdiction 
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over the property of a debtor in bankruptcy, is distinguishable 
from the instant case inasmuch as Judge Christoffersen's 
February 8 Order did not attempt to determine any rights in the 
fund of money at issue. Rather, this court should follow the 
precedent of Dority v. Dority, 645 P.2d 56 (Utah 1982), wherein 
the court held that a state court with jurisdiction over the 
parties and subject matter (the cause of action) may direct the 
parties1 conduct with respect to property within the parties' 
control but outside of the court's jurisdiction. The subject 
matter of this lawsuit was PCA's claims against the Labrums for 
conversion, fraud and failure to pay a promissory note. The 
fund of money in Mr. Malouf's control, while vitally important 
to the litigants, as was the real estate to the litigants in 
the Dority case, was not the subject matter of the suit. 
Therefore, when the lower court lost jurisdiction of the fund 
of money by virtue of the Labrums' bankruptcies, it did not 
lose jurisdiction of the subject matter of the case. 
Personal Jurisdiction 
In addition to subject matter jurisdiction over PCA's 
causes of action against the Labrums, Judge Christoffersen had 
personal jurisdiction over Mr. Malouf. Besides being the 
Labrums' attorney and having voluntarily appeared before the 
court as the Labrums' representative, Mr. Malouf was brought 
within the jurisdiction of the trial court through notice of 
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the court's temporary restraining order and order to show cause 
(regarding turnover) which restrained him, as attorney for the 
Labrums, from disbursing the Milk Diversion Proceeds. Mr. 
Malouf filed a motion to dissolve the temporary restraining 
order and order to show cause (R. 365) and was before the court 
on February 8, 1985, on that motion when Judge Christoffersen 
issued his February 8 Order. 
In addition, and as a separate ground for personal 
jurisdiction, Mr. Malouf was served with the court's writ of 
garnishment on January 2, 1985. Mr. Malouf also filed a motion 
to dissolve the writ on behalf of his clients and appeared 
before the court on that motion also on February 8, 1985. 
Mr. Malouf contends that the court below lost its 
jurisdiction over him when he allegedly answered Plaintiff's 
garnishment some weeks after being ordered to safely keep the 
Labrums' property in his possession for the benefit of the 
trustee in the Labrums' bankruptcy cases. The lower court's 
order, however, required Mr. Malouf to do much more than merely 
answer interrogatories. He was not released from his duties to 
fully comply with the lower court's order by half-heartedly 
complying with part of the order. Indeed, Mr. Malouf answered 
Plaintiff's interrogatories evasively and weeks after the 
deadline set by the lower court. Mr. Malouf's failure to 
timely and properly answer PCA's interrogatories is yet another 
potential independent ground for finding Mr. Malouf in 
contempt. 
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Mr. Malouf claims that there can be no jurisdiction 
over him because Judge Christoffersen's written order was 
allegedly not served upon him in accordance with Rule 2.9 
before it was signed by the court. Mr. Malouf relies on Larsen 
v. Larsen, 674 P.2d 116 (Utah 1983). In that case this Court 
held that the rules of practice require proposed judgments to 
be served upon opposing counsel before being presented to the 
court. The court found that if Rule 2.9 is not complied with, 
the judgment will not be deemed "filed as that term is used in 
Rule 58A(c) for purposes of taking an appeal" and that the time 
for taking an appeal therefore does not begin to run until the 
order is property "filed." Ld. at 117. The Larsen decision 
addresses only the appealability of the judgment and that is 
not an issue here. Rule 2.9 has no bearing upon the 
jurisdiction or the power of the lower court to issue orders 
nor does it bear upon the duties of attorneys and litigants to 
obey lawful orders of the court. In any event, the lower 
court's order was served on Mr. Malouf as required by Rule 2.9 
as evidenced by the attorneys1 certificate attached to the 
order. (R. 424). Mr. Malouf's accusation that PCA's 
counsel deliberately withheld the proposed order from him until 
it was signed was stricken by Judge Christoffersen as 
scandalous and impertinent. (R. 444). 
Even assuming arguendo that Mr. Malouf did not receive 
a copy of the order before it was signed, he cannot say that he 
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had no duty to obey the order. He certainly had notice of the 
order inasmuch as he was present at the hearing when the order 
was given. Furthermore, he came before the court on an 
objection to the form of the order under local Rule 2.9 and 
presumably under Rule 7(b)(2), Ut. R. Civ. P., after the order 
was executed. (R. 426). Rule 7(b)(2), Ut. R. Civ. P., 
provides that "any order made without notice to the adverse 
party may be vacated or modified without notice by the judge 
who made it, or may be vacated or modified on notice." It was 
Mr. Malouffs contention that the order should be narrowed to 
apply only to a limited amount of Defendants1 property in his 
possession. Upon consideration of Mr. Malouffs objection to 
the order, Judge Christoffersen reaffirmed the initial order 
in its entirety, evidencing an intent to have Mr. Malouf safely 
keep any and all of the Labrums1 property in his possession for 
the bankruptcy trustee. 
In ordering Mr. Malouf to hold the Defendants1 
property in his possession for the trustee appointed in their 
bankruptcy cases, Judge Christoffersen was exercising his 
jurisdiction over Mr. Malouf in the civil proceeding between 
PCA and the Defendants. In issuing his order, Judge 
Christoffersen did not attempt to determine any rights in or 
the status of the property in Mr. Malouf s possession. Judge 
Christoffersen recognized that only the bankruptcy court can 
determine those issues in light of the grant of excJusive 
jurisdiction contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1334(d) which provides: 
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[T]he district court in which a case under 
Title 11 is commenced or is pending shall 
have exclusive jurisdiction of all of the 
property, wherever located, of the debtor as 
of the commencement of such case, and of the 
estate. 
The filing of the petition in bankruptcy does not void 
garnishment proceedings begun before the filing. Matter of 
Georgia Steele, Inc., 25 B.R. 781 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1982). It 
follows that neither does it void a temporary restraining order 
and order to show cause why property should not be turned over 
to a secured creditor before bankruptcy. In light of the 
language of § 1334(b) and (d) , this court should rule that 
Judge Christoffersen had jurisdiction to deny the Labrums1 
motion to dissolve the writ of garnishment and to order Mr. 
Malouf to hold the property in his possession for the benefit 
of the trustee appointed in the Labrums1 bankruptcy cases 
pending a resolution in the bankruptcy court as to who should 
have the money. 
The present case is analagous to the case of Dority v. 
Dority, supra. In that case the court held that where a court 
of the State of Utah has personal jurisdiction over a party the 
court may compel compliance with its orders to convey 
out-of-state real property even though the state court has no 
jurisdiction to directly affect title to property located in 
another state. Id,, at 58. Here, Judge Christof fersen used his 
equitable power to facilitate the orderly transfer of a dispute 
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concerning the effect of PCA's claimed security interest and 
the garnishment order to the bankruptcy forum. Judge 
Christoffersen had all the jurisdiction necessary to make the 
limited order he made. 
Effect of Automatic Stay 
Mr. Malouf contends that the bankruptcy automatic stay 
imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362 deprived Judge Christoffersen of 
jurisdiction to enter his February 8 Order. Clearly, § 362 has 
nothing to do with jurisdiction. That section is merely a stay 
of "proceedings against a debtor or against property of the 
estate". Inasmuch as Judge Christoffersen1s order did not 
attempt to determine any rights, in the Labrums1 property in 
Mr. Malouffs possession and merely instructed Mr. Malouf to 
preserve the property in his possession for the benefit of the 
trustee appointed in the Labrums1 bankruptcy cases (something 
that Mr. Malouf was required to do in any event under 11 U.S.C. 
§ 521 and 11 U.S.C. § 542 of the Bankruptcy Code) it cannot be 
said that Judge Christoffersen1s order was against the debtors 
or against the property of the debtor's estate. See In re 
Laird, 6 B.R. 273, 275-276 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980) (order of 
state court in attachment and garnishment proceedings creating 
fund to be held by the state court pending determination of 
rights therein of debtor and competing creditors in bankrutpcy 
court not violative of automatic stay because order not 
directed against the debtor within the meaning of § 362). 
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In the alternative, if Judge Christoffersen and/or PCA 
violated the automatic stay imposed by 11 U.SeC. § 362 by the 
issuance of the February 8 Order, this court should find that 
it is no defense to a finding of contempt. Rather, the Labrums 
must seek redress from the bankruptcy court which has authority 
to vindicate itself if the stay has been violated. Of course 
the Labrums will be hard pressed to show they were injured by 
Judge Christoffersen1s February 8 Order inasmuch as all 
property, whether exempt or not, should be turned over to the 
control of the bankruptcy trustee at the commencement of the 
bankruptcy case. 11 U.S.C. § 521 and 11 U.S.C. § 545. See 
also In re Thomas Kerr, No. 84C-03028, Slip. Op. at 22 (August 
4, 1986)(even property claimed exempt by the debtors is 
property of the estate subject to the control of the bankruptcy 
trustee). This Court should rule that the Labrums' or Mr. 
Malouf's remedies for any alleged violation of the bankruptcy 
stay are limited to those ordered by the bankrutpcy court and 
will not be considered in this appeal. 
POINT III 
THE ORDERS MR. MALOUF REFUSED TO OBEY WERE 
LAWFUL. 
An order is lawful if the order issued is within the 
jurisdiction of the court and is in proper form. See Mellor v. 
Cook, 597 P.2d 882, 884 (Utah 1979); Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, 
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580 Po2d 1090, 1092 (Utah 1978). Inasmuch as "an order 
includes every direction of a court", Rule (7)(b)(2) Ut. R. 
Civ. P. , an order is in proper form if it is clear and 
understandable. See Foreman v. Foreman, 111 Utah 72, 176 P. 2d 
144, 148-149 (1946). In Foreman the court interpreted former 
§ 104-42-1 Utah Code Ann. (1943) which provides as follows: 
Every direction of a court or judge, made or 
entered in writing and not included in a 
judgment, is denominated an order. An 
application for an order is a motion. 
In interpreting that former statute, the court found 
that a minute entry was a sufficient order on which to ground a 
finding of contempt and that an order need not be "made in 
writing". The court found that a minute entry satisfied the 
language that an order be "entered in writing". 
Since Foreman, former § 104-42-1 has been repealed and 
replaced by Rule 7(b)(2) which does not require that an order 
be "in writing" at all; rather, Rule 7(b)(2) provides as 
follows: 
An order includes every direction of the 
court including a minute order made and 
entered in writing and not included in a 
judgment. (Emphasis added). 
Mr. Malouf contends on appeal that the lower court's 
orders were not lawful because they should be reversed on 
appeal for various alleged procedural defects. Nevertheless 
the myriad issues raised by Mr. Malouf respecting the 
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correctness of the issuance of the writ of garnishment or Judge 
Christoffersen•s refusal to vacate the writ have no bearing on 
Mr. Malouf's duty to comply with the command of the writ to 
hold and not disburse Defendant's property in his possession 
pending further order of the court or Judge Christoffersen's 
later order that Mr. Malouf hold and safely keep the property 
in his possession for the benefit of the trustee appointed in 
the Labrums* bankruptcy cases. Orders issued by a court with 
jurisdiction over the subject matter and persons must be obeyed 
until reversed by orderly and proper proceedings. Nelson v. 
Steiner, 279 F.2d 944, 948 (7th Cir. 1960); see also In re 
Petro, 18 B.R. 566, 568 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982) (invalidity of 
order, no defense to contempt charge). To hold otherwise would 
invite chaos and open disregard of lower court orders. 
Therefore, Mr. Malouf's assertions that the orders of the court 
are procedurally defective are irrelevant to the issues on 
appeal. Meverthelss they are addressed below. 
Mr. Malouf argues that the writ of garnishment was not 
a lawful order of the court because it was founded on a money 
judgment which was either improperly entered as a violation of 
the one action rule or not a final order or violative of the 
Labrums' exemption rights. Mr. Malouf relies on the case In re 
Thomas, 56 Utah 315, 190 P.952 (1920). The Court in Thomas 
refused to hold a lawyer in contempt for advising his client to 
resist the efforts of a Salt Lake County Sheriff attempting to 
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open a safety deposit box pursuant to an order of garnishment 
issued by the district court of Salt Lake County. The Court in 
Thomas said: 
While it is the duty of attorneys at law, 
who are officers of the court, to promptly 
obey all lawful orders of the court and to 
advise their clients when called on for 
advice to obey them, yet it is also their 
duty, in case a reasonable doubt exists 
respecting the jurisdiction of the court, or 
that the order in question was improvidently 
made, to preserve and protect the legal 
rights of their clients by assailing any 
order in a proper manner and at the proper 
time. Id. at 955. (Emphasis added). 
The Court in Thomas noted that the attorney in that 
case had taken steps to bring the matter before the district 
court in the proper manner but had not had sufficient time to 
do so when he gave his advice to his client. The court found 
that the advice to refuse to comply was given in good faith 
and, therefore, not contumacious. No such facts exist in the 
present case and, therefore, Mr. Malouf's reliance on Thomas is 
misplaced. 
Alleged Violation of One Action Rule 
Mr. Malouf argues that the money judgment in this case 
was precluded by Utah Code Ann. § 78-37-1 (1953) popularly 
referred to as the "One Action Rule" which states: 
There can be one action for the recovery of 
any debt or the enforcement of any right 
secured solely by mortgage upon real estate 
which action must be in accordance with the 
provisions of this chapter. _ld. (Empasis 
added). 
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The statute is clearly not applicable in this case 
inasmuch as the Labrums1 debt to PCA was not secured solely by 
mortgage upon real estate but was secured in addition by 
security interests in virtually all of the debtors' personal 
property, including farming machinery, accounts, general 
intangibles and livestock. In the case of Kennedy v. Bank of 
Ephraim, 594 P.2d 881, 883-884 (Utah 1979) this court held that 
where a creditor's rights are not limited by § 78-37-1, because 
the collateral is personal property, then they are governed by 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-501 which allows a secured party a broad 
choice of remedies other than strict foreclosure. Ld. In the 
current case, PCA requested and received a money judgment and 
then proceeded to liquidate its collateral, both real and 
personal, by execution rather than foreclosure. With respect 
to the personal property, PCA clearly had the right to proceed 
in that manner. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-501 (4) . With resepct 
to the real property no statute is clearly applicable and, 
therefore, PCA argues that it had the right to proceed as under 
common law by waiving the security. In any event, if this 
court should find that the money judgment was improvidently 
entered, it should not be forgotten that neither the money 
judgment nor the writ of garnishment formed the basis of Judge 
Christoffersen1s February 8 Order. 
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Alleged Absence of Final Judgment 
Mr. Malouf contends that no writ of garnishment could 
be issued on the money judgment because the judgment was not a 
final order, inasmuch as PCA's claims for conversion and fraud 
had not been determined. Rule 62 Ut. R. Civ. P. provides in 
pertinent part: 
Execution or other proceedings to enforce a 
judgment may be issued immediately upon the 
entry of a judgment, unless the court in its 
discretion and on such conditions for the 
security of the adverse party as are proper, 
otherwise directs. 
The issue then is whether or not the money judgment 
granted PCA was entered. Rule 58A Ut. R. Civ. P. provides as 
A judgment is complete and shall be deemed 
entered for all purposes, except for 
creation of a lien on real property, when 
the same is signed and filed as hereinabove 
provided. The clerk shall immediately make 
a notation of the judgment in the register 
of actions and the judgment docket. 
Clearly PCAfs money judgment was entered in this case inasmuch 
as it was signed by the judge and filed. 
Rule 64D provides in pertinent part as follows: 
After judgment a writ of garnishment is 
available in aid of execution to satisfy a 
money judgment. Rule 64D(a)(ii) Ut. R. Civ. 
Mr. Malouf asserts that a garnishment cannot be had 
except upon a "final judgment". However, nothing in the 
applicable rules requires that a judgment on which a 
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garnishment is based be "final" and hence appealable as of 
right under Rule 54(b) Ut. R. Civ. P. 
Rule 69(a) Ut. R. Civ. P. provides as follows? 
Process to enforce a judgment shall be by a 
writ of execution unless the court otherwise 
directs, which may be issued at any time 
within eight (8) days after the entry of the 
judgment, except as execution may be stayed 
pursuant to Rule 62, either in the county in 
which judgment was rendered or in any county 
in which a transcript thereof has been filed 
and docketed in the office of the clerk for 
the district court. 
Rule 64D(d) provides as follows: 
After the entry of a judgment requiring the 
payment of money, the clerk of any court 
from which execution therein may be issued 
shall issue a writ or writs of garnishment, 
without the necessity for an undertaking, 
upon the filing of an affidavit of the 
judgment creditor: 
(i) Identifying the persons sought 
to be charged as a garnishee; 
(ii) Stating that the personal 
property sought to be garnished is 
non-exempt; and 
(iii) Stating whether such property 
consists, in whole or in part, of earnings 
from personal services as heretofore defined 
in (e)(iv) of this Rule. 
Clearly, all the procedural due process required for 
the issuance of the writ of garnishment at issue in this case 
was accorded the Labrums. Judge Christoffersen, in an effort 
to assure that the Labrums were treated fairly, granted a stay 
of all garnishment and execution proceedings pending review of 
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the Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration, Upon review Judge 
Christof fersen vacated the stay and authorized PCA to move to 
collect the judgment. 
Alleged Exemption Claims 
Mr. Malouf asserts that the writ of garnishment served 
upon him on January 2, 1985, is overbroad in its attachment 
inasmuch as it does not exclude, on its face, property of the 
debtors which is exempt from garnishment. Mr. Malouf relies on 
Rule 64D(a)(iii) which reads as follows: 
A writ may be used to levy upon or effect 
the accrued credits, chattels, goods, 
effects, chooses in action, money and other 
personal property and rights to property of 
defendant in the possession of a third 
person, or under the control or constituting 
a performance obligation of any third 
person, whether due or yet to become due at 
the time of service of the writ of 
garnishment, which are not exempt from 
garnishment or execution under any 
applicable provisions of state or federal 
law. 
Under Rule 64D the writ of garnishment served on Mr. 
Malouf clearly did not attach property in his possession that 
was truly exempt. However, Mr. Malouf has made no credible 
factual showing that the funds in his possession, which he 
spent in violation of the garnishment and Judge 
Christoffersen1s orders, were in fact exempt under applicable 
provisions of state or federal law. The record is wholly 
devoid of any facts to which state or federal law may be 
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applied to determine whether the funds in Mr- Malouf's 
possession qualified as exempt under those laws. The record is 
devoid of any evidence of a bona fide pension plan in which the 
funds in Mr. Malouf's possession were deposited. Rather, Judge 
Wahlquist found that he could "find little persuasive evidence 
at all to support the contention that there does exist and did 
exist earlier before the bankruptcy started a pension fund 
arrangement". (R. 523). The burden is on the Labrums to prove 
the existence of a bona fide pension plan. Geisy-Walker Co. v. 
Briggs, 49 Utah 205, 162 P.876 (1916). 
Mr. Malouf relies on the fact that in his answer to 
PCA's garnishment he claimed that the property in his 
possession was exempt and that the answer was not contraverted 
by PCA. However, PCA had no opportunity to contr avert Mr. 
Malouf's answer in the state court proceedings because the 
answer was served two months after the Labrums had commenced 
their bankruptcy cases and the state court no longer had any 
jurisdiction to determine whether or not the funds in Mr. 
Malouf's possession were exempt. By the time Mr. Malouf had 
answered PCA's garnishment the issue of exemptions had moved 
from the state court to the bankruptcy court with no showing 
having been made in the state court that the funds attached by 
the garnishment, and the subject of Judge Christoffersen's 
February 8 Order, were exempt. Indeed, on February 8, 1985, 
when Judge Christoffersen was confronted with Mr. Malouf's 
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claim of exempt property, he ordered Mr. Malouf to hold the 
property in his possession for the benefit of the trustee so 
the issue of exemptions could be determined in the bankruptcy 
court. Mr. Malouf refused to comply with that order and hence 
was found in contempt. It is worth noting that of the 
$21,260.12 taken by Mr. Malouf only $5,360.12 was taken after 
he answered PCAfs garnishment. Most of the money was taken 
within a few weeks of Judge Christoffersen's explicit order to 
Mr. Malouf to hold the money for the trustee. 
POINT IV 
THE GARNISHMENT AND JUDGE CHRISTOFFERSEN'S 
FEBRUARY 8 ORDER WERE NEVER RENDERED MOOT. 
Mr. Malouf argues that he should not be held in 
contempt for either the garnishment or Judge Christoffersenfs 
February 8 Order because both of those orders were rendered 
moot during the pendency of the Labrums' Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
cases. Mr. Malouf asserts that Judge Christoffersen1s February 
8 Order did not require him to transfer anything to the trustee 
but merely to hold it for the benefit of the trustee and did 
not specify how long he should hold the money and, therefore, 
he cannot be held in contempt for refusing to transfer the 
property to the trustee. Mr. Malouffs contentions are 
falicious. During the bankruptcy proceedings, the trustee 
requested that Mr. Malouf turnover the funds in his possession. 
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Mr. Malouf refused to comply with the trustee's request. In 
addition, Mr. Malouf was ordered to transfer all of the money 
in his possession to the trustee by the Honorable John H. 
Allen, United States Bankruptcy Judge. (R. 493). On July 19, 
1985, he partially complied with Judge Allen's order by 
transferring $41,299.88 to the trustee, but failed to transfer 
$5,360.12, which he retained. Under 11 U.S.C. § 521 (debtor's 
duties) and 11 U.S.C. § 542 (turnover of property to the 
estate), Mr. Malouf was required to turnover the property he 
held for the benefit of the trustee to the trustee without the 
necessity of any order or request to do so. In addition, Judge 
Christoffersen made it clear at the February 8 hearing that the 
money was "to be held for the trustee to make an adjudication 
under the bankruptcy of whether—or as to how those assets may 
be used" (transcript at p. 17, lines 19-25) and that the money 
in Mr. Malouf's possession "either goes to the trustee, or if 
you want to argue about whether they are partnership assets, 
whether you can proceed against them". (Transcript at p. 19, 
lines 11-17). 
Trustee's Alleged Waiver 
Mr. Malouf baldly asserts that the trustee waived any 
interest the trustee may have had in the funds in Mr. Malouf fs 
possession. There is no evidence of any waiver in the record. 
To the contrary the trustee joined in PCA's order to show cause 
why Mr. Malouf should not be held in contempt. (R. 458-459). 
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Mr. Malouf asserts that his clients claimed the funds in his 
possession as exempt in the bankruptcy proceedings and that no 
one objected and therefore they are exempt under local Rule 25, 
Bankruptcy Rules, and, therefore, not property of the 
bankruptcy estate. Mr. Malouffs assertion fails on every 
level. Mr. Malouf's clients did not properly claim the funds 
in his possession as exempt, they did not even reveal the 
amount of those funds in their schedules. (Def. Ex. 2). 
Similarly, Mr. Malouf's contentions that his clients' 
discharge in bankruptcy renders the issue moot is without 
merit. The debtors' discharge clearly does not work to divest 
the bankruptcy estate of its interest in the debtor's property. 
The affect of discharge is explained in 11 U.S.C. § 524 and 
does not deal with the estate's interest in the debtor's 
property at all. Discharge may occur soon after the debtor's 
bankruptcy begins and years before final distribution of the 
debtor's property to the debtor's creditors under 11 U.S.C. 
§ 726. The Labrums' Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases are still 
proceeding and, as evidenced by the trustee's joinder in the 
contempt proceedings, the trustee is still trying to assemble 
the Labrums' property for distribution to the Labrums' 
creditors. (R. 458-459). 
Judge Allen has in fact heard argument as to the 
debtors' claimed exemptions and has taken the matter under 
advisement. This court should rule that the bankruptcy court 
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is the only forum with jurisdiction to determine the issue 
after the debtors commenced their bankruptcy in February of 
1985. The court should rule that the Labrums1 claims to 
exemptions under either state or federal law do not raise a 
substantial issue of defense to the charges against Mr. Malouf 
for contempt. Indeed, if Mr. Malouf is permitted to abscond 
with property of the bankruptcy estate, and property in which 
PCA claims a security interest, before the issues of claimed 
exemptions and security interests can be determined in the 
bankruptcy court, Mr. Malouf's actions will make the bankruptcy 
court's determination moot and PCA's action in the state court 
moot. Judge Christoffersen made his February 8 Order to 
prevent that from happening. 
POINT V 
MR. MALOUF'S REFUSAL TO OBEY THE WRIT OF 
GARNISHMENT AND JUDGE CHRISTOFFERSEN•S 
FEBRUARY 8 ORDER CONSTITUTES CONTEMPT. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-1 (1953) provides in pertinent 
part: 
The following acts or omissions in respect 
to a court or proceedings therein are 
contempts of the authority of the court: 
• * • 
(3) Misbehavior in office or other 
willful neglect or violation of duty by an 
attorney, counsel, clerk, sheriff, or other 
person appointed or elected to perform a 
judicial or ministerial service. 
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(4) Deceit, or abuse of the process or 
proceedings of the court by a party to an 
action or special proceeding. 
(5) Disobedience of any lawful 
judgment, order or process of the court. 
Similarly, Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-5(4) (1953) provides 
that "every court has power to compel obedience to its orders". 
This court has repeatedly recognized the power given courts to 
issue orders and see that their orders are fulfilled. See e.g. 
Mellor v. Cook, 597 P.2d 882 (Utah 1979); Foreman v. Foreman, 
111 Utah 72, 176 P.2d 44 (1946). Under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-32-1, "[D]isobedience of any lawful order, or process of 
the court" is a contempt of the court's authority. Where a 
person is found guilty of contempt, § 78-32-10 authorizes the 
court to both fine and imprison the contemner. In addition, 
§ 78-32-11 authorizes the court to add to the penalty of fine 
and imprisonment and order the contemner to pay the aggrieved 
party his damages, costs and expenses. 
The power of the court to find one in contempt and 
impose the above-described penalties is sustained in the case 
law. In State v. Giles, 576 P.2d 876, 878 (Utah 1978), this 
Court stated: 
[A] refusal to abide by an order made 
against a party to an action in favor of the 
opposing party is civil contempt and 
sanctions may be imposed to compel 
obedience. 
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In Bradshaw v. Kershaw, 627 P.2d 528, 530 (Utah 1981), 
the Court explained thai three specific sanctions may be 
imposed for contempt: Punishment, which includes a fine and 
imprisonment; indemnification, for actual loss or injury; and 
coercion, which includes imprisonment until the contemner 
complies with the court's order. Furthermore the trial court 
has considerable discretion in determining the penalty for 
contempt. Kessimakis, supra, at 1092. 
In order for the court to impose these sanctions for 
disobedience of its orders, the person given the order must 
have known the duty imposed upon him, he must have had the 
ability to comply with the order, and he must have willfully 
and knowingly refused to comply. Coleman v. Coleman, 664 P.2d 
1155 (Utah 1983). The burden is on Mr. Malouf to show that a 
finding of contempt is not proper in light of the three 
elements. Id. at 1157. Mr. Malouf has utterly failed in that 
burden. In Mellor v. Cook, 597 P.2d 882, 883-884 (Utah 1979), 
this court explained that the critical questions making up the 
proper analysis in contempt proceedings are: first, was the 
order lawful; and second, does the conduct constitute contempt 
of court. It has already been shown that the orders at issue 
were lawful. At the very least, Judge Christoffersen's 
explicit order on February 8, 1985, to Mr. Malouf to hold and 
safely keep the property in his possession pending resolution 
of the issues between the parties in bankruptcy court cannot be 
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assailed as a lawful exercise of his jurisdiction over the 
dispute between the parties. Therefore, it remains only to 
determine whether Mr. Malouffs conduct was contumacious, by 
examining whether he knew the duty imposed by the court and 
whether he knowingly refused to comply. Mr. Malouf has not met 
his burden on appeal in attacking Judge Wahlquist's findings 
that Mr. Malouf knew the duty imposed by the court's orders and 
knowingly refused to comply. Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P. 2d 
1068 (Utah 1985). On appeal Mr. Malouf has the burden of 
marshaling all of the evidence in support of the trial's 
court's findings and then demonstrating that viewed in the 
light most favorable to the court below the evidence is 
insufficient to support the findings. I_d. at 1070. Mr. Malouf 
has not begun to carry that heavy burden. 
Mr. Maloufs acts, coupled with this knowledge of the 
duty imposed upon him, show that he knowingly and willfully 
refused to comply with the trial court's orders. There can be 
no question that Mr. Malouf was capable of full compliance with 
the orders, nevertheless, Mr. Malouf chose to act contrary to 
the orders in clear contempt of the authority of the lower 
court. 
Furthermore, Mr. Malouf, has taken upon himself the 
responsibility of being an officer of the court, and has a 
heightened responsibility to obey the lower court's orders. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-26 (1953) states, in pertinent part: 
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[I]t is the duty of the an attorney and 
counselor to maintain the respect due the 
courts of justice and judicial officers. 
Willful refusal to comply with the lower court's 
orders is nothing less than lack of respect for the courts of 
this state. If our judicial system is to maintain its 
integrity, it is imperative that officers of the court be the 
first to assure that the process and proceedings of the court 
are not ignored. Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-1(3) (1953) labels as 
contempt: "misbehavior in office, or other willful neglect or 
violation of a duty by an attorney." Similarly, "deceit, abuse 
of the process or proceedings of the court, by a party to an 
action or special proceeding is contempt." 
There can be no question that Mr. Malouf acted in 
willful disobedience of a lawful order and thereby violated his 
appointment as an attorney. Under the facts of this case it is 
clear that Mr. Malouf has acted contumaciously, that sanctions 
are appropriate and that PCA and the trustee of the Labrums1 
bankruptcy cases have been injured by his misbehavior. 
POINT VI 
ALL ISSUES RESPECTING PCAfS FORECLOSURE ON 
THE LABRUMS' REAL PROPERTY ARE MOOT. 
On November 19, 1984, a sheriff's sale was conducted 
whereby PCAfs mortgages on the Labrums' real property were 
foreclosed. (R. 235-238). Judge Christofferson refused to 
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stay the sale on that date. On appeal, the Labrums assert 
Judge Christof fersen erred in refusing to stay the sale in 
light of certain alleged procedural defects in the conduct of 
the sale. On May 7, 1985, the Federal Land Bank of Sacramento 
foreclosed its liens on the same real property, which liens 
were senior to PCA's. The subsequent foreclosure by the senior 
lienholder moots all issues as to the propriety of Judge 
Christofferson1s order refusing to stay PCA's foreclosure. 
True and correct copies of the Certificate of Sale of Real 
Estate and Sheriff's Deeds to the Federal Land Bank are set 
forth in the Addendum to this Brief. 
POINT VII 
THAT PART OF JUDGE WAHLQUIST'S ORDER 
REQUIRING MR- MALOUF TO PAY $2.1,260.12 TO 
THE LABRUMS1 BANRKUPTCY TRUSTEE IS MOOT. 
On November 26, 1985, as part of his order finding Mr. 
Malouf in contempt, Judge Wahlquist ordered Mr. Malouf to pay 
$21,260.12 to the trustee of the Labrums' bankruptcy estates. 
Judge Wahlquist found that that sum had been disbursed from Mr. 
Malouffs trust account between February 8, 1985, and June 
18,1985, after the Labrums1 individual bankruptcies had begun 
and contrary to Judge Christofferson's orders. Mr. Malouf now 
seeks return of that money by this appeal. 
The money paid to the trustee of the Labrums' 
bankruptcy cases was and is now part of the Labrums' bankruptcy 
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estates and under the exclusive jurisdiction of the bankruptcy 
court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(d). Neither Judge 
Christofferson's nor Judge Wahlquist's orders purport to 
adjudicate the trustee's ultimate rights in the money in his 
possession. The issue of what rights PCA, the trustee, Mr. 
Malouf and Mr. Malouf's clients have in the money was reserved 
by Judge Christofferson for decision in the bankruptcy court. 
Mr. Malouf should go there to seek relief. 
Furthermore, prior to Judge Christofferson1s order to 
Mr. Malouf to hold and safely keep the money in his possession 
for the benefit of the trustee and prior to Judge Wahlquist's 
order of contempt, Mr. Malouf was ordered by Judge Allen of the 
United States bankruptcy court to turn over the same funds and 
more to the trustee. Mr. Malouf has refused to comply with 
Judge Allen's order. In addition, 11 U.S.C. §§ 521(4) and 542 
of the United States Bankruptcy Code impose a statutory 
obligation on Mr. Malouf to turnover the money at issue to the 
trustee. Copies of those sections together with a copy of 
11U.S.C. § 101(10) defining the term "custodian" used in § 542 
are set forth in the Addendum: to this Brief. See also Matter 
of Georgia Steel, Inc., 25 B.R. 781, 786 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1982) 
(garnishee not "custodian" within meaning of § 542). 
In sum, even if Judge Wahlquist's contempt order were 
to be overturned, Mr. Malouf could not recover the money in the 
trustee's possession except by instigating and prevailing in 
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appropriate proceedings in the bankruptcy court. This appeal 
will have no effect on the bankruptcy proceeding. 
POINT VIII 
APPELLANTS' REQUESTED RELIEF SHOULD BE 
DENIED. 
This Court should not reverse Judge Wahlquist's order 
of contempt. Judge Wahlquist's order is amply supported by the 
written findings of fact and conclusions of law that the 
Labrums failed to attach to their Docketing Statement or their 
brief. 
This Court should not require the trial court to order 
the return of the money paid to the trustee in the Labrums1 
bankruptcy cases because the trial court has no jurisdiction 
over property of the Labrums1 bankruptcy estates and the 
bankruptcy court will decide whether the money is property of 
the estate or not. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(d). This Court should not 
require the trial court to order return of the attorney's fees 
paid to PCA pursuant to the contempt order because the 
appropriateness of the fees is supported by Judge Wahlquist's 
findings. 
This Court should not "require the trial court to rule 
that the funds claimed as exempt under the Utah Exemptions Act 
are exempt property" because the trial court has no 
jurisdiction to do so in light of the Labrums' bankruptcy 
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cases, and on the further ground that the trial court has 
issued no order respecting the character of the "funds claimed 
as exempt.,s The appropriate characterization of the funds in 
Mr. Malouf s possession as exempt or nonexempt is an issue 
wholly irrelevant to the issue of Mr. Maloufrs contempt. Judge 
Christofferson ordered Mr, Malouf to hold the funds pending a 
determination in the bankruptcy court of the merits of his 
clients' claimed exemptions, which he failed to do. 
This Court should not set aside the partial summary 
judgment because the partial summary judgment is not a final 
order appealable order. Alternatively, this Court should not 
set the partial summary judgment aside because the issue of the 
Labrums' liability under the judgment is moot in light of their 
discharge in bankruptcy and the lower court's finding of 
contempt does not depend on the judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
PCA respectfully requests that this Court dismiss this 
appeal on the grounds that Appellants have failed to comply 
with Rules 9(e) and 24(k), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
In the alternative, PCA requests that this Court dismiss all 
issues pertaining to the interlocutory orders entered in the 
court below on the grounds that permission to appeal has not 
been granted pursuant to Rule 5, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. This Court should find that all issues pertaining 
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to Judge Christofferson's refusal to stay PCA's foreclosure and 
sale of the Labrums1 real property are moot in light of the 
subsequent foreclosure of Federal Land Bank's senior liens. 
This Court should rule that all issues pertaining to the return 
of money Mr. Malouf has paid to the trustee of the Labrums1 
bankruptcy cases are moot in light of the fact that only the 
bankruptcy court has jurisdiction over those funds which are 
property of the estate and the bankruptcy court will determine 
that issue. PCA respectfully requests that this Court affirm 
Judge Wahlquist's order and finding of contempt on the grounds 
that no substantial issues have been raised respecting Judge 
Wahlquist's finding of contempt or the propriety of the 
sanctions imposed thereunder. 
DATED this 19th day of November, 1986. 
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I hereby certify that on the 19th day of November, 
1986, I caused four copies of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
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70A-9-5U1. JLieiatlll — r r w c u u * t •*»*«,«. ~ „ _„_ 
both real and personal property. 
(1) When a debtor is in default under a security agreement, a secured 
party has the rights and remedies provided in this part and except 
as limited by subsection (3) those provided in the security agree-
ment. He may reduce his claim to judgment, foreclose or otherwise 
enforce the security interest by any available judicial procedure. If 
the collateral is documents the secured party may proceed either 
as to the documents or as to the goods covered thereby. A secured 
party in possession has the rights, remedies and duties provided 
in section 70A-9-207. The rights and remedies referred to in this 
subsection are cumulative. 
(2) After default, the debtor has the rights and remedies provided in 
this part, those provided in the security agreement and those pro-
vided in section 70A-9-207. 
(3) To the extent that they give rights to the debtor and impose dut 
on the secured party, the rules stated in the subsections referr 
to below may not be waived or varied except as provided w> 
respect to compulsory disposition of collateral (subsection (3) 
section 70A-9-504 and section 70A-9-505) and with respect 
redemption of collateral (section 70A-9-506) but the parties may 
agreement determine the standards by which the fulfillment 
these rights and duties is to be measured if such standards are n 
manifestly unreasonable: 
(a) subsection (2) of section 70A-9-502 and subsection (2) 
section 70A-9-504 in so far as they require accounting i 
surplus proceeds of collateral; 
(b) subsection (3) of section 70A-9-504 and subsection (1) 
section 70A-9-505 which deal with disposition of collateral; 
(c) subsection (2) of section 70A-9-505 which deals with acce 
tance of collateral as discharge of obligation; 
(d) section 70A-9-506 which deals with redemption of collater; 
and 
(e) subsection (1) of section 70A-9-507 which deals with tl 
secured party's liability for failure to comply with this part 
(4) If the security agreement covers both real and personal propert 
the secured party may proceed under this part as to the person, 
property or he may proceed as to both the real and the person 
property in accordance with his rights and remedies in respect ( 
the real property in which case the provisions of this part do n< 
apply. 
(5) When a secured party has reduced his claim to judgment the li< 
of any levy which may be made upon his collateral by virtue 
any execution based upon the judgment shall relate back to t) 
date of the perfection of the security interest in such collateral, 
judicial sale, pursuant to such execution, is a foreclosure of tl 
security interest by judicial procedure within the meaning of th 
section, and the secured party may purchase at the sale and then 
after hold the collateral free of any other requirements of th' 
chapter. 
1 
7S-3-4. Jurisdiction - Original and appellate -
Transfer of cases to drcuit court. 
The district court shall have original jurisdiction 
in all matters civil and criminal, not excepted in 
the Constitution and not prohibited by law; 
appellate jurisdiction from all inferior courts and 
tribunals, and a supervisory control of the same. 
The district courts, or any judges thereof, shall 
have power to issue writs of habeas corpus, 
mandamus, injunction, quo warranto, certiorari, 
prohibition, and other writs necessary to carry into 
effect their orders, judgments and decrees, and to 
give them a general control over inferior courts 
and tribunals within their respective jurisdictions. 
Under the general supervision of the chief judge of 
the judicial council and subject to policies 
established by the judicial council, cases filed in 
the district court, which arc also within concurrent 
jurisdiction of the circuit court, may, be 
transferred to the circuit court by the presiding 
judge of the district court in multiple judge 
districts, or the district court judge in single judge 
districts. The transfer of these cases may be made 
upon the court's own motion or upon the motion 
of either party for adjudication. When an order is 
made transferring a case, the court must transmit 
the pleadings and papers to the circuit court to 
which the case is transferred. The circuit court 
shall have the same jurisdiction as if the case had 
been originally commenced in the circuit court and 
any appeals from final judgments shall run to the 
district court as provided for in section 78-4-11 
unless the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari 
shall order the appeal heard by the Supreme 
Court. 
78-7-5. Powers of every court.—Every court has power : 
(1) To preserve and enforce order in its immediate presence. 
(2) To enforce order in the proceedings before it, or before a person 
empowered to conduct a judicial investigation under its authority. 
(3) To provide for the orderly conduct of proceedings before it or 
its officers. 
(4) To compel obedience to its judgments, orders and process, and to 
the orders of a judge out of court, in an action or proceeding pending 
therein. 
(5) To control in furtherance of justice the conduct of its ministerial 
officers, and of all other persons in any manner connected with a judicial 
proceeding before it in every matter pertaining thereto. 
(6) To compel the attendance of persons to testify in an action or 
proceeding pending therein, in the cases and manner provided by law. 
(7) To administer oaths in an action or proceeding pending therein, 
and in all other cases where it may be necessary in the exercise of its 
powers and duties. 
(8) To amend and control its process and orders so as to make them 
conformable to law and justice. 
(9) To devise and make new process and forms of proceedings, con-
sistent with law, necessary to carry into effect the powers and jurisdiction 
78-32-1. Acts and omissions constituting contempt.—The following 
acts or omissions in respect to a court or proceedings therein are contempts 
of the authority of the court: 
(1) Disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior toward the judge 
while holding the court, tending to interrupt the due course of a trial 
or other judicial proceeding. 
(2) Breach of the peace, boisterous conduct or violent disturbance, 
tending to interrupt the due course of a trial or other judicial proceeding. 
(3) Misbehavior in office, or other willful neglect or violation of duty 
by an attorney, counsel, clerk, sheriff, or other person appointed or elected 
to perform a judicial or ministerial service. 
(4) Deceit, or abuse of the process or proceedings of the court, by 
a party to an action or special proceeding. 
(5) Disobedience of any lawful judgment, order or process of the 
court. 
(6) Assuming to be an officer, attorney or counselor of a court, and 
acting as such without authority. 
(7) Rescuing any person or property in the custody of an officer by 
virtue of an order or process of such court. 
(8) Unlawfully detaining a witness or party to an action while going 
to, remaining at, or returning from, the court where the action is on 
the calendar for trial. 
(9) Any other unlawful interference with the process or proceedings 
of a court. 
(10) Disobedience of a subpoena duly served, or refusing to be sworn 
or to answer as a witness. 
(11) When summoned as a juror in a court, neglecting to attend or 
serve as such, or improperly conversing with a party to an action to be 
tried at such court, or with any other person, concerning the merits of 
such action, or receiving a communication from a party or other person 
in respect to it, without immediately disclosing the same to the court. 
(12) Disobedience by an inferior tribunal, magistrate or officer of 
the lawful judgment, order or process of a superior court, or proceeding 
in an action or special proceeding contrary to law, after such action or 
special proceeding is removed from the jurisdiction of such inferior 
tribunal, magistrate or officer. Disobedience of the lawful orders or 
process of a judicial officer is also a contempt of the authority of such 
officer. 
78-32-10. Judgment.—Upon the answer and evidence taken the court 
or judge must determine whether the person proceeded against is guilty 
of the contempt charged, and if it is adjudged that he is guilty of the 
contempt, a fine may be imposed upon him not exceeding $200, or he may 
be imprisoned in the county jail not exceeding thirty days, or he may be 
both fined and imprisoned; provided, however, that a justice of the peace 
may punish for contempt by a fine not to exceed $100 or by imprisonment 
for one day, or by both such fine and imprisonment. 
78-32-11. Damages to party aggrieved.—If an actual loss or injury to 
a party in an action or special proceeding, prejudicial to his rights therein, 
is caused by the contempt, the court, in addition to the fine or imprison-
ment imposed for the contempt or in place thereof, may order the person 
proceeded against to pay the party aggrieved a sum of money sufficient 
to indemnify him and to satisfy his costs and expenses; which order and 
the acceptance of money under it is a bar to an action by the aggrieved 
party for such loss and injury. 
78-37-1. Form of action — Judgment — Special execution. — There 
can be one action for the recovery of any debt or the enforcement of any 
right secured solely by mortgage upon real estate which action must be in 
accordance with the provisions of this chapter Judgment shall be given 
adjudging the amount due, with costs and disbursements, and the sale t>£ 
mortgaged property, or some part thereof, to satisfy said amount and ac-
cruing costs, and directing the sheriff to proceed and sell the same accord-
ing to the provisions of law relating to sales on execution, and a special 
execution or order of sale shall be issued for that purpose 
78-51-26. Duties of attorneys and counselors —11 is the duty of an 
attorney and counselor 
(1) To support the Constitution and the laws of the United States 
and of this s tate , 
(2) To maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial 
officers, 
(3) To counsel or maintain no other action, piocecding or defense 
than that which appears to him legal and just, excepting the defense of 
a person charged with a public offense, 
(4) To employ for the purposes of maintaining the causes confided 
to him such means only as are consistent with truth, and never to seek 
to mislead the judges by nn\ artifice or false statement of fact or law, 
(5) To maintain mwolatc the confidences and at every peril to 
himself to preserve the secrets, of his client, 
(6) To abstain from all offensne personality, and to advance no 
fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or a witness, unless 
required by the justice of the cause with u Inch he is charged , 
(7) Not to encourage cither the commencement or continuance of 
an action or proceeding from any corrupt niolixe oi passion or interest, 
(8) Never to reject for any consideration personal to himself the 
cause of the defenseless or the oppressed; and, 
(9) To comply with all duly approved rules and regulations pre-
scribed by the board of commissioners of the Utah state bar and to pay 
the fees provided by law 
SECTION 101 (11 U.S.C § 101) 
(10) "custodian" means— 
(A) receiver or trustee of any of the property of the 
debtor, appointed in a case or proceeding not under this 
title; 
(B) assignee under a general assignment for the benefit 
of the debtor's creditors; or 
(C) trustee, receiver, or agent under applicable law, or 
under a contract, that is appointed or authorized to take 
charge of property of the debtor for the purpose of enforc-
ing a hen against such property, or for the purpose of 
general administration of such property for the benefit of 
the debtor's creditors; 
Secton 104-42-1, O.C.A. 1943: 
Every direction of a court or judge
 f made or 
entered in writing and not included in a 
judgment, is denominated an order. An 
application for an order is a motion. 
As quoted in Foreman v. Foreman, 176 P.2d 144 (1946) . 
§ 362. Automatic stay. 
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a 
petition filed under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or an 
application filed under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Inves-
tor Protection Act of 1970 (15 XJ.S.C. 78eee(a)(3)), operates as 
a stay, applicable to ail entities, of— 
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the 
issuance or employment of process, of a judicial, adminis-
trative, or other action or proceeding against the debtor 
that was or could have been commenced before the com-
mencement of the case under this title, or to recover a 
claim against the debtor that arose before the commence-
ment of the case under this title; 
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against prop-
erty of the estate, of a judgment obtained before the com-
mencement of the case under this title; 
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate 
or of property from the estate or to exercise control over 
property of the estate; 
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against 
property of the estate; 
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against proper-
ty of the debtor any lien to the extent that such lien se-
cures a claim that arose before the commencement of the 
case under this title; 
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against 
the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case 
under this title; 
(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose 
before the commencement of the case under this title 
against any claim against the debtor; and 
(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding 
before the United States Tax Court concerning the debtor. 
(b) The filing of a petition under section 301, 302, or 303 of 
this title, or of an application under section 5(a)(3) of the 
Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C 
78eee(a)(3)), does not operate as a stay— 
(1) under subsection (a) of this section, of the com-
mencement or continuation of a criminal action or pro-
ceeding against the debtor, 
(2) under subsection (a) of this section, of the collection 
of alimony, maintenance, or support from property that is 
not property of the estate, 
(3) under subsection (a) of this section, of any act to 
perfect an interest in property to the extent that the trust-
ee's rights and powers are subject to such perfection un-
der section 546(b) of this title or to the extent that such 
act is accomplished within the period provided under sec-
tion 547(e)(2)(A) of this title; 
(4) under subsection (a)(1) of this section, of the com-
mencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a 
governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's 
police or regulatory power; 
(5) under subsection (a)(2) of this section, of the en-
forcement of a judgment, other than a money judgment, 
obtained in an action or proceeding by a governmental 
unit to enforce such governmental unit's police or regula-
tory power; 
(6) under subsection (a) of this section, of the setoff by 
a commodity broker, forward contract merchant, stock-
broker, financial institution, or securities clearing agency 
of any mutual debt and claim under or in connection with 
commodity contracts, as defined in section 761(4) of this 
title, forward contracts, or securities contracts, as defined 
in section 741(7) of this title, that constitutes the setoff of 
a claim against the debtor for a margin payment, as de-
fined in section 741(5) or 761(15) of this title, or settle-
ment payment, as defined in section 741(8) of this title, 
arising out of commodity contracts, forward contracts, or 
securities contracts against cash, securities, or other prop-
erty held by or due from such commodity broker, forward 
contract merchant, stockbroker, financial institution, or 
securities clearing agency to margin, guarantee, secure, or 
settle commodity contracts, forward contracts, or securi-
ties contracts; 
(7) under subsection (a) of this section, of the setoff by 
a repo participant, of any mutual debt and claim under or 
in connection with repurchase agreements that constitutes 
the setoff of a claim against the debtor for a margin pay-
ment, as defined in section 741(5) or 761(15) of this title, 
or settlement payment, as defined in section 741(8) of this 
title, arising out of repurchase agreements against cash, 
securities, or other property held by or due from such repo 
participant to margin, guarantee, secure or settle repur-
chase agreements; 
(8) under subsection (a) of this section, of the com-
mencement of any action by the Secretary of Housing and 
Urban Development to foreclose a mortgage or deed of 
trust in any case in which the mortgage or deed of trust 
held by the Secretary is insured or was formerly insured 
under the National Housing Act and covers property, or 
combinations of property, consisting of five or more living 
units; 
(9) under subsection (a) of this section, of the issuance 
to the debtor by a governmental unit of a notice of tax 
deficiency; or [sic] 
(9) * under subsection (a) of this section, of any act by a 
lessor to the debtor under a lease of nonresidential real 
property that has terminated by the expiration of the stat-
ed term of the lease before the commencement of or during 
a case under this title to obtain possession of such proper-
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sentment of a negotiable instrument and the giving of no-
tice of and protesting dishonor of such an instrument. 
(c) Except as provided in subsections (d), (e), and (f) of this 
section— 
(1) the stay of an act against property of the estate 
under subsection (a) of this section continues until such 
property is no longer property of the estate; and 
(2) the stay of any other act under subsection (a) of this 
section continues until the earliest of— 
(A) the time the case is closed; 
(B) the time the case is dismissed; or 
(C) if the case is a case under chapter 7 of this title 
concerning an individual or a case under chapter 9, 11, 
or 13 of this title, the time a discharge is granted or 
denied. 
(d) On request of a party in interest and after notice and a 
hearing, the court shall grant relief from the stay provided 
under subsection (a) of this section, such as by terminating, 
annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay— 
(1) for cause, including the lack of adequate protection 
of an interest in property under subsection (a) of this 
section of such party in interest; or 
(2) with respect to a stay of an act against property, 
if— 
(A) the debtor does not have an equity in such proper-
ty; and 
(B) such property is not necessary to an effective 
reorganization. 
(e) Thirty days after a request under subsection (d) of this 
section for relief from the stay of any act against property of 
the estate under subsection (a) of this section, such stay is 
terminated with respect to the party in interest making such 
request, unless the court, after notice and a hearing, orders 
such stay continued in effect pending the conclusion of, or as a 
result of, a final hearing and determination under subsection 
(d) of this section. A hearing under this subsection may be a 
preliminary hearing, or may be consolidated with the final 
hearing under subsection (d) of this section. The court shall 
order such stay continued in effect pending the conclusion of 
the final hearing under subsection (d) of this section if there is 
a reasonable likelihood that the party opposing relief from 
such stay will prevail at the conclusion of such final hearing. 
If the hearing under this subsection is a preliminary hearing, 
then such final hearing shall be commenced not later than thir-
ty days after the conclusion of such preliminary hearing. 
(f) Upon request of a party in interest, the court, with or 
without a hearing, shall grant such relief from the stay provid-
ed under subsection (a) of this section as is necessary to pre-
vent irreparable damage to the interest of an entity in proper-
ty, if such interest will suffer such damage before there is an 
opportunity for notice and a hearing under subsection (d) or 
concerning relief from the stay of any act under subsection (a) 
of this section— 
(1) the party requesting such relief has the burden of 
proof on the issue of the debtor's equity in property; and 
(2) the party opposing such relief has the burden of 
proof on all other issues. 
(h) An individual injured by any willful violation of a stay 
provided by this section shall recover actual damages, includ-
ing costs and attorneys' fees, and, in appropriate circum-
stances, may recover punitive damages. 
SECTION 521 (11 U.S.C. § 521) 
§ 521. Debtor's duties. The debtor shall— 
(1) file a list of creditors, and unless the court orders other-
wise, a schedule of assets and liabilities, a schedule of current 
income and current expenditures, and a statement of the debt-
or's financial affairs; 
(2) if an individual debtor's schedule of assets and liabilities 
includes consumer debts which are secured by property of the 
estate— 
(A) within thirty days after the date of the filing of a 
petition under chapter 7 of this title or on or before the 
date of the meeting of creditors, whichever is earlier, or 
within such additional time as the court, for cause, within 
such period fixes, the debtor shall file with the clerk a 
statement of his intention with respect to the retention or 
surrender of such property and, if applicable, specifying 
that such property is claimed as exempt, that the debtor 
intends to redeem such property, or that the debtor in-
tends to reaffirm debts secured by such property; 
( B ) within forty-five days after the filing of a notice of 
intent under this section, or within such additional time as 
the court, for cause, within such forty-five day period 
fixes, the debtor shall perform his intention with respect 
to such property, as specified by subparagraph (A) of this 
paragraph; and 
(C) nothing in subparagraphs (A) and (BJ) of this para-
graph shall alter the debtor's or the trustee's rights with 
regard to such property under this title; 
(3) if a trustee is serving in the case, cooperate with the 
trustee as necessary to enable the trustee to perform the trust-
ee's duties under this title; 
(4) if a trustee is serving in the case, surrender to the trustee 
all property of the estate and any recorded information, in-
cluding books, documents, records, and papers, relating to 
property of the estate, whether or not immunity is granted 
under section 344 of this title; and 
(5) appear at the hearing required under section 524(d) of 
this title. 
§ 524. Effect of discharge. 
(a) A discharge in a case under this title— 
(1) voids any judgment at any time obtained, to the 
extent that such judgment is a determination of the per-
sonal liability of the debtor with respect to any debt dis-
charged under section 727, 944, 1141, or 1328 of this title, 
whether or not discharge of such debt is waived; 
(2) operates as an injunction against the commencement 
or continuation of an action, the employment of process, 
or an act, to collect, recover or offset any such debt as a 
personal liability of the debtor, whether or not discharge 
of such debt is waived; and 
(3) operates as an injunction against the commencement 
or continuation of an action, the employment of process, 
or an act, to collect or recover from, or offset against, 
property of the debtor of the kind specified in section 
541(a)(2) of this title that is acquired after the commence-
ment of the case, on account of any allowable community 
claim, except a community claim that is excepted from 
discharge under section 523 or 1328(a)(1) of this title, or 
that would be so excepted, determined in accordance with 
the provisions of sections 523(c) and 523(d) of this title, in 
a case concerning the debtor's spouse commenced on the 
date of the filing of the petition in the case concerning the 
debtor, whether or not discharge of the debt based on such 
community claim is waived. 
(b) Subsection (a)(3) of this section does not apply if— 
(1)(A) the debtor's spouse is a debtor in a case under 
this title, or a bankrupt or a debtor in a case under the 
Bankruptcy Act, commenced within six years of the date 
of the filing of the petition in the case concerning the 
debtor; and 
(B) the court does not grant the debtor's spouse a 
discharge in such case concerning the debtor's spouse; or 
(2)(A) the court would not grant the debtor's spouse a 
discharge in a case under chapter 7 of this title concerning 
such spouse commenced on the date of the filing of the 
petition in the case concerning the debtor; and 
(B) a determination that the court would not so grant 
such discharge is made by the bankruptcy court within 
the time and in the manner provided for a determination 
under section 727 of this title of whether a debtor is 
granted a discharge. 
(c) An agreement between a holder of a claim and the debtor, 
the consideration for which, in whole or in part, is based on a 
debt that is dischargeable in a case under this title is enforcea-
ble only to any extent enforceable under applicable nonban-
kruptcy law, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived, 
only if— 
(1) such agreement was made before the granting of the 
discharge under section 727, 1141, or 1328 of this title; 
statement which advises the debtor that the agreement 
may be rescinded at any time prior to discharge or within 
sixty days after such agreement is filed with the court, 
whichever occurs later, by giving notice of rescission to 
the holder of such claim; 
(3) such agreement has been filed with the court and, if 
applicable, accompanied by a declaration or an affidavit of 
the attorney that represented the debtor during the pourse 
of negotiating an agreement under this subsection, which 
states that such agreement— 
(A) represents a fully informed and voluntary agree-
ment by the debtor; and 
(B) does not impose an undue hardship on the debtor 
or a dependent of the debtor; 
(4) the debtor has not rescinded such agreement at any 
time prior to discharge or within sixty days after such 
agreement is filed with the court, whichever occurs later, 
by giving notice of recission to the holder of such claim; 
(5) the provisions of subsection (d) of this section have 
been compiled with; and 
(6)(A) in a case concerning an individual who was not 
represented by an attorney during the course of negotiat-
ing an agreement under this subsection, the court ap-
proves such agreement as— 
(i) not imposing an undue hardship on the debtor or 
a dependent of the debtor; and 
(ii) in the best interest of the debtor. 
( B ) Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to the extent 
that such debt is a consumer debt secured by real prop-
erty, 
(d) In a case concerning an individual, when the court has 
determined whether to grant or not to grant a discharge under 
section 727, 1141, or 1328 of this title, the court shall hold a 
hearing at which the debtor shall appear in person. At such 
hearing, the court shall inform the debtor that a discharge has 
been granted or the reason why a discharge has not been grant-
ed. If a discharge has been granted and if the debtor desires to 
make an agreement of the kind specified in subsection (c) of 
this section, then at such hearing the court shall— 
(1) inform the debtor— 
(A) that such an agreement is not required under this 
title, under nonbankruptcy law, or under any agreement 
not made in accordance with the provisions of subsec-
tion (c) of this section; and 
( B ) of the legal effect and consequences of— 
(i) an agreement of the kind specified in subsection 
(c) of this section; and 
(ii) a default under such an agreement; 
desires to make complies with the requirements of subsec-
tion (cX6) of this subsection, if the consideration for such 
agreement is based in whole or in part on a consumer debt 
that is not secured by real property of the debtor. 
(e) Except as provided in subsection (a)(3) of this section, 
discharge of a debt of the debtor does not affect the liability of 
any other entity on, or the property of any other entity for, 
such debt. 
(f) Nothing contained in subsection (c) or (d) of this section 
prevents a debtor from voluntarily repaying any deb t 
SECTION 542 (11 U.S.C. § 542) 
§ 542. Turnover of property to the estate. 
(a) Except as provided in subsection (c) or (d) of this sec-
tion, an entity, other than a custodian, in possession, custody, 
or control, during the case, of property that the trustee may 
use, sell, or lease under section 363 of this title, or that the 
debtor may exempt under section 522 of this title, shall deliver 
to the trustee, and account for, such property or the value of 
such property, unless such property is of inconsequential value 
or benefit to the estate. 
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) or (d) of this sec-
tion, an entity that owes a debt that is property of the estate 
and that is matured, payable on demand, or payable on order, 
shall pay such debt to, or on the order of, the trustee, except to 
the extent that such debt may be offset under section 553 of 
this title against a claim against the debtor. 
(c) Except as provided in section 362(a)(7) of this title, an 
entity that has neither actual notice nor actual knowledge of 
the commencement of the case concerning the debtor may 
transfer property of the estate, or pay a debt owing to the 
debtor, in good faith and other than in the manner specified in 
subsection (d) of this section, to an entity other than the trust-
ee, with the same effect as to the entity making such transfer 
or payment as if the case under this title concerning the debtor 
had not been commenced. 
(d) A life insurance company may transfer property of the 
estate or property of the debtor to such company in good faith, 
with the same effect with respect to such company as if the 
case under this title concerning the debtor had not been com-
menced, if such transfer is to pay a premium or to carry out a 
nonforfeiture insurance option, and is required to be made 
automatically, under life insurance contract with such compa-
ny that was entered into before the date of the filing of the 
petition and that is property of the estate. 
(e) Subject to any applicable privilege, after notice and a 
hearing, the court may order an attorney, accountant, or other 
person that holds recorded information, including books, docu-
ments, records, and papers, relating to the debtor's property or 
financial affairs, to to [sic] turn over or disclose such recorded 
information to the trustee. 
§ 726. Distribution of property of the estate. 
(a) Except as provided in section 510 of this title, property 
of the estate shall be distributed— 
(1) first, in payment of claims of the kind specified in, 
and in the order specified in, section 507 of this title; 
(2) second, in payment of any allowed unsecured claim, 
other than a claim of a kind specified in paragraph (1), 
(3), or (4) of this subsection, proof of which is— 
(A) timely filed under section 501(a) of this title; 
( B ) timely filed under section 501(b) or 501(c) of this 
title; or 
(C) tardily filed under section 501(a) of this title, if— 
(i) the creditor that holds such claim did not have 
notice or actual knowledge of the case in time for 
timely filing of a proof of such claim under sec-
tion 501(a) of this title; and 
(ii) proof of such claim is filed in time to permit 
payment of such claim; 
(3) third, in payment of any allowed unsecured claim 
proof of which is tardily filed under section 501(a) of this 
title, other than a claim of the kind specified in paragraph 
(2)(C) of this subsection; 
(4) fourth, in payment of any allowed claim, whether 
secured or unsecured, for any fine, penalty, or forfeiture, 
or for multiple, exemplary, or punitive damages, arising 
before the earlier of the order for relief or the appoint-
ment of a trustee, to the extent that such fine, penalty, 
forfeiture, or damages are not compensation for actual 
pecuniary loss suffered by the holder of such claim; 
(5) fifth, in payment of interest at the legal rate from 
the date of the filing of the petition, on any claim paid 
under paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4) of this subsection; 
and 
(6) sixth, to the debtor. 
(b) Payment on claims of a kind specified in paragraph (1), 
(2), (3), (4), (5), or (6) of section 507(a)* of this title, or in 
paragraph (2), (3), (4), or (5) of subsection (a) of this section, 
shall be made pro rata among claims of the kind specified in 
each such particular paragraph, except that in a case that has 
been converted to this chapter under section 1112 or 1307 of 
this title, a claim allowed under section 503(b) of this title 
incurred under this chapter after such conversion has priority 
over a claim allowed under section 503(b) of this title incurred 
under any other chapter of this title or under this chapter 
before such conversion and over any expenses of a custodian 
superseded under section 543 of this title. 
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this title, or proceeds of such property, in the estate, such 
property or proceeds shall be segregated from other property 
of the estate, and such property or proceeds and other proper-
ty of the estate shall be distributed as follows: 
(1) Claims allowed under section 503 of this title shall be 
paid either from property of the kind specified in section 
541(a)(2) of this title, or from other property of the es-
tate, as the interest of justice requires. 
(2) Allowed claims, other than claims allowed under sec-
tion 503 of this title, shall be paid in the order specified in 
subsection (a) of this section, and, with respect to claims 
of a kind specified in a particular paragraph of section 
507(a) of this title or subsection (a) of this section, in the 
following order and manner: 
(A) First, community claims against the debtor or the 
debtor's spouse shall be paid from property of the kind 
specified in section 541(a)(2) of this title, except to the 
extent that such property is solely liable for debts of the 
debtor. 
( B ) Second, to the extent that community claims 
against the debtor are not paid under subparagraph (A) 
of this paragraph, such community claims shall be paid 
from property of the kind specified in section 541 (a)(2) 
of this title that is solely liable for debts of the debtor. 
(C) Third, to the extent that all claims against the 
debtor including community claims against the debtor 
are not paid under subparagraph (A) or ( B ) of this 
paragraph such claims shall be paid from property of 
the estate other than property of the kind specified in 
section 541(a)(2) of this title. 
(D) Fourth, to the extent that community claims 
against the'debtor or the debtor's spouse are not paid 
under subparagraph (A), (B) , or (C) of this paragraph, 
such claims shall be paid from all remaining property of 
the estate. 
28U.S.C.§ 1334. Bankruptcy cases and proceedings. 
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the 
district courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of 
all cases under title 11. 
(b) Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclu-
sive jurisdiction on a court or courts other than the district 
courts, the district courts shall have original but not exclusive 
jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or 
arising in or related to cases under title 11. 
(c)(1) Nothing in this section prevents a district court in the 
interest of justice, or in the interest of comity with State 
courts or respect for State law, from abstaining from hearing 
a particular proceeding arising under title 11 or arising in or 
related to a case under title 11. 
(2) Upon timely motion of a party in a proceeding based 
upon a State law claim or State law cause of action, related to a 
case under title 11 but not arising under title 11 or arising in a 
case under title 11, with respect to which an action could not 
have been commenced in a court of the United States absent 
jurisdiction under this section, the district court shall abstain 
from hearing such proceeding if an action is commenced, and 
can be timely adjudicated, in a State forum of appropriate 
jurisdiction. Any decision to abstain made under this subsec-
tion is not reviewable by appeal or otherwise. This subsection 
shall not be construed to limit the applicability of the stay 
provided for by section 362 of title 11, United States Code, as 
such section applies to an action affecting the property of the 
estate in bankruptcy. 
(d) The district court in which a case under title 11 is com-
menced or is pending shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all of 
the property, wherever located, of the debtor as of the com-
mencement of such case, and of the estate. 
(b) Motions, Orders and Other Papers. 
(1) Motions. An application to the court for an order shall be by 
motion which, unless made during a hearing or trial, shall be made in 
writing, shall state with particularity the grounds therefor, and shall set 
forth the relief or order sought. The requirement of writing is fulfilled 
if the motion is stated in a written notice of the hearing of the motion. 
(2) Orders. An order includes every direction of the court including 
a minute order made and entered in writing and not included in a judg-
ment An order for the payment of money may be enforces by execution 
in the same manner as if it were a judgment. Except as otherwise 
specifically provided by these rules, any order made without notice to the 
adverse party may be vacated or modified without notice by the judge 
who made it, or may be vacated or modified on notice. 
(3) Hearings on Motions or Orders to Show Cause. AVhcn on the 
day fixed for the hearing of a motion or an order to show cause, the 
judge before whom such motion or order is to be heard is unable to hear 
the parties, the matter shall stand continued until the further order of 
the court, or it may be transferred by the court or judge to some other 
judge of the court for such hearing 
(4) Application of Rules to Motions, Orders, and Other Papers. The 
rules applicable to captions, signing, and other matters of form of pleadings 
apply to all motions, orders, and other papers provided for by these rules. 
R U L E 54 
JUDGMENT; COSTS 
(a) Definition; Form. "Judgment" as used in these Rules includes 
a decree and any order from which an appeal lies A judgment need 
not contain a recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record 
of prior proceedings. 
(h) Judgment Upon Multiple Claims And/Or Involving Multiple 
Parties. When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action 
whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or 
when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the cntt \ oi a 
final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the chums oi parties 
only upon an express determination by the court that there is no just icason 
for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment In the 
absence of such determination and direction, any order oi other loim 
of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the 
<laims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall 
not terminate the action as to an} of the claims or parties, and the order 
or oilier form ot decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry 
of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of 
all the parties. 
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT 
(a) Judgment Upon the Verdict of a Jury. Unless the court otherwise 
directs and subject to the provisions of Rule 54(b), judgment upon the 
verdict of a jury shall be forthwith signed by the clerk and filed. If there 
Is a special verdict or a general verdict accompanied by answers to 
interrogatories returned by a jury pursuant to Rule 49, the court shall 
direct the appropriate judgment which shall be forthwith signed by the 
clerk and filed. 
(b) Judgment in Other Cases. Except as provided in subdivision (a) 
hereof and subdivision (b) (1) of Rule 55, all judgments shall be signed 
by the judge and filed with the clerk. 
(c) When Judgment Entered; Notation in Register of Actions and 
Judgment Docket. A judgment is complete and shall be deemed entered 
for all purposes, except the creation of a lien on real property, when 
the same is signed and filed as herein above provided. Tiie rleik shall 
immediately make a notation of the judgment in the register of actions 
and the judgment docket. 
RULE 62 
STAY OP PROCEEDINGS TO ENFORCE A JUDGMENT 
(a) Stay Upon Entry of Judgment Execution or other proceedings 
to enforce a judgment may issue immediately upon the entry of the 
judgment, unless the court in its discretion and on such conditions for 
the security of the adverse party as are proper, otherwise directs. 
RULE 64D 
GARNISHMENT 
(a) Availability of Writ of Garnishment. Except as provided in Rule 
64A and as authorized and permitted therein. 
(i) Before Judgment. A writ of garnishment is available as a means 
of attachment of intangible property, other than earnings from personal 
services of the defendant as hereinafter defined in subdivision (e) (iv), 
at any time after the filing of a complaint and before judgment, in eases 
in which a writ of attachment is available under Rule 64C. 
(ii) After Judgment. After judgment a writ of garnishment is avail-
able in aid of execution to satisfy a money judgment. 
(iii) Property Subject to Garnishment. The writ may be used to levy 
upon or affect the accrued credits, chattels, goods, effects, debts, ehoses 
in action, money and other personal property and rights to property of the 
defendant in the possession of a third person, or under the control or con-
stituting a performance obligation of any third person, whether due or 
yet to become due at the time of service of the writ of garnishment, which 
arc not exempt from garnishment or execution under any applicable pro-
visions of state or federal law. 
quired. 
Before the clerk may issue a writ of garnishment, before judgment the 
plaintiff must file with the clerk: 
(i) An affidavit briefly setting forth the facts showing that plaintiff's 
claim is one upon which attachment is authorized by Rule 64C; the grounds 
and cause for the garnishment; that plaintiff has good reason to believe 
and does believe that defendant has nonexempt credits, chattels, goods, ef-
fects, debts, choses in action or other personal property or rights to obliga-
tions of performance in the possession or in the control or otherwise owing 
from one or more specified third persons that plaintiff seeks to charge as 
garnishees or that such third persons are indebted to the defendant; and 
that such property, rights or debts are not earnings for the personal services 
of the defendant, or otherwise exempt from garnishment 
(ii) A bond or undertaking in the form and amount required for the 
issuance of a writ of attachment. 
(c) Exception to Sureties—Justification. 
Exceptions to the sufficiency of the sureties on plaintiff's prejudgment 
garnishment bond or undertaking and the justification of such sureties 
shall be made within the times and in the manner and with the effect pro-
vided in Rule 64C(c). 
(d) Issuance of Writ. 
(i) Upon the filing of the required affidavit and undertaking for gar-
nishment before judgment, the clerk shall issue a writ or writs of garnish-
ment directed to the persons sought to be charged as garnishees identified 
u\ the affidavit. 
(ii) After the entry of a judgment requiring the payment of money, 
the clerk of any court from which execution thereon may be issued shall 
issue a writ or writs of garnishment, without the necessity for an under-
taking, upon the filing of an affidavit of the judgment creditor: (a) identi-
fying the person sought to be charged as a garnishee; (b) stating that the 
personal property sought to be garnished is nonexempt; and (c) stating 
whether such property consists in whole or part of earnings from personal 
services as hereinafter defined in (e) (iv) of this Rule. Several writs may 
be issued at the same time and the names of as many persons as are sought 
to be charged as garnishees may be inserted in the same writ or different 
writs. 
RULE 69 
EXECUTION AND PROCEEDINGS SUPPLEMENTAL THERETO 
(a) Issuance of Writ of Execution. Process to enforce a judgment 
shall be by a writ of execution unless the court otherwise directs, which 
may issue at any time within eight years after the entry of judgment, 
(except an execution may be stayed pursuant to Rule 62) either in the 
county in which such judgment was rendered, or in any county in which 
a transcript thereof has been filed and docketed in the office of the clerk 
of the district court. Notwithstanding the death of a party after judgment 
execution thereon may be issued, or such judgment may be enforced, as 
follows: 
(1) In case of the death of the judgment creditor, upon the application 
of his executor or administrator, or successor in interest. 
(2) In case of the death of the judgment debtor, if the judgment is 
for the recovery of real or personal property or the enforcement of a lien 
thereon. 
(b) P«rposc of DockcOag Statement. 
(c) CMteat of DoekcCiog Statement. 
(d) Necessary Attachments. 
(e) Continences of Failure to Comply. 
(c) Content of Docketing Statement. 
The docketing statement shall contain the* follo-
wing information in the order set forth below: 
(1) the authority believed to ponfer jurisdiction on 
the Court to hear the appeal or petition for review, 
or in the case of an interlocutory appeal, the date of 
the Court order allowing the appeal and the issues 
which may be appealed pursuant to the granting of 
an interlocutory appeal. In multi-party or multi-
issue cases, particular attention should be paid to 
Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
(2) a concise statement of the nature of the proc-
eeding, e.g., this appeal is from a final order of the 
district court, or this petition is for review of an 
order of an administrative agency; 
(3) the date of the judgment or order sought to be 
reviewed; the date of any order respecting a motion 
pursuant to Rules 50(b), 52(b), or 59, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure; and the date the notice of appeal 
or petition for review was filed; 
(4). a concise statement of facts material to a 
consideration of the questions presented; 
(5) the issues presented by the appeal, expressed in 
terms and circumstances of the case, but without 
unnecessary detail. The questions should not be 
repetitious. General conclusory statements such as 
"the judgment of the trial court is not supported by 
the law or facts" are not acceptable; 
(6) any statutes, rules, or cases believed tc be 
determinative of the respective issues stated; 
(7) a reference to all related or prior appeals in 
the case. If the reference is to a prior appeal, the 
appropriate citation should be given. 
(d) Necessary Attachments. 
Attached to each copy of the docketing statement 
shall be a copy of the following: 
(1) the judgment or order sought to be reviewed; 
(2) any opinion or findings; and 
(3) the notice of appeal and a copy of any order 
extending the time for the filing of a notice of 
appeal. 
RULE 24. BRIEFS 
(a) Brief of the Appellant. 
(b) Brief 6f the Respondent. 
(c) Reply Brief. 
(d) References in Briefs to Parties. 
(e) References in Briefs to the Record. 
(f) Reproduction of Statutes, Rules, Regulations, 
Documents, Etc. 
(g) Length of Briefs. 
(h) Briefs in Cases Involving Cross-Appeals* 
(i) Briefs in Cases Involving Multiple Appellants or 
Respondents, 
(j) Citation of Supplemental Authorities, 
(k) Requirements and Sanctions. 
(I) Brief Covers. 
(k) Requirements and Sanctions. 
All briefs under this Rule must be concise, pres-
ented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper 
headings and free from burdensome, irrelevant, 
immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which arc 
not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, 
on motion or sua sponte by the Court, and/or the 
Court may assess attorney's fees against chc offen-
ding lawyer. 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
CACHE COUNTYf STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH FARM PRODUCTION 
CREDIT ASSOCIATIONf 
Plaintiff^ 
vs. 
GARTH N. LABRUM, DUANE B. 
LABRUM, ROSS N. LABRUM, et al. 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 
DISSOLUTION OF WRITS OF 
GARNISHMENT 
Civil No. 20842 
This matter having come before the undersigned on 
February 8f 1985f pursuant to Defendants' Motion for Dissolution 
of Writs of Garnishment; and Plaintiff having filed a response 
thereto, upon consideration of the motion and response, and the 
Court having been advised that the Labrum individuals have filed 
petitions in the United States Bankruptcy Court, and that all 
property of the partnership is now claimed by the individuals in 
their bankruptcy estates, and it appearing to the Court that no 
execution may enter upon any answers of garnishees given upon the 
Writs of Garnishment at issue here, but that Plaintiff is entitl-
ed to the information requested of the garnishees with respect to 
the property they may hold for the Defendants, and aood cause 
appearing therefor, it is hereby 
:-r .:...q .... 
,Jof. 56 .-AL: 541 /3>o 
ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Dissolution of Writs 
of Garnishment be, and the same hereby isf denied; and it is further 
ORDERED that Raymond N. Malouf, answer the interrogator-
ies heretofore served upon him with the Writ of Garnishment and 
that said answer be served upon counsel for Utah Farm Production 
Credit Association on or before February 18, 1985; and it is 
further 
ORDERED that no execution upon the answers of the gar-
nishee may issue, said execution being stayed by the automatic 
stay imposed by § 36 2 of the United States Bankruptcy Code; and 
it is further 
ORDERED that Raymond N. Malouf, hold and safely keep any 
and all property in his possession belonging to the Defendants 
herein for the benefit of the Trustee appointed in the bankruptcy 
cases of said Defendants. 
DATED this _M day of February, 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
;U}ur, u 8 J'W.54^ 
ATTORNEYS CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the .P2rrday of February, 1985, 
I caused to be served the foregoing Order Denying Motion for 
Dissolution of Writs of Garnishment, pursuant to Local Rule 2.9 
of the Rules of Practice, by mailing a copy thereof, by first-
class United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Raymond N. Malouf 
Attorney for Defendants 
150 East 200 North, #D 
Logan, Utah 84321 
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IN THE DISTOICTCOUin OF THEini^^UDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN ^NDlFOR^tHE 
COUNTY OF CACH& STATE OFiUTAH 
ORDERED ENTERED November 25 , 1985 
CASE NUMBER 20842 
TIt^.J.arffi..PXQi»r i.U9Jl...GrMi.t:...A§aG. t——- / VE NOY CHRISTOFFERSEN, Judge 
Plaintiff I , _ __ _, , , 
John F. wanlquxst , . 
*•• ( George Parker, Court Reporter 
n urj r u . , ? ? * * . ? l * e » Court Reporter Garth N. Labrum, et al 1 _, „ „ , _„ i Dotti C. Campbell rv*.«* ™_*ri. 
Defendant / • • • • C o u r t C l e r k 
^ HEARING 
Now is the time for the Order To Shore nanae Kearinp In the phovp Pr>t-it-1^ d 
case. James R. Brr*~ and Michael N. Zundel are representing the plaintiff. 
ftny M a l m i f i s p r p g p n t *r>d -f g r n n n s p l f rvr f>iP dnf*mdflTit-g r p p r f i Q P n f p H Ky Q a d K ^ 
N. Labrum. 
V\U-£Kce£?< counsels give opening statements* 
Plaintiff exhibit ^1 is marked, introduced and received. 
7* 
Arguments folloxsr. Court rules that the February transcript shows that all 
fiands uere to he, hold and not disbursed, 
Michael Zimdol ic oworn» examined and erooo-examined. p2a:i.rit.f f cnnc3udg>g case. 
HQ-FoncG o:'hibit'- Jl? and n3 arc marked, introduced and received. 
T^cfanoo callc Duanc Lab run who ±3 sworn and examined 1—an^ crocn^OKaninod , 
^^Tpr^^p p7-^ •?,V) - f o—are T^nrknd—nnd introduced *—«V. rocQivod*———3*^2—Jt' c\ro r c celved 
a*=ter Hf£Er ar^nents. Defense exhibits H and -J-P are marked, introduced and received, 
Pvay Kalouf is cilled. Court cautions him that testimony m this civil case could 1 
used apainst hir m a criminal case, Carl Malouf comes from the audience to act v •• c 
arid sitfe as defense counsel. Mr. Malouf is then sworn and examined by Plaintiff counsel 
James Brown. 
l!r. Labrum and then Mf. lialouf are called for rebuttal examination. Plaintiff 
staton that court ordoro have been violated and asks for judgment aqninqt Mr. Malouf. 
Defense concludes case. 
Court finds resident judge issued an order to show cause and deems this document 
ic aeeurant and the Court did net exempt, anything":—ALLuruev fees 111 elLlibti Chap. 7 
or Chap. 11 hearings were disallowed. Court finds Mr. Malouf in contempt of this court. 
He muot turn over all fundo to bankruptcy court. Court in recess until Tues_—£03L, 
HflWiRfnCTjeaa^ 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
ORDERED ENTERED November 26, 1985 
CASE NUMBER 20842 
Utah Farm Production Credit Assn. 
Plaintiff*" I V E N 0 Y CHR,ST0FFERSEN, Judge 
John F.
 m Wahlguist Judge 
**• [ George Parker, Court Reporter 
. . Dean Olsen c ^
 Rep0rter 
Dptti . C.# Campbell QQ^ Cterk 
Garth N. Labrum, e t a l 
Defendant 
*S HEARING (Continued) 
Now is the time for the continued hearing in the above entitled case. All 
officers of the court are present. 
Plaintiff's counsel, James R. Brown begins testimony. He reinterates his 
clients^as'"stated in yesterday1 s proceedings. 
Ray Malouf testifies (after being cautioned that he has been sworn}i. He 
requests that Defense Exhibit #9 be marked, introduced and it is received. 
Plaintiff gives further testimony. 
Court requests Plaintiff to prepare judgment and findings and facts. Court 
finds resident judge's summary judgment to be accurate. Court finrfc o^-migh^ 
order to be a total hold of aM' funds for bankruptcy court and trustee. Court 
finds that m violation of thpse orders. £71 .960.1? TT*Q n*-M m l.aKrnn,'c smrf 
Malouf Law firm. Court finds that Defense counsel Ray Malouf, has acted in 
bad fajth, Court sentences as follow Crant judgment to plaintiff of ^ l.^nQ.12; 
grants plaintiff attorney's fees of $2,200; defense is to be fined $100.00; Defense 
is to snenri ^0 days in P.arViP rmmfy .Tail 95 A*ye r»f fM o ^ ^ ^ ^ 11 1 hv ^iffp^n^ed if 
all monies are returned to the proper accounts and Mr. Malouf answers all money 
q u e s t i o n s t r u t h f u l l y a f f p r a 15 n i n n f p -ro^ooc T\oro r>f
 O Var.tif T n r , ^ f c c n t c n ^ r JC 
fixed as Dec. 11% 1^85 at 9:00 a.m. in the Cache County Jail. If an appeal is 
filed a hone* of £ I
 ; OOP nngf Ko pncfp^ 
Mr. Malouf takes the x^ itness stand and Mr. Brown examines him concerning 
nis personal firmnres Carl >'g,1m.if neks? for protactior for the law firm.—G^urt 
reaffirms that this action is against Mr. Ray Malouf, personally. 
r
nnrt alior^ release of Mr. Malouf from jail for a ochGdulod trial m Hyde 
Park on Dec. 11th - 1 hour before the trial and he must return to jail immediately 
aftprwards , 
Court recesses at 12:25 p.m. to resume at 1:30 p.m. 
Court contactc Mr, Malouf at hio law office at 1IA5 p.m. and he lias nothing 
further to add to the proceedings. 
Court is dicmiscod. .— 
f=:\^A 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
!
ORDERED ENTERED December 1 1 , 1985 
CASE NUMBER 208^2 
VE NOY CHRISTOFFERSEN, Judge 
J??1)1. X: H^y-SLUA?? Judge 
George Parker, Court Reporter 
1J»A .Qlsen court Reporter 
Pott i .Campbel l Court Clerk 
c / - " HEARING 
Now is the time set for the hearing in the above entitled case. Mike Zundel-
"and James Brown appear tor the plaintilf. Ray Malouf represents the defendants. 
Both counsels give their opening statements. 
Court statec " T . Zundel called him about the judgment check for $21,000 
that was tendered to the Trustee of the Milk Diversion Fund yesterday. A cashier*s 
check has been obtained for that check. Court deems $l,00Qis sufficient fcr 
the appearance bond for Mr. Malouf. Court states an aditional S2500.00 bond for 
attorney's fees, costs and interest will be necessary. 
Plaintiff calls Arlene Hutchinson who is sworn, examined and cross-examined 
Plaintiff exhibits #10 and #11 are marked, introduced and received. 
"Plaintiff calls Harold C. Heninger who is sworn, examined and cross-examined. 
Both counsels 5*ive closing statements. 
Court rules that that the bail bondsman fcssn't adequate surety for the hond 
obtained in this case. The appearance bond for $1,0^0 must be posted bv "^ ridav, 
December 1^, lc^5 at n:00 a.m. with the Clerk of the Court for Mr. Malouffs sta\ 
from iail and appeal of this case to hhe Supreme Court. The i\?^ on.on bond must 
be posted bv then also. 
Piaintiff requests additional information from Mr. Malouf who is sworn and 
examined. Mr. Malouf requests a stav 6fom the Priday morning deadline and the 
reouest is denied bv the court. __ 
Court recesses to enable Mr. Malouf to ro to hi g nffipp fn obtain arvsvprq ^  
to ^ laintmfffs questions. Mr. Malouf returns with a check to Production Credit 
association for £2200.00 (interest i.s nor n^ -frO . Plg-f-nfff «r *
 €
 gt-t-ompyg cm m thp 
bank. The check is cashed for a cashierTs check. Court is adiourned. 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH FARM PRODUCTION ) 
CREDIT ASSOCIATION, 
) ORDER HOLDING RAYMOND N. 
Plaintiff, MALOUF IN CONTEMPT AND 
) JUDGMENT 
vs. 
GARTH N. LABRUM, DUANE B. 
LABRUM, ROSS N. LABRUMf et al. ) Civil No. 20842 
Defendants. 
This matter having come before the Court on November 25 
and 26, 1985 on this Court's Order to Show Cause issued to 
Raymond N. Malouf
 f as to why he should not be held in contempt 
and upon Raymond N. Maloufs Verified Reply and Motion to Strike 
for Lack of Jurisdiction; Michael N. Zundel and James R. Brown 
appearing on behalf of Utah Farm Production Credit Association 
and Raymond N. Malouf, appearing on behalf of himself, assisted 
by Carl E. Malouff the Court having reviewed the recordf having 
heard oral testimony and received documentary evidencef having 
considered the arguments of counsel and having found Raymond N. 
Malouf in contempt of this Court's orders; and Mr. Malouf having 
submitted to questioning about his assets and ability to repay 
funds wrongfully taken from the defendant's accounts in his 
control; and the Court being fully advised and good cause 
apearing therefor, it is hereby 
BJ3K 0 8 ' ! •>;,-,[ 3 9 3 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREEDf that Raymond N. Malouf pay 
to David L. Gladwellf trustee of the defendants1 bankruptcy 
estates, as a party injured by Raymond N. Malouffs contempt, the 
amount of $21,260.12 plus interest thereon from tlie date of this 
judgment at the rate of 12% per annum; and it is further 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that Raymond N. Malouf 
pay to Utah Farm Production Credit Association, the amount of 
$2,200, as attorneyfs fees and costs incurred in bringing this 
matter before the Court; and it is further 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that Raymond N. Malouf 
pay a fine of $100 to the Court on or before December 11, 1985 at 
9:00 a.m.; and it is further 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that Raymond N. Malouf be 
confined in the county jail for 30 days commencing December 11, 
1985 at the hour of 9:00 a.m. All but 120 hours of said sentence 
is hereby suspended pending Raymond N. Malouf's compliance with 
the following: 
1. Raymond N. Malouf shall pay over to David L. 
Gladwell, as trustee of the defendants1 bankruptcy cases, all 
money in his possession and control which may be in any way 
traceable to the defendants herein. 
2. Raymond N. Malouffs answers in open Court on Novem-
ber 26, 1985 to Utah Farm Production Credit Association's 
questions regarding his assets and ability to repay the money 
wrongfully taken from the defendants1 accounts in his control are 
not hereafter determined to be untruthful and that Raymond N. 
Malouf delivers copies of the following documents to PCA's coun-
sel on or before December 6, 1985: 
1. All personal tax returns for himselff his wife 
and his law partnership for the past four years. 
2. All documents respecting the purchase by him 
and/or his wife of their home and the office 
building in which he conducts his practice. 
Those documents shall include all purchase 
agreements, financing documents (notes, trust 
deeds, mortgages) and closing statements. 
3. A summary of all accounts receivable of his law 
partnership which are over $300. The summary 
shall include the name, address and receivable 
balance of each client. 
4. All documents showing his holdings or the 
holdings of his wife in IRA accounts. 
5. All documents identifying any pension plans in 
which he or his wife have any interest and the 
value of their interests in such plans. 
6. All financial statements reflecting his assets 
and liabilities and/or the assets and lia-
bilities of his wife. 
7. All documents evidencing loans to his wife from 
him or relatives for the last four years. 
8. All bank account statements for accounts held or 
controlled by his law firm for the month of 
November 1985. 
9. A summary of the contents of all safety deposit 
boxes owned or controlled by him, his wife or 
his law partnership to the extent that any of 
them have an interest in those contents. 
it is further 
„,->„ P6* r. CrlC 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Raymond N. Malouf 
report all changes in the amount of his or his wifefs assets over 
$300, and all changes in the location of his assets or the assets 
of his wife, to counsel for Utah Farm Production Credit 
Association within five working days of such change. This 
portion of this Order shall expire ninety days after the 
execution hereof unless extended by the Court; and it is further 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Raymond N. Malouf may 
be released from the county jail on December 11, 1985 one hour 
before any trial which may go forward on that day at which he has 
entered his appearance as counsel. Mr. Malouf is to return to 
the county jail within one hour after the trial he attends is 
concluded or recessed for the day. No other release is 
authorized without further order of this Court. The amount of 
time Raymond N. Malouf is absent from the jail under this part of 
this order shall not be credited toward his 120-hour sentence; 
and it 
is further 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that in the event this 
Judgment and Order is appealed, Raymond N. Malouf's confinement 
shall be stayed upon the posting of $1,000 bond; and it is 
further 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that collection of this 
Judgment shall only be stayed on appeal upon posting of a 
supersedeas bond; and it is further 
PG-v-'ige 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that this order and 
judgment shall be entered as a final judgment upon its execution, 
there being no just reason for delay./0 
DATED this _Z> day of V .-985. 
BY TJHE COtfRT: 
L/JOHN- r. WAHEQO* 
District Court Judge 7 
/ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ' 
I hereby certify that on the &-ty^-~day of November 1985 
I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order Holding 
Raymond N. Malouf in Contempt and Judgment to be served pursuant 
to local rule 2.9 of the Rules of Practicef by first class United 
States mailf postage prepaidf addressed as follows: 
Raymond N. Malouf, Esq. 
and Carl E. Malouf, Esq. 
Malouf Law Offices 
150 East 200 North, #D 
Logan, Utah 84321 
and 
David L. Gladwell, Esq. 
Trustee of the Labrum Bankruptcy Cases 
2610 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
»" 06^397 
JAMES R. BROWN (#456) 
MICHAEL N. ZUNDEL (#3755) 
Win. SHANE TOPHAM (#4425) 
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
370 East South Temple, Suite 401 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7700 
R E C E I V E D 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH FARM PRODUCTION 
CREDIT ASSOCIATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GARTH N. LABRUM, DUANE B. 
LABRUM, ROSS N. LABRUM, et al, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 20842 
A hearing on Utah Farm Production Credit Association's 
Verified Motion for Order to Show Cause Why Raymond N. Malouf 
Should Not Be Held in Contempt was held before the Honorable John 
F. Wahlquist on November 25, 1985. Plaintiff (hereinafter "PCA") 
was represented by counsel, James R. Brown and Michael N. Zundel. 
Raymond N. Malouf Jr., ("Mr. Malouf"), was represented by himself 
with Carl E. Malouf assisting. The Court having heard oral 
testimony and received documentary evidence, and having 
^OW-LH' 
reconsidered its original orders to Mr. Maloufr and being fully 
advised in the premisesf now makes the following 
FINDINGS OP PACT 
1. In August of 1982, Utah Farm Production Credit 
Association ("PCA") commenced this action tof inter aliar 
foreclose its mortgage against the defendant's farm. 
2. Thereafter, defendants filed for bankruptcy under 
Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Codef in the United 
States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utahr Northern 
Division. 
3. Mr. Malouf acted as counsel for the defendants in 
their bankruptcy proceedings as well as in this case, and during 
the bankruptcy proceedings Mr. Malouf was denied all of his fees. 
Nothing occurred in the bankruptcy proceedings which would 
justify Mr. Malouf in drawing attorney's fees from the debtor's 
funds in his possession. 
4. During the Chapter 11 bankruptcy case, PCA obtained 
a lift of the automatic stay to proceed against the defendants in 
this action. On September 20, 1984, partial summary judgment was 
entered in favor of PCA and against the Labrum defendants for 
$599f054.60 principalf together with interest thereon in the 
amount of $102,512.61 plus interest accruing after the date of 
judgment at the rate of 12% per annum. 
*™ 06V/183 
5. After the entry of the court's summary judgment 
against defendants, PCA attempted to execute on its collateral, 
consisting of both real and personal property. Mr. Malouf filed 
numerous motions attempting to delay plaintiff's legitimate 
efforts to realize the benefits of its collateral and satisfy the 
judgment entered herein. 
6. On December 13, 1984, defendants testified before 
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah that 
their counsel, Mr. Malouf, held $108,000 in his trust account on 
their behalf. At the hearing, Mr. Malouf was admonished by the 
bankruptcy court to advise the court if the testimony of his 
clients was not true. Mr. Malouf declined to refute his clients 
testimony. At the hearing, Mr. Malouf was advised by the 
bankruptcy court that it would be illegal for him to take any 
fees for his involvement in the bankruptcy case from defendants1 
funds then in his possession. The bankruptcy court also ordered 
at the hearing that the defendants1 Chapter 11 bankruptcy case be 
dismissed effective December 24, 1984. 
7. On January 2, 1985, PCA caused a Writ of Garnishment 
to be served upon Mr. Malouf. Said Writ of Garnishment commanded 
Mr. Malouf "not to pay any debt due or to become due to the 
defendants and to retain possession and control of all personal 
property, effects and choses in action of defendants until 
further order of this Court." 
L * P61KT.E384 
8* Thereafterf Mr, Malouf filed an objection to the 
Writ of Garnishment and a motion to vacate the Writ. 
9. On January 21, 1985, this Court issued a Temporary 
Restraining Order restraining Mr. Malouff as defendants1 
attorneyr from in any way disposing of milk diversion moneyf 
belonging to the defendantsr received from the United States 
Government. The order also ordered Mr. Malouf to appear and show 
cause why the milk diversion money in his possession should not 
be turned over to PCA. The effect of the Temporary Restraining 
Order was extended past the usual ten-day period by stipulation 
of the parties and an order of this Court until February 8f 
1985. 
10. On February 5, 1985f defendants filed petitions in 
bankruptcy commencing Chapter 7 liquidation cases, and a trustee 
was appointed to administer all of the debtors' property, 
including the money in Mr. Malouffs possession. 
11. On February 8f 1985 f the parties came before this 
Court on the Court's order to Mr. Malouf to show cause why the 
milk diversion money in his possession should not be turned over 
to PCA, and upon Mr. Maloufs objection to the Writ of 
Garnishment and motion to vacate the Writ. At the hearing Mr. 
Malouf asserted the bankruptcy of the defendants as a defense to 
any order of turnover. 
OK 
12. Upon consideration of Mr. Malouf's representations, 
this Court ordered Mr. Malouf to fully and completely answer the 
interrogatories previously served upon him with PCA's Writ of 
Garnishment and to "hold and safely keep any and all property in 
his possession belonging to the defendants herein for the benefit 
of the trustee appointed in the bankruptcy cases of said 
Defendants." 
13. On February 22, 1985, the proposed written order 
was simultaneously mailed to Mr. Malouf and the Court by PCA's 
counsel. Three days later, on February 25f 1985f Mr. Malouf gave 
$1,500 of the money in his control to his client, Duane Labrum, 
and $300 to Ross Labrum. Two days after that, on February 27, 
1985, Mr. Malouf paid himself $6,000 from the funds in his 
control. 
14. On March 4, 1985, the order was signed by the court 
and Mr. Malouf, and Mr. Malouf received the order on March 6, 
1985. 
15. On about March 12, 1985f Mr, Malouf filed a motion 
to amend the order and objected to the form of the order as 
overbroad. 
16. On March 22f 1985, Mr. Malouf disbursed another 
$600 to his client, Duane Labrum. 
17. On April 1, 1985, this Court denied Mr. Malouf's 
motion to modify the order and thereby reaffirmed the breadth of 
the order* 
18. Two days later
 f on April 3f 1985 f Mr. Malouf 
disbursed another $lf500 to his clientf Duane Labrumr and 
thirteen days after thatf on April 16, 1985, Mr. Malouf took 
another $3,000 for his law firm. 
19. On May 6, 1985, Mr. Malouf disbursed another $3f000 
to his client, Ross Labrum. In addition, between May 16, 1985 
and June 18, 1985, Mr. Malouf took an additional $5,360.12 in 
fees from the defendants' funds in his possession. 
20. All the money disbursed was disbursed by Mr. Malouf 
or his partner, Carl E. Malouf, and was disbursed from his law 
firm trust account or other funds he controlled on the date of 
the garnishment and - the dates of the Court1 s oral and written 
orders. 
21. During the defendants Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases, 
on May 30, 1985, Mr. Malouf was denied all fees in both the 
Chapter 11 and Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases by the United States 
Bankruptcy Court. Mr. Malouf did not have and does not now have 
a legitimate claim against the defendants1 funds in his 
possession for fees earned during the pendency of the defendants1 
Chapter 11 and Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases. 
22. During the defendants' bankruptcy proceedings and 
during these proceedings Mr. Malouf has argued that the funds in 
his control are immune from execution or other process of this 
Court or any other court because they are exempt under state and 
federal law as part of a pension plan of some sort. This Court 
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has no evidence from which it can find that any sort of a pension 
plan was created prior to the defendants1 bankruptcies or with 
the consent of the bankruptcy court after their bankruptcies were 
filed and this Court finds that none was created. 'Mr. Malouf has 
not been candid with this Court in explaining the source of funds 
in his possession. This Court's Order to Show Cause has been 
defended by Mr. Malouf in bad faith. 
23. The trustee of the defendants' bankruptcy cases, 
David L. Gladwell, has joined with PCA in its motion requesting 
this Court to issue its order to show cause to Mr. Malouf why he 
should not be held in contempt. 
24. Mr. Malouf knew the duty imposed upon him by the 
order of this Court set forth in the Writ of Garnishment served 
upon him January 2, 1985. 
25. Mr. Malouf knew the duty imposed upon him by the 
Court's oral order of February 8f 1985. 
26. Mr. Malouf knew the duty imposed upon him by the 
Court's written order and understood the breadth of all of the 
Court's orders. 
27. Mr. Malouf had the ability to comply with the 
Court's orders to hold the defendants' property in his possession 
until further order of the Court or for the benefit of the 
trustee, as those court orders required him to do. 
28. Mr. Malouf willfully and knowingly refused to 
comply with this Court's orders and has knowingly and willfully 
refused to comply with orders of other courts respecting his 
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duties, vis a visf the defendants1 property held in his 
possession. 
29. Mr. Malouf is in contempt of this Court's order as 
set forth in the Writ of Garnishment served upon him and of this 
Court1s order of February 8, 1985. 
30. The trustee of the defendants1 bankruptcy case has 
been injured in the amount of $21f260.12 by Mr. Malouffs willful 
disobedience of this Court's February 8th order and contemptuous 
conduct. 
31. PCAf has been injured by Mr. Malouf1 s willful 
disobedience of this Court's orders and contemptuous conduct and 
is. entitled to its attorneys fees in the amount of $2/200 
incurred in bringing its motion for an order to show cause and in 
participating in these proceedings. 
32. There is no just reason to delay the entry or 
effect of this order. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court now enters its 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The order contained in the Writ of Garnishment 
served upon Mr. Malouf on January 2, 1985, was a lawful order of 
this Court. 
2. The order to Mr. Malouf on February 8f 1985, to hold 
and safely keep any and all property in his possession belonging 
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to the defendants for the benefit of the trustee appointed in the 
defendants1 bankruptcy cases was a lawful order of this Court. 
3. Mr. Malouf1s willful disobedience of this Court's 
orders is contemptuous. 
4. David L. Gladwell, trustee of the defendants1 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases, is entitled to recover damages from 
Mr. Malouf in the amount of $21,260.12. 
5. PCA is entitled to recover reasonable attorney's 
fees and costs incurred in these contempt proceedings in the 
amount of $2f200. 
6. Mr. Malouf should be ordered to pay on or before 
December 11, 1985 at 9:00 a.m. a fine to the Court in the amount 
of $100. 
7. Mr. Malouf should be ordered confined in the county 
jail for 30 days, 25 days of that confinement to be suspended 
upon condition that he pays over to David L. Gladwell, as 
trusteef all sums which he still holds which are in any way 
traceable to monies drawn from the defendants1 accounts in his 
possession and control and upon the further condition that Mr. 
Malouf truthfully answer questions concerning his resources to 
repay the funds unlawfully taken by him and upon the condition 
that he provide the following documents to PCA's counsel on or 
before the close of business December 6, 1985: 
a. All personal tax returns for himself, his wife 
and his law partnership for the past four 
years. 
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b. All documents respecting the purchase by him 
and/or his wife of his home and the office 
building in which he conducts his practice. 
Those documents shall include all purchase 
agreements, financing documents (notes, trust 
deeds, mortgages) and closing statements. 
c. A summary of all accounts receivable of his 
law partnership which are over $300. The 
summary shall include the name, address and 
receivable balance of each client. 
d. All documents showing his holdings or the 
holdings of his wife in IRA accounts. 
e. All documents identifying any pension plans in 
which he or his wife have any interest and 
the value of their interests in such plans. 
f. All financial statements reflecting his assets 
and liabilities and/or the assets and 
liabilities of his wife. 
g. All documents evidencing loans to his wife 
from him or relatives for the last four 
years. 
h. All bank account statements for accounts held 
or controlled by his law firm for the month of 
November 1985. 
i. A summary of the contents of all safety deposit 
boxes owned or controlled by him, his wife or 
his law partnership to the extent that any 
of them have an interest in those contents. 
8. In the event this Judgment and Order is appealed, 
Mr. Malouf's confinement should be stayed upon the posting of a 
$1,000 bond. 
9. Collection of this Order should proceed upon entry 
and should not be stayed on appeal unless a supersedeas bond is 
posted. 
PR'V.r *'\Q! 
DATED t h i s /n day of 
/BY THfe 
/ "7 
H A i j^tetofeW'- ^ Fl^&HEQl 
ct Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE / 
I hereby certify that on the ,^-f—day of November 1985 
I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law to be served pursuant to local rule 
2.9 of the Rules of Practice, by first class United States mail, 
postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Raymond N. Malouff Esq. 
and Carl E. Malouf, Esq. 
Malouf Law Offices 
150 East 200 North, #D 
Loganf Utah 84321 
and 
David L. Gladw'ell, Esq. 
Trustee of the Labrum Bankruptcy Cases 
2610 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH FARM PRODUCTION 
CREDIT ASSOCIATION, 
PLAINTIFF, 
VS. 
GARTH N. LABRUM, ET AL 
DEFENDANTS. 
BE IT REMEMBERED -
1
 FOR HEARING BEFORE THE 
SITTING AT LOGAN, UTAH 
NOVEMBER, 1985 AND THE 
DECEMBER, 1985. 
• / 
) REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
) CIVIL NO. 20842 
rHAT THIS MATTER CAME ON REGULARLY 
HONORABLE JOHN F. WAHLQUIST, JUDGE, 
ON THE 25TH AND 26TH DAYS OF 
5TH, 11TH, AND 16TH DAYS OF 
WHEREUPON THE FOLLOWING 
APPEARANCES: 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF: 
FOR THE DEFE^ NIDANTS: 
PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD, TO WIT: 
JAMES R. BROWN 
MICHAEL N. ZUNDEL 
370 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE 
SUITE 401 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
RAYMOND N. MALOUF, JR. 
CARL MALOUF 
150 EAST 200 NORTH 
SUITE D 
LOGAN, UTAH 84321 
mo JUN35I986 1 
DEAN C. O L S E N , C . S . . , . 
6Q5 MUNICIPAL BLDG. $ | tH S» AU£M| OBHI 
DGDEN, UTAH B4.4-D1 i*CK3TCi Deputy 
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1 TO TESTIFY RIGHT NOW, I AM PREPARED TO CALL HIM AS A WITNESS 
2 TO TESTIFY TO THOSE THINGS. 
3 THE COURT: DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING ELSE YOU WANT ME TO 
4 KNOW BEFORE I START HEARING EVIDENCE, IF I DO'1 
5 MR. MALOUF: WE HAVE COPIES OF THE BANKRUPTCY 
6 SCHEDULES AND CLAIMS FOR EXEMPTIONS THAT ARE PERTINENT TO THIS 
7 ISSUE, WHICH WE'RE GOING TO OFFER. AND I HAVE CARL MALOUF WHO 
8 WILL TESTIFY AS TO THE EXISTENCE OF THE FARM BOY PENSION 
9 PROGRAM THAT WAS ESTABLISHED AND HE WAS A TRUSTEE OF IT. 
10 THE COURT: OKAY. IS THERE ANYTHING ELSE? 
11 MR. MALOUF: I DON'T THINK SO, YOUR HONOR. 
12 THE COURT: COURT WILL BE IN RECESS FIVE MINUTES TO 
13 READ EXHIBIT 1. 
14 (WHEREUPON THE COURT TOOK A BRIEF RECESS. ) 
15 THE COURT: THE COURT'S PREPARED TO MAKE CERTAIN 
16 RULINGS. THE COURT RULES AS FOLLOWS: THE FEBRUARY TRANSCRIPT 
17 CONVINCES THE COURT BEYOND ANY QUESTION. MR. MALOUF WAS 
18 PRESENT IN THE COURTROOM AND THE JUDGE DID HOLD ALL FUNDS 
19 HELD. HE DID NOT EXEMPT ANY FUNDS FREE OF GARNISHMENT. HE 
20 DID NOT MAKE ANY LIMITATION. IT'S f) COMPLETE ORDER FOR A 
21 HOLD. RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY, AS FAR AS THIS JUDGE IS CONCERNED, 
22 AS HE COMES TO THE BENCH AT THIS TIML, THIS IS THE LAW Or THE 
23 STATE. 
24 YOU HAVE ft RIGHT TO PROCEED ON YOUR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE. 
25 DO YOU HAVE FURTHER EVIDENCE? 
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VERSUS KERSHAW, WHICH IS FOUND AT 627 P. 2d 1981, A DECISION 
WRITTEN BY JUSTICE OAKS, WHICH THEY WERE ARGUING WHETHER OR 
NOT THE — AND THE ONLY ISSUE THERE WAS WHETHER OR NOT THERE 
WAS AN IMPOSSIBILITY OR WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER WAS UNCLEAR 
IN ANY MANNER. AND THE COURT HELD NEITHER OF THOSE THINGS 
WERE APPLICABLE, AND THEREFORE IF YOU DIDN'T RAISE THE 
IMPOSSIBILITY AT THE TIME, AND THEY DIDN'T, OR IF YOU DIDN'T 
HAVE SOME UNDERSTANDING, THEN IF THE ORDER IS CLEAR ON ITS 
FACE, THEN IT'S GOT TO BE ENFORCED AND YOU CAN BE HELD IN 
CONTEMPT OF COURT. AND THEY WERE HELD IN CONTETMPT OF COURT 
UNDER THIS VERY STATUTE THAT WE'VE SOUGHT TODAY, AND HELD THAT 
NOT ONLY FOR THE JUDGMENT AS WE'VE SOUGHT HERE TODAY, BUT 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AS WELL, AND FOR PUNISHMENT AS IN CONTEMPT. I 
SUBMIT THAT THAT CASE IS DIRECTLY IN POINT, AND THEREFORE 
WE'RE ENTITLED TO THE RELIEF SOUGHT. THANK YOU. 
THE COURT: THE COURT FINDS THE FACTS AS FOLLOWS: 
THE COURT FINDS THAT THE RESIDENT JUDGE DID ISSUE AN ORDER TO 
SHOW CAUSE. THAT THE COURT HAS LOOKED AT THE ORDER TO SHOW 
CAUSE AND DOES NOT FIND IT AS AMBIGUOUS. THE COURT FINDS THAT 
IT IS IN SUBSTANCE A COMPLETE FREEZE OF ALL FUNDS HELD BY MR. 
MALOUF. THE COURT KNOWS AND APPRECIATES THAT VERY OFTEN 
GARNISHMENT JUDGMENTS GO OUT AND THEY SAY EXEMPT FOR EXEMPT 
PROPERTIES. THIS IS VERY COMMON WHERE YOU ARE AFTER WAGES. 
THIS IS NOT COMMON WHERE IT'S AFTER OTHER FUNDS AND IT 
FREQUENTLY WILL FREEZE OTHER FUNDS IN TOTAL. THE COURT DOES 
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NOT DEEM THAT DOCUMENT TO HAVE BEEN AMBIGUOUS. AND IT WAS A 
COMPLETE FREEZE. 
THE COURT FINDS THAT THE ISSUE OF WHETHER IT WAS A 
COMPLETE FREEZE OR IN SOME WAY A LESSER THAN A COMPLETE FREEZE 
AND WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS JURISDICTION HAS BEEN DISPOSED OF 
BY THE RESIDENT JUDGE, AND AS FAR AS THE COURT IS CONCERNED, 
THOSE ITEMS ARE PART OF THE LAW OF THE CASE BEFORE THIS 
PROCEEDING STARTED. I FIND THAT JUDGE CHRISTOFFERSEN WHEN HE 
SAID IN THE FEBRUARY HEARING THAT THAT WOULD — HE DID NOT 
EXEMPT PROPERTIES THAT MIGHT BE CLAIMED TO BE A EXEMPT FROM 
THE ORDER, THAT IT WAS CONTINUED, AND I DO NOT THINK IT IS 
AMBIGUOUS FROM THE TRANSCRIPT AT ALL THAT THIS IS A COMPLETE 
FREEZE. I CANNOT SEE ANY OTHER REASONABLE INTERPRETATION OF 
WHAT THE RESIDENT JUDGE SftlD. 
THE COURT'S LOOKED ftT THE JUDGMENT ftS HE FINALLY ENTERED 
IT, AND THE COURT DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT THE RESIDENT JUDGE'S 
FINftL ORDER IS AMBIGUOUS. THE COURT INTERPRETS IT TO BE VERY 
CLEAR. IT IS ft COMPLETE FREEZE. 
THE COURT HAS ALSO HEARD THE TESTIMONY HERE GIVEN ftND 
FINDS THftT IN TRUTH MR. MftLOUF KNEW THIS WftS ft COMPLETE FREEZE 
ftND KNEW IT THROUGHOUT. HE'S STRUGGLED FOR SOME WftY TO ftVOID 
IT, AND HE HftS ft HODGEPODGE OF HftLF-REftSONED THROUGH 
EXPLANATIONS, BUT NONE OF WHICH AVOID THE BASIC CONCLUSION 
THAT THOSE ORDERS FROM THE RESIDENT JUDGE WERE A COMPLETE 
FREEZE. 
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THE COURT FINDS FURTHER THAT THERE HAVE BEEN HEARINGS 
UNDER CHAPTER 11 IN WHICH SPECIFICALLY NO ATTORNEY'S FEES WERE 
PAID. THE COURT FURTHER FINDS THAT THERE HAVE BEEN HEARINGS 
UNDER CHAPTER 7 IN WHICH NO ATTORNEY'S FEES WERE TO BE PAID. 
THE COURT FINDS THAT PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY FEES ON THESE 
MATTERS IS — CONSTITUTES A VIOLATION OF THOSE ORDERS, AND IS 
NO DEFENSE INSOFAR AS VIOLATIONS OF — ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF 
THE RESIDENT JUDGE'S ORDER HEREIN. THIS WAS A COMPLETE 
FREEZE. 
INSOFAR AS THE EXPLANATION INVOLVING THE DIFFERENCE 
BETWEEN THE SO-CALLED 46,000 PLUS AND THE 41,000 PLUS, I HAVE 
HEARD TWO THINGSt I'VE HEARD ONE THING THAT ALL MONEYS THAT 
WERE OWED WERE PAID OVER, AND THAT HE DID — MR. MALOUF DOES 
NOT KNOW WHAT THE OTHER 5,000 WAS FOR. THEN I HAVE HEARD THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF AN EXPLANATION WHICH SEEMS TO VIOLATE THE RULES 
OF THE IRS AND THE RULES OF LOGIC, AND THE COURT DOES NOT 
BELIEVE HIM. THE CPURT FINDS THIS TO BE A FALSEHOOD. 
THE COURT DOES FIND MR. MALOUF IN CONTEMPT. 
I FIND THAT ATTORNEYS' FEES WILL BE AWARDED AGAINST HIM 
AND SANCTIONS OF OTHER NATURES WILL BE IMPOSED.^ ALSO, HE MUST 
BE AWARE THAT HE CONTINUES TO BE UNDER THE RESIDENT JUDGE'S 
VALID ORDER, THAT HE MUST TURN OVER ANY FUNDS HE HAS TO THE 
TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY. 
THE COURT NOW SITS IN A UNIQUE POSITION AT NEARLY 5:00 
O'CLOCK OF BEING IN THE POSITION WHERE IT'S SIMILAR TO A 
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CRIMINAL PROCEEDING IN WHICH A DEFENDANT IS FOUND GUILTY. BUT 
HE'S ENTITLED TO A MITIGATION-AGGRAVATION HEARING. THE COURT 
WILL SCHEDULE SUCH AN EVENT FOR TOMORROW MORNING AT 10100 
O' CLOCK. 
ALSO, THE COURT IS INTERESTED IN ONE ABSTRACT QUESTION. 
IT WOULD APPEAR TO THE COURT AT THIS TIME THAT THE EXACT 
RULING AND DETERMINATION OF WHETHER OR NOT ANY OF THESE FUNDS 
MAY OR MAY NOT BE EXEMPTED AND THE EXTENT, THE WAY THEY WERE 
EXEMPT, IS NOT CLEAR AT THIS TIME. THE COURT HAS REFERENCE TO 
THOSE SECTIONS OF THE STATUTE WHERE THEY TALK ABOUT REMEDIES 
FOR CONTEMPT AND ONE IS TO MAKE THE PARTY WHO SUFFERED IT IN 
THE CIVIL PROCEEDING WHOLE. THE COURT CANNOT TELL WHAT THAT 
SUM IS AT THIS TIME. SO IF YOU WANT TO PRESENT ANY EVIDENCE 
TOMORROW MORNING AT 10:00 O'CLOCK ON THAT ISSUE, THE COURT 
WILL HEAR IT. 
THE COURT IS FULLY AWARE THAT THE CONSEQUENCES OF 
CONTEMPT HEARINGS ^ AGAINST ATTORNEYS CAN BE FAR-REACHING. FOR 
THAT REASON I THINK MR. MALOUF IS ENTITLED TO MEDITATE ON THIS 
MATTER AND PRESENT WHAT HE HAS TOMORROW MORNING ON THAT ISSUE. 
THIS PARTICULAR TRIAL WILL BE IN RECESS UNTIL TOMORROW 
MORNING AT 10:00 O'CLOCK. 
LQ§9Nx_yiBH NQVEMBER_2§i._i985 i0I00_AJLMi 
THE COURT: UNDER THE NORMAL RULES IN SUCH MATTERS, 
THE PLAINTIFF, PETITIONER, HAS A RIGHT TO PROCEED FIRST. DO 
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THE COURT: I'VE BEEN A JUDGE FOR MORE THAN 30 YEARS, AND 
THIS IS THE FIRST TIME I'VE HAD A PROBLEM OF QUITE THIS 
MAGNITUDE AS FAR AS MISCONDUCT OF AN ATTORNEY IS INVOLVED. 
j 
THE COURT DIRECTS THAT FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND JUDGMENT HAVE TO BE PREPARED, AND I ASSUME THE PETITIONER 
WILL DO THAT FOR THE COURT. NOW, THESE FINDINGS ARE TO 
CAREFULLY CITE THAT, FIRST, THAT THERE WAS A PROCEEDING 
BROUGHT TO FORECLOSE A MORTGAGE ON HIS CLIENTS' FARM 
PROPERTIES, AND THAT THIS IS, SO FAR AS THE COURT IS ABLE TO 
ASCERTAIN, PROBABLY THE EVENT THAT BROUGHT ON THE PETITION 
UNDER CHAPTER 11 IN BANKRUPTCY. 
THAT NOTHING OCCURRED — SECOND, THAT NOTHING OCCURRED IN 
THAT PROCEEDING WHICH WOULD IN ANY WAY JUSTIFY MR. MALOUF IN 
DRAWING ATTORNEY'S FEES FROM FUNDS AVAILABLE AT THAT TIME. 
THAT EXACTLY THE OPPOSITE IS TRUE, HE WAS DENIED THAT 
PRIVILEGE. 
LATER THE CHAPTER 11 BANKRUPTCY WAS CONVERTED TO A 
CHAPTER 7. THERE IS NOTHING IN THE RULINGS OF THE BANKRUPTCY 
JUDGE THAT WOULD GIVE HIM ANY COMFORT INSOFAR AS MAKING A 
CLAIM TO FEES AS FAR AS THE FUNDS ARE CONCERNED. THE COURT 
HAS EXAMINED THE SCHEDULE IN BANKRUPTCY AND CAN FIND NO 
REFERENCE IN ANY WAY TO A SAVING OF *5,300 REFERRED TO 
YESTERDAY. YET IT'S — EVEN IF I WERE TO ACCEPT WHAT HE'S 
TOLD ME, THOSE FUNDS HAD NEVER BEEN CREDITED AS PAID AND WERE 
STILL HELD FOR THEM. 
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THE COURT FINDS THAT THE JUDGE, THE RESIDENT JUDGE DID 
HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO PROCEED WITH THE FORECLOSURE AND 
APPARENTLY DID SO AND APPARENTLY GRANTED A SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 
THE TOTAL OF THE MATTER. 
I CAN — I INTERPRET THE ORIGINAL GARNISHMENT ORDER TO BE 
CAPABLE OF ONE INTERPRETATION AND ONE INTERPRETATION ONLY, AND 
THAT WAS A TOTAL HOLD. I'VE HEARD THE ARGUMENTS ABOUT YOU 
HAVE TO ALLOW FOR EXEMPT PROPERTIES TO AUTOMATICALLY BE TAKEN 
BEYOND THAT, BUT SO FAR AS THE COURT'S AWARE, THAT RULE 
APPLIES ONLY TO THE EXTENT THAT IT'S INVOLVING WITH WAGE 
EARNERS WHERE PART OF THE WAGES ARE EXEMPT FROM ALL 
GARNISHMENTS. BUT THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT THAT IT OTHERWISE 
BE SO INTERPRETED. IN OTHER WORDS, I THINK JUDGE — THE 
RESIDENT JUDGE'S ORDER IS UNAMBIGUOUS. THAT'S MY FINDING. I 
FIND THAT THE HEARING — AT THE HEARING ON FEBRUARY THE 8TH, 
THAT THE TRANSCRIPT DISCLOSES THAT IT'S TOTALLY UNAMBIGUOUS. 
IT CLEARLY IS A COMPLETE HOLD, WITH THE DISCRETION TO 
DETERMINE ANY GARNISHMENT EXEMPTION WOULD BE THEN PLACED 
BEFORE THE TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY AND THE BANKRUPTCY COURT. I 
DO NOT INTERPRET THIS TO BE AMBIGUOUS IN ANY WAY. I THINK 
IT'S CLEAR. 
I THINK THE ORDER WHICH LATER FOLLOWED THE JUDGE'S METHOD 
IS CLEAR THAT THIS IS UN — IT WAS A TOTAL HOLD ORDER AND IT 
IS NOT CAPABLE OF ANY OTHER INTERPRETATION. 
THE COURT FINDS THAT IN VIOLATION OF THESE ORDERS, SUMS 
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HAVE BEEN PAID OUT IN THE AMOUNT OF •21,260.12. THE FOLLOWING 
ITEMS WERE PAID TO HIS CLIENT; AND THAT IS, 1,500, 300, THE 
600, 1,500, AND THE 3,000. THE FOLLOWING SUMS WERE DRAWN BY 
» 
HIMSELF SO FAR AS I CAN DETERMINE FROM THESE AMOUNTS; AND THAT 
IS, 6,000, AND ONE THE THE 3,000S, AND THE 5,300 IS DRAWN BY 
HIMSELF. ACTUALLY HE DREW MORE MONEYS OUT THAN DID HIS 
CLIENT. 
THE COURT FINDS IT TO BE A FACT THAT THE DEFENSE IN THIS 
MATTER HAS NOT BEEN IN GOOD FAITH. THE COURT FINDS THAT IT IS 
IN BAD FAITH. THAT THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SUDDEN EXPLANATION 
OF THE *5,300 IS TOTALLY INCONSISTENT WITH THE EARLIER 
STATEMENTS AND REPRESENTATIONS THAT ALL OF THE MONEYS WERE 
EXEMPT BECAUSE THEY CAME FROM THE MILK FUND, AND THEN IT'S — 
AND THIS — AND THESE TYPE OF REPRESENTATIONS, AND THEN 
SUDDENLY IT COMES FROM A BRAND NEW SOURCE, AFTER THERE BEING 
NO DISCLOSURE OF THAT EARLIER. 
THE COURT CAN F4ND LITTLE PERSUASIVE EVIDENCE AT ALL TO 
SUPPORT THE CONTENTION THAT THEIR DOES EXIST AND DID EXIST 
EARLIER BEFORE THE BANKRUPTCY STARTED A PENSION FUND 
ARRANGEMENT. I HAVE LITTLE EVIDENCE THIS IS TRUE. 
THE COURT BELIEVES THAT THE DEFENSE IS PRIMARILY ONE OF 
ATTEMPTING TO CAUSE A SMOKE SCREEN SO THAT THERE WOULD BE SOME 
CLOUD ON THE MATTER, SO THAT IT COULD BE CONTINUED, NOT 
BROUGHT TO A HEAD, AND COLLECTIBLE. THE COURT BELIEVES THAT 
THE DEFENSE IS IN BAD FAITH UNDER THE STATUTES. 
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THE COURT SENTENCES AS FOLLOWS: THE COURT GRANTS 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE TRUSTEE FOR *21,260. 12. 
THE COURT GRANTS JUDGMENT FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES BECAUSE OF 
THE BAD FAITH DEFENSE. I THINK SOME OF THE MONEYS WHICH WERE 
SPENT ON ATTORNEYS' FEES MAY HAVE BEEN SPENT IN PART FOR OTHER 
PURPOSES, BUT THE COURT HERE ASSESSES ATTORNEY FEES AT «£,200 
AS A REASONABLE FEE. THIS JUDGMENT IS IN FAVOR OF THE 
PETITIONER ALONE, NOT THE TRUSTEE. 
THE COURT SENTENCES HIM TO PAY A FINE OF *100 AND SERVE 
30 DAYS IN THE COUNTY JAIL. THE COURT WILL SUSPEND 25 DAYS OF 
THE COUNTY JAIL TIME UPON THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS: FIRST OF 
ALL, HE MUST RETURN ALL SUMS WHICH HE STILL HOLDS REGARDLESS 
OF HOW — WHERE OR HOW THEY'RE INVESTED THAT ARE IN ANY WAY 
TRACEABLE FROM MONEYS DRAWN FROM THE — FROM THESE ACCOUNTS. 
NEXT, HE MUST ANSWER QUESTIONS TRUTHFULLY CONCERNING HIS 
RESOURCES AND WHERE HIS FUNDS ARE AT THE TIME. HE1S PROVIDED 
AN OPPORTUNITY TO D0 SO, SO THAT — TO FACILITATE THE 
COLLECTION OF THE MONEYS. THIS OPPORTUNITY TO ANSWER 
QUESTIONS SO AS TO REDUCE THE SENTENCE WILL BE GIVEN TO HIM IN 
15 MINUTES. YOU MAY ASK HIM ABOUT HIS RESOURCES, IF HE WANTS 
TO ANSWER THE QUESTIONS. 
THZ COURT WILL FIX THE DATE OF THE EXECUTION OF THE 
SENTENCE AS IT WILL START ON THE 11TH DAY OF DECEMBER, THE 
COUNTY JAIL, CACHE COUNTY, 9:00 O'CLOCK IN THE MORNING. THE 
COURT ANTICIPATES THAT THE COURT WILL HAVE BEFORE THAT TIME 
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SIGNED THOSE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, SO THAT HE 
WILL HAVE HAD THEM BY FIVE DAYS FOR A FULL — AT LEAST FIVE 
DAYS BEFORE THAT JAIL SENTENCE STARTS. IN THE EVENT THERE IS 
AN APPEAL, THE COURT WILL FIX THE APPEAL BOND AT *1,000. 
COURT WILL BE IN RECESS 15 MINUTES, AND YOU SEE IF YOU 
WANT TO ASK QUESTIONS AND IF HE WANTS TO ANSWER QUESTIONS AS 
TO THE FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR THE RESTORINIG OF THE FUNDS. COURT 
WILL BE IN RECESS — 
MR. MALOUFs I HAVE ONE QUESTION, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: YES. THE COURT WILL ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS AS 
TO ADDITIONAL FINDINGS EITHER SIDE HAS. 
MR. MALOUF: IF THERE IS AN APPEAL, WILL THAT STAY THE 
COMMENCEMENT OF THE JAIL TERM? 
THE COURT: ONLY IF YOU POST A BOND WILL IT STAY THE JAIL 
TERM. IF YOU WANT TO STAY THE OTHERS, YOU WILL HAVE TO POST A 
SUPERSEDEAS BOND. ARE THERE OTHER QUESTIONS? 
MR. BROWN: NO^ YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: COURT WILL BE IN RECESS 15 MINUTES. 
(WHEREUPON THE COURT TOOK A BRIEF RECESS-) 
THE COURT: DO YOU DO YOU WISH TO EXPLORE THE 
POSSIBILITY OF RETURN OF FUNDS? 
MR. BROWN: YES, YOUR HONOR, I DO. 
THE COURT: DO YOU ELECT TO ANSWER QUESTIONS? 
MR. MALOUF: I ELECT TO ANSWER QUESTIONS. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. DO YOU OR DO YOU NOT? 
•M 
James R. Brown (#456) 
Michael N. Zundel (#3755) 
Wm. Shane Topham (#4425) 
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
370 East South Temple, Suite 401 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7700 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH FARM PRODUCTION 
CREDIT ASSOCIATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GARTH N. LABRUM, DUANE B. 
LABRUM, ROSS N. LABRUM, et al. 
Defendants. 
CONSENT TO EXTENSION 
OF EFFECT OF TEMPORARY 
RESTRAINING ORDER 
AND JOINT MOTION FOR ORDER 
EXTENDING EFFECT AND 
CONTINUANCE OF HEARINGS 
Civil No. 20842 
Utah Farm Production Credit Association, by and through 
its counsel of record, Michael N. Zundel, and Garth N. Labrum, 
Duane B. Labrum, Ross N. Labrum, I. Lee Labrum dba Labrum Brothers, 
a partnership, and the following individuals, Garth N. Labrum, .-,,*•, 
Duane B. Labrum, Ross N. Labrum, I. Lee Labrum, Lori^^^aErum, 
f», by
 a„d^?/' Kaye S. Labrum, Jane£^-ft7Labrum, and Lin 
through their counsel of record, Raymond N. Malouf, hereby 
stipulate and agree as follows? 
1. All of J:he above-named Defendants, do hereby consent 
this 
^ 6 
that the Temporary Restraining Order issued by Court against 
said Defendants on January 21, 1985 at the hour of 1:35 p.m., may 
be extended to February 8, 1985, through the hour of 11:59 P.m. u~* 
~>r-ofe^t *^<£ fc> X^ &Kb^^ ~fh/£ Valid J^t° &&ys 7>*AA pz*\ £'> 
2. Dtah Farm Production Credit Association consents to 
the continuance of the hearings on its Temporary Restraining Order 
and Order to Show Cause, previously scheduled for February 4, 
1985/ to February 8f 1985 at the hour of 3:00 p.m., all as requested 
by counsel for the above-named Defendants in order to accomodate 
his schedule. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff and the above-named Defendants 
jointly move this Court for an Order extending the effect of the 
Temporary Restraining Order heretofore issued, to February 8, 
1985, at the hour of 11:59 p.m. and an Order continuing the 
hearing of Plaintiff's Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order 
and this Court's Order to Show Cause from February 4, 1985 to 
February 8, 1985 at the hour of 3:00 p.m. 
DATED this day of January, 1985. 
,OUF 
150 East 200 North, #1 
Logan, Dtah 84321 
Attorney for Defendants Labrum 
'MICHAEL N. ziaNDErr ^ S S L ^ ^ 
JARDINE, LINEBAUOH, BROWN & DUNN 
370 East South'Temple, Suite 401 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT CODRT IN AND FOR 
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH FARM PRODUCTION 
CREDIT ASSOCIATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GARTH N. LABRUM, DUANE B. 
LABRUM, ROSS N. LABRUM, et al. 
Defendants. 
ORDER EXTENDING EFFECT 
OF TEMPORARY RESTRAINING 
ORDER AND CONTINUING 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
AND HEARING ON 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
Civil No. 20842 
Upon consideration of the Stipulation and Joint Motion 
4L of the Plaintiff and the Defendants herein, whereby the Defendants 
restrained by that certain Temporary Restraining Order issued 
by this Court on January 21, 1985 have consented to the extension 
of the effect of said Temporary Restraining Order to February 8, 
1985r to the hour of 11:59 p.m., and good cause appearing there-
forf it is hereby 
ORDERED, that the Temporary Restraining Order heretofore 
issued by this Court on January 21 , 1985, at the hour of 1:35 
p.m., is hereby extended andf doopite its termsf shall not expire 
until February 8/ 1985/ at the hour of 11:59 p.m.; and it is 
further 
ORDERED, that the hearing of Plaintiff's Motion for '•] 
Preliminary Injunction, previously scheduled for Februarv^4/ ^ jsZ 
1985f at the hour of 9:00 a.m.f is hereby continued and shall .be _~ 
^SJ o n .i 377 
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heard on February 8, 1985, at the hour of 3:00 p.m.; and it is 
further 
ORDERED, that the Order to Show Cause previously issued 
by this Court on January 21, 1985, ordering all of the Defendants 
in the above-entitled case, except Federal Land Bank, Hyrum Feed, 
and New Holland Equipment Agency, to appear and show cause on 
February 4, 1985, at the hour of 9:00 a.m. is hereby modified so 
that said Defendants are hereby ordered to appear and show cause 
on February 8, 1985, at the hour of 3:00 p.m., at the Courthouse 
of the District Judge, Logan, Utah, then and there to show cause, 
if any they have, why this Court should not order turnover of the 
Milk Diversion proceeds to Utah Farm Production Credit Association. 
DATED this .?J|. day of January, 1985. 
/ 
BY THE COURT:h 
i I / 
/ 
VeNoy Chri/fetoffepson 
District Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORMs 
55 '*Lf205 
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
In re ) 
THOMAS A. KERR, ) Bankruptcy Case No* 84C-03028 
Debtor. ) 
GORDON M. MCCLEAN, SR., ) Bankruptcy Case No. 84C-01280 
Debtor. ) 
GORDON M. MCCLEAN, JR.f ) Bankruptcy Case No. 84C-01279 
Debtor. ) 
) MEMORANDUM OPINION 
Appearances: R. Kimball Mosier, Mosier, Straley & Doxey, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, for Thomas A. Kerr; Michael A. Katz, 
Garrett & Sturdy, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Deseret Federal 
Savings and Loan Association; Carl J. Nemelka, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, for Gordon M. McClean, Sr. and Gordon M. McClean, Jr.; 
Roger G. Segal, Cohne, Rappaport & Segal, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
for himself as trustee. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Before the Court are three contested matters which have been 
consolidated to consider common issues of law concerning whether 
or not these self-employed debtors1 interests in their Keogh 
retirement plans are excluded or exempt from their bankruptcy 
estates. 
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The Kerr Case 
Thomas A. Kerrr a practicing dentist, filed a voluntary 
petition for relief under Chapter 7 on November 6, 1984. The 
principal assets listed on his bankruptcy schedules are two Keogh 
retirement accounts totaling $77,000.00. The debtor claimed the 
funds in the plans as exempt pursuant to Utah Code Ann, 
§ 78-23-5(3). 
Kerr first established a Keogh plan in 1964 and has 
contributed to it for 18 years. In August 1984, Kerr deposited 
his retirement funds into an "'H.R. 10' Keogh Retirement Plan and 
Trust," Account No. 489982, and designated Zions First National 
Bank as Trustee. The plan is qualified under ERISA. The plan 
contains a clause which prohibits a participant or beneficiary 
from alienating or assigning any benefit provided under the 
plan.l 
Deseret Federal Savings and Loan Association ("Deseret 
Federal") was listed on the debtor's A-3 Schedule as a creditor 
having an unsecured claim in the sum of $250,000.00. The claim 
1 
Paragraph 8.05 of the Trust Agreement provides: 
Assignment or Alienation. Neither a 
Participant nor a Beneficiary shall assign or 
alienate any benefit provided under the Plan, 
and the Trustee shall not recognize any such 
assignment or alienation. 
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arises out of a judgment against the debtor entered by the Third 
Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on 
March 29, 1983, Deseret Federal filed an objection to the 
debtor's claim of exemptions on February 6, 1985. The objection 
was heard on March 28, 1985 and taken under advisement. 
The McClean Cases 
Gordon McClean, Sr. and Gordon McClean, Jr., father and son, 
each filed a petition for voluntary relief under Chapter 7 on May 
10, 1984. Both debtors are self-employed chiropractors. The 
only assets with recognized values listed in their bankruptcy 
schedules filed pursuant to Section 521(1) and Bankruptcy Rule 
1007(b) were wearing apparel, ski equipment, and certain 
ERISA-qualified pension plans. McClean, Sr. listed an E.F. 
Hutton Keogh plan with a value of $56,000.00, and McClean, Jr. 
listed two plans with an aggregate value of $33,651.12. Funds in 
the plans were claimed as exempt property by the debtors on 
Schedule B-4 pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 4003(a). The trustee 
questioned each debtor about the plans at the Section 341 meeting 
held on June 11, 1984. On July 9, the trustee filed objections 
to the debtors' claimed exemptions. The parties submitted 
memoranda of law and an evidentiary hearing was held on 
December 7, 1984. 
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At the hearing, the trustee offered and the*Court received 
in evidence Gordon McClean Jr.'s Keogh Account/ entitled 
•'Colonial Profit-Sharing Retirement Plan and Trust for Self-
Employed Individuals." The plan qualifies under Section 401 of 
the Internal Revenue Code for self-employed individuals. 
Ronald L. Tressler, an account executive with Prudent ial -Bache, 
testified that the Keogh account set up for Gordon McClean, Jr. 
had funds on deposit in the amount of $33,351.12. Mark J. 
Meidell, an account executive with E.F. Hutton & Company, 
testified that the McClean pension plans were established as 
ERISA-qualified Keogh accounts.2 The debtors were granted 
leave to join E.F. Hutton & Company and Prudential-Bache in this 
proceeding, but apparently have declined to do so. 
2 
Mr. Meidell appeared and testified pursuant to a subpoena 
issued by the Court at the trustee's request which directed 
him to bring any documentation related to the McClean 
accounts. He testified that the documents were in New York 
and were being sent to him. The Court directed Meidell upon 
receipt of the documents to turn them over to his attorney 
and instructed him to inform counsel for the trustee and the 
McCleans. To date counsel have neither moved to supplement 
the record with the documents relating to the plans or to 
reopen the hearing for the purpose of introducing additional 
evidence based upon the documents. Therefore, the Court 
considers the record closed and shall decide the matter on 
the basis of the evidence presently before it. 
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DISCUSSION 
Debtors' attempts to keep their pension plan funds^ out of 
the bankruptcy estate have resulted in increasing litigation and 
much discussion by courts and commentators^ in recent years. 
Judicial resolution of these cases involves the interpretation of 
Although a wide variety of pension plans exist, there are 
four general categories. The first is the traditional 
defined-benefit pension plan, which provides for a guaranteed 
benefit after retirement, and is usually connected to some 
portion or percentage of the worker's salary. The second 
category is the defined-contribution plan, which simply 
operates to provide certain contributions to a special 
retirement account during the employee's stay with the 
employer. The third category of pension plan, the Keogh 
plan, is limited to use by self-employed persons, and is 
usually controlled and administered by the self-employed 
individual. Keogh plans are established pursuant to the 
Keogh-Smathers Act, Pub.L. No. 87-792, 76 Stat. 809 (1962) 
(codified in scattered sections of the Internal Revenue 
Code). The final category consists of individual retirement 
accounts ("IRAs"). Note, The Fate of ERISA-Qualifled 
Pension Plans Under the Federal Bankruptcy Code, 11 Win. 
Mitchell L.Rev. 1045 n. 2 (1985). 
See, e.g. , Note, Contra Goff: Of Retirement Trusts and 
Bankruptcy Code § 541(c)(2), 32 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 1266-1331 
(1985); Note, The Fate of ERISA-Qualified Pension Plans Under 
the Federal Bankruptcy Code, Comment, Retirement Plan Assets: 
The Retention Rights of an Oklahoma Debtor in Bankruptcy, 20 
Tulsa L.J. 589-604 (1985); Wohl, Pension and Bankruptcy Laws: 
A Clash of Social Policies, 64 N.C.L.Rev. 3-36 (1985); Note, 
The Individual Debtor's Interest in ERISA Benefits: Is It 
Property of the Estate? Is It Exempt" 1 Bkrtcy .Dev „ J. 
293-316 (1985); Note, Corporate Pension Plans as Property of 
the Bankruptcy Estate, 69 Mmn.L.Reve 1113-1134 (1985); Note, 
Exemption of ERISA Benefits Under Section 522(b)(2)(A) of the 
Bankruptcy Code, 83 Mich.L.Rev. 214-236 (1984); Wemtraub & 
Resnick, From the Bankruptcy Courts: In Re Goff -- Keogh 
Plans and IRAs as Property of the Bankruptcy Estate, 16 
U.C.C.L.J. 264 (1984) . 
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ambiguous statutory language in the Bankruptcy Code and 
< 
conflicting policy objectives which exist between the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") and the Code. 
Basically/ debtors have urged courts to exclude or exempt 
pension funds on three grounds. First, they argue that such 
funds are excluded property under § 541(c)(2). Second, they 
argue that ERISA-qualified pension plans are exempted under 
§ 522(b)(2)(A). Third, where, as in Utah, a state has "opted 
out" of the federal exemptions, debtors look to the state 
exemptions act. Each of these positions has been raised by the 
parties in these proceedings. 
I. 
Property of the Estate and the § 541(c)(2) Exclusion 
Section 541(a) provides that a bankruptcy estate is 
comprised of "all legal or equitable interest of the debtor in 
property as of the commencement of the case." Congress intended 
the scope of § 541(a)(1) to be very broad and to expand the reach 
of the bankruptcy estate beyond what had existed under the former 
Act. United States v. Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. 198, 204-05, 103 
S.Ct. 2309, 2313, 76 L.Ed.2d 515 (1983). 
Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, property of the estate had 
been defined in terms of transferability and leviability. 11 
U.S.C. § 110(a)(5) (repealed Oct. 1, 1979). See 3 REMINGTON ON 
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BANKRUPTCY § 1178, at 9-11 (J. Henderson rev.,ed. 1957)o A 
two-part test was applied to determine whether property passed 
into the bankruptcy estate: At the date of filing the petition, 
could the property have been (1) transferred by the debtor?; or 
(2) levied upon and sold by judicial process against him, or 
otherwise seized, impounded, or sequestered? If neither one of 
these conditions was met, the property was excluded from the 
estate. 4A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 11 70.15 [2], at 137 (14th ed . 
1978). The primary objective of § 70(a)(5), former 11 U.S.C. 
§ 110(a)(5), was "to secure for creditors everything of value the 
bankrupt may [have possessed] in alienable or leviable form when 
he file[d] his petition." Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 379, 
86 S.Ct. 511, 15 L.Ed.2d 428 (1966). 
Under the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, however, all property of the 
debtor comes into the estate upon the filing of a bankruptcy 
petition. After the property comes into the estate, the debtor 
may claim certain exemptions under § 522. S. Rep. No. 95-989, 
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 82 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. 
& Admin. News, p. 5860. Section 541(c)(2) creates an exception 
to the broad inclusion of all of the debtor's property in the 
bankruptcy estate. It provides that certain property subject to 
restrictions on alienation which are enforceable "under 
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a p p l i c a b l e nonbankruptcy law" never becomes proper ty of the 
e s t a t e * 5 Matter of Reagan, 741 F.2d 95 , 97 (5th Cir . 1984) . 
The i s sue of whether an ERISA-qualified plan f i t s within the 
terms of the § 5 4 1 ( c ) ( 2 ) e x c e p t i o n i s compl i ca ted by the f a c t 
t h a t t h e r e i s a f e d e r a l exemption** in the Bankruptcy Code which 
5 
Section 541(c)(2) states: 
A restriction on the transfer of a beneficial 
interest of the debtor in a trust that is 
enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy 
law is enforceable in a case under this 
title. 
6 
Section 522(d)(10)(E) provides: 
The following property may be exempted under 
subsection (b)(1) of this section: 
• * * 
(10) The debtor's right to receive — 
(E) a payment under a stock bonus, 
pension, profitsharing, annuity, or similar 
plan or contract on account of illness, 
disability, death, age, or length of service, 
to the extent reasonably necessary for the 
support of the debtor and any dependent of 
the debtor, unless — 
(i) such plan or contract was 
established by or under the 
auspices of an insider that 
employed the debtor at the time the 
debtor's rights under such plan or 
contract arose; 
(ii) such payment is on account of 
age or length of service; and 
(iii) such plan or contract does 
not qualify under section 401(a), 
403(a), 403(b), 408, or 409 of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 
U.S.C. 401(a), 403(a), 403(b), 408, 
or 409). 
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appears to apply more specifically to ERISA. Matter of Jones, 43 
i 
B.R. 1002f 1005 (N.D. Ind. 1984). Since § 522 (d) (10) (E) 
specifically refers to pension plans and profit-sharing plans, it 
is reasonable to conclude that Congress intended that such 
benefits were to be first brought into the estate and then 
claimed as exempt by the debtor. 
Courts have interpreted § 541(c)(2) in two ways. The 
liberal view, typified by the decision of the court in In re 
Threewitt, 24 B.R. 927, 9 B.C.D. 1225, Bankr.L.Rep. (CCH) 
II 69,020, 8 C.B.C.2d 890 (D. Kan. 1982) holds that since ERISA 
spendthrift restrictions are enforceable against creditors 
The significance of this federal exemption on the question of 
whether pension rights are subject to exclusion under 
§ 541(c)(2) has been the subject of considerable disagreement 
among the courts. Compare In re Graham, 726 F.2d 1268, 1272 
(8th Cir. 1984) (presence of § 522(d) (10)(E) suggests that 
Congress did not intend § 541(c)(2) to be a broad exclusion 
which would keep debtors' entire ERISA benefits out of 
estate) and Regan v. Ross, 691 F.2d 81, 86 (2d Cir. 1982) 
(from coexistence of § 522 (d) (10) (E) and § 541(c)(2) it may 
be inferred that Congress did not intend to exclude pension 
funds from becoming property of the estate) with McClean v. 
Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 
762 F.2d 1204, 1207-08 (4th Cir. 1985) (§ 541(c)(2) is a more 
narrowly focused provision that excludes from the estate 
some, but not all, of the employment benefits which, if 
included in the estate property, might then be subject to 
exemption under § 522(d)(10)(E)) and Matter of Goff, 706 F.2d 
574, 587 (5th Cir. 1983) (given that § 522(d)(10)(E) is much 
broader than § 541, court may consider whether pension plan 
qualifies as a spendthrift trust under state law). See also 
In re White, 47 B.R. 410 (W.D. Wash. 1985); In re DeWeese, 47 
B.R. 251, Bankr.L.Rep. (CCH) 11 70,340, 12 C. B.C. 2d 404 
(Bkrtcy. W.D. N.C. 1985); Matter of Cook, 43 B.R. 996, 1000 
(N.D. Ind. 1984). 
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outside of bankruptcy, then they are enforceable against the 
bankruptcy trustee* Courts adopting this view point out that the 
actual language of the statute does not limit the exclusion to 
spendthrift trusts. See, e.g. , Warren v. G.M. Scott & Sons (In 
re Phillips) , 34 B.R. 543, 544-45, Bankr.L.Rep. (CCH) 11 69,566 
(Bkrtcy. S.D. Ohio 1983); In re Pruitt, 30 B.R. 330, 331, 10 
B.C.D. 760, Bankr.L.Rep. (CCH) % 69,355, 8 C.B.C.2d 912 (Bkrtcy. 
D. Colo. 1983). These cases are based on a broad reading of 
§ 541(c)(2) as including all trusts with assignment and transfer 
restrictions recognized in general federal nonbankruptcy law. 
Matter of Nichols, 42 B.R. 772, 775 (Bkrtcy. M.D. Fla. 1984). The 
Threewitt line of cases rest their holding that pension funds are 
excluded from the debtor's estate under § 541(c)(2) on three 
grounds: (1) that the statute does not explicitly use the term 
"spendthrift trust"; (2) that under nonbankruptcy law a debtor's 
interest in an ERISA-qualified plan is beyond the reach of his 
creditors; and (3) the § 522(d)(10)(E) exemption for pension and 
profit-sharing plans actually "overlaps" § 541(c)(2) rather than 
indicating that ERISA funds were intended as part of the 
bankruptcy estate which could then be exempted under § 522(d) 
(10)(E). Matter of Berndt, 34 B.R. 515, 518-19, Bankr.L.Rep 
(CCH) 11 69,467, 9 C.B.C.2d 848 (Bkrtcy. N.D. Ind. 1983). See, 
e.g. , In re Holt, 32 B.R. 767, 10 B.C.D. 1267, Bankr.L.Rep. (CCH) 
11 69,353 (Bkrtcy. E.D. Tenn. 1983); In re Pruitt, 30 B.R. at 
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331-32; In re Threewitt, 24 B.R. at 929-30; In ,re Rodgers, 24 
B.R. 181, 182-83, Bankr.L.Rep. (CCH) f 68,880 (Bkrtcy. D. Ariz. 
1982); In re Ralstin, Bankr.L.Rep. (CCH) 11 71,184 (Bkrtcy. D. 
Kan. 1986); Warren v. G.M. Scott & Sons, 34 B.R. at 545; In re 
DiPiazza, 29 B.R. 916, 10 B.C.D. 618, Bankr.L.Rep. (CCH) 
1! 69,226, 8 C.B.C.2d 654 (Bkrtcy. N.D. 111. 1983). Under these 
decisions, the debtor's interest in a qualified pension plan 
would always be excluded from the estate. In re El sea, 47 B.R. 
142, 147 (Bkrtcy. E.D. Tenn. 1985). 
The majority position, however, based primarily on the 
legislative history of § 541(c)(2), and on § 522 (d) (10) (E) , is 
that anti-alienation and nonassignability clauses in qualified 
pension plans do not prevent the debtor's interest from coming 
into the bankruptcy estate. In re Elsea, 47 B.R. at 147. See, 
e .g. , In re Daniel, 771 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1985), cert, denied 
Daniel v. Security Pacific Nat. Bank, 106 S.Ct. 1199 (1986); In 
re Lichstrahl, 750 F.2d 1488 (11th Cir. 1985); In re Graham, 726 
F.2d at 1268; In re Goff, 706 F.2d at 574; Regan v. Ross, 691 
F.2d at 81; In re Goldberg, 59 B.R. 201, Bankr.L.Rep. (CCH) 
11 71,068 (Bkrtcy. N.D. Okla. 1986); In re Schwartz, 58 B.R. 606 
(Bkrtcy. N.D. Iowa 1984); In re McKenna, 58 B.R. 221 (Bkrtcy. 
N.D. Iowa 1985); In re White, 47 B.R. 410 (W.D. Wash. 1985); ^ 11 
re DeWeese, 47 B.R. 251, Bankr.L.Rep. (CCH) 11 70,340, 12 C.B.C.2d 
404 (Bkrtcy. W.D. N.C. 1985); In re Nichols, 42 B.R. 772, 776 
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(Bkrtcy. M.D. Fla. 1984). In cases involving pension plans such 
as these, the courts have treated the debtor's interest in the 
plan as a beneficial interest in a trust. In re Elsea, 47 B.R. 
at 147. The question then arises as to what Congress meant in 
Section 541(c)(2) by the words "applicable nonbankruptcy law" 
under which the debtor's interest in a retirement trust may be 
excluded from the estate. ERISA is codified partly in the 
Internal Revenue Code and partly in Title 29 of the United States 
Code, and it contains anti-alienation provisions in each. It 
provides that a pension plan can qualify only if it includes a 
restriction on transfer of the beneficiary's interest. These 
statutes do not specifically require a "spendthrift" restriction 
that prohibits creditors from using garnishment, attachment, 
execution or other process to collect the beneficiary's debt 
directly from the administrator of the pension plan. However, the 
rule has developed that a spendthrift restriction is required and 
is enforceable against creditors. Id. at 146-47, citing 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1056(d); 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(13); 26 C.F.R. § 1 . 401(a)-13; 
United States v. Buha, 623 F.2d 455 (6th Cir. 1980). 
The majority and trend position, particularly among the 
appellate courts, is that the reference in Section 541(c) to 
"applicable nonbankruptcy law" applies only to state law 
concerning spendthrift trusts. See, e.g. , In re Daniel, 771 F.2d 
at 1360; In re Lichstrahl, 750 F.2d at 1490; In re Graham, 726 
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F.2d at 1271; Matter of Goff, 706 F.2d at 582; In re Crenshaw, 51 
B„R. 554, 556-57, Bankr.L.Rep. (CCH) 11 71,009 (N.D. Ala. 1985); 
Matter of Cook, 43 B.R. 996, 999-1000 (N.D. Ind. 1984); SSA 
Baltimore Federal Credit Union v. Bizon, 42 B.R. 338, 341-42 (D. 
Md. 1984); In re O'Brien, 50 B.R. 67, 73, 13 B.C.D. 97, 12 
C . B . C . 2 d 1 1 6 1 ( B k r t c y . E . D . Va. 1 9 8 5 ) ; In r e G i l l e t t , 46 B.R. 
6 4 2 , 644 ( B k r t c y . S . D . F l a . 1 9 8 5 ) ; In re Ridenour , 45 B.R. 7 2 , 
7 8 , B a n k r . L . R e p . (CCH) \\ 7 0 , 1 7 2 , 11 C.B.C.2d 1086 ( B k r t c y . E.D. 
Tenn. 1984); Matter of Jones, 43 B.R. at 1006; In re Huff, 42 
B.R. 553, 556, Bankr.L.Rep. (CCH) 11 70,038 (Bkrtcy. N.D. 111. 
1984); Matter of Berndt, 34 B.R. at 515; Matter of Kelley, 31 
B.R. 786, 788, 10 B.C.D. 1457 (Bkrtcy. N.D. Ohio 1983); In re 
DiPiazza, 29 B.R. at 918. 
This position enjoys support from the legislative history. 
Subsection (c) invalidates restrictions 
on the transfer of property of the debtor, in 
order that all of the interests of the debtor 
in property will become property of the 
estate. The provisions invalidated are those 
that restrict or condition transfer of the 
debtor's interest, and those that are 
conditioned on the insolvency or financial 
condition of the debtor, on the commencement 
of a bankruptcy case, or on the appointment 
of a custodian of the debtor's property. 
Paragraph (2) of subsection (c), however, 
preserves restrictions on transfer of a 
spendthrift trust to the extent that the 
restriction is enforceable under applicable 
nonbankruptcy law. 
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H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, 95th Cong. , 1st Sessj. 369 (1977), 
reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, p. 6325. The 
Senate Report similarly states that § 541(c)(2) "preserves 
restrictions on a transfer of a spendthrift trust 
enforceable [under] nonbankruptcy law" but the Senate bill to 
which the report relates, S. 2266, would have limited the extent 
to which such property would be excluded from the estate to that 
"reasonably necessary" for the support of the debtor and his 
dependents. S.Rep. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1978), 
reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, p. 5869. 
Congress adopted the House version and rejected the narrower 
position taken in the Senate version "with respect to income 
limitations on a spend-thrift trust." 124 Cong. Rec. S. 17, 413 
(daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini); 124 Cong. 
Rec. H. 11,096 (daily ed/ Sept. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep, 
Edwards) (emphasis added). Therefore, this Court joins in the 
position of the Fifth, Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuit Courts 
of Appeals that pension plans will be excluded from property of 
the estates only if they are enforceable under state law as 
spendthrift trusts. 
The Utah Supreme Court has not indicated whether or not 
spendthrift trusts are valid in Utah to any extent, but has 
stated that there is a presumption against the creation of a 
spendthrift trust unless either words to that effect are set 
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forth, or the clear and undoubted intention is manifested by the 
terms of the trust instrument. Cronquist v. Utah State 
Agricultural College, 114 Utah 426, 201 P.2d 280, 284 (1949). In 
general, a spendthrift trust is one in which the beneficiary is 
prohibited from anticipating or assigning his interest in or 
income from the trust fund. Id. at 282. See Restatement 
(Second) of Trusts § 152(2) (1959). In Leach v. Anderson, 535 
P.2d 1241 (Utah 1975), the Utah Supreme Court invalidated as a 
fraudulent conveyance a purported spendthrift trust, wherein the 
entire trust res was committed to maintaining the settlor. 
The Utah cases cited suggest that Utah would follow the 
traditional view and hold that restrictions on alienation will 
not be enforced against creditors if the trust is self-settled, 
that is, if the settlor and beneficiary of the trust are the same 
person. See 4 G. Bogert, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 233 
(2d ed. 1966); 2 A. Scott, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 156 (3d ed. 1967); 
E. Griswold, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS § 474, at 543 (2d ed. 1947); 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 156(1). Accordingly, this Court 
concludes that the debtors' pension plans do not constitute valid 
spendthrift trusts under Utah law and, therefore, are not 
excludable from property of the estate under § 541(c)(2). 
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II. 
Exemption of the Debtors1 Pension Funds Under § 522(b)(2)(A) 
Having determined that the pension funds are not excluded 
from the property of the estate under § 541(c)(2), the Court must 
next consider whether they are exempt under § 522(b)(2)(A)* That 
subsection permits the debtor to claim as exempt the property 
allowable under the state exemption ais well as any property that 
is exempt under federal law other than the alternative federal 
exemptions listed in § 522(d). In re Stewart, 32 B.R. 132, 136, 
11 B.C.D. 27, Bankr.L.Rep. (CCH) H 69,342 (Bkrtcy. D. Utah 1983). 
The House and Senate Reports on § 522(b)(2)(A) provide an 
illustrative list of property that can be exempted under federal 
laws: 
Foreign Service Retirement and Disability 
payments, 22 U.S„C. 1104; Social security 
payments, 42 U.S.C. 407; Injury or death 
compensation payments from war risk hazards, 
42 U.S.C. 1717; Wages of fishermen, seamen, 
and apprentices, 46 U.S.C. 601; Civil service 
retirement benefits, 5 U.S.C. 729, 2265; 
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compen-
sation Act death and disability benefits, 33 
U.S.C. 916; Railroad Retirement Act annuities 
and pensions, 45 U.S.C. 228(L); Veterans 
benefits, 45 U.S.C. 352(E); Special pensions 
paid to winners of the Congressional Medal of 
Honor, 38 U.S.C. 3101; and Federal homestead 
lands on debts contracted before issuance of 
the patent, 43 U.S.C. 175. 
S. Rep. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 75 (1978), reprinted in 
1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, p. 5861; H.R. Rep. No. 
Page 17 
84003028 
84001280 
84001279 
95 -595 , 95th Cong. , 1st Sess . 360 (1977), reprinte/3 in 1978 U.S. 
Code Cong. & Admin. News, p . 6316. 
In Graham, the deb to r argued t h a t the p l a n ' s p roh ib i t i on 
a g a i n s t ass ignment and a l i ena t ion required by ERISA? and by the 
I n t e r n a l Revenue Code** in o rder t o q u a l i f y the p lan for tax 
purposes , made h i s i n t e r e s t in the plan "property t h a t i s exempt 
under Federa l l aw." The Court noted tha t the House and Senate 
Repor ts on § 522(b) (2) (A) each conta ined a n o n - e x c l u s i v e 
i l l u s t r a t i v e l i s t of p r o p e r t y which might be exempted under 
f e d e r a l l aws , but r e j e c t e d the view t h a t ERISA plan b e n e f i t s 
should be included. 
While the above l i s t was not meant to be 
exc lus ive , we find the f a i l u r e of Congress to 
inc lude ERISA plan b e n e f i t s p r o b a t i v e of 
Congress iona l i n t e n t t h a t ERISA was not a 
"Federa l law" upon which a § 522(b)(2) (A) 
exemption could be based . See In re Goff, 
706 F.2d a t 585. 'Furthermore, although the 
p r o v i s i o n s of some of the s t a t u t e s on the 
l i s t c reat ing a federal exemption are s imi lar 
to the a n t i - a l i e n a t i o n p r o v i s i o n of ERISA, 
there i s a conceptual d i s t i n c t i o n between the 
property exempted by the l i s t e d laws and the 
p r o p e r t y covered by ERISA. The p e n s i o n s , 
wages, benef i t s and payments included in the 
i l l u s t r a t i v e l i s t are a l l pecu l i a r ly federal 
in na tu re , created by federal law or r e l a t e d 
t o i n d u s t r i e s t r a d i t i o n a l l y protected by the 
federal government. In sharp con t r a s t , ERISA 
r e g u l a t e s p r i v a t e employer pension systems. 
We thus conclude, as did the F i f th C i r c u i t , 
[In re Goff, 706 F.2d a t 586] tha t Congress 
29 U.S.C. § 1056(d). 
26 U.S.C. § 401(a) . 
7 
8 
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did not intend to include ERISA plans within 
the other "Federal law" exemption of § 522* 
726 F.2d at 1274. The Eleventh Circuit reasoned similarly in 
Lichstrahl: 
Congress knew of the much-debated and 
comprehensive statute when it issued the 
House and Senate reports on § 522(b)(2)(A) in 
1977 and 1978, and yet it did not include 
ERISA in those reports. Matter of Goff, 706 
F.2d at 585; see also In re Graham, 726 F.2d 
1268, 1274 (8th Cir. 1984). Congress, 
however, did refer to ERISA in other sections 
of the Bankruptcy Code. Of particular 
importance is ERISA's inclusion within the 
alternative federal exemptions listed in 
§ 522(d). The failure to mention ERISA in 
connection with § 522(b) was intentional. 
Matter of Goff, 706 F.2d at 585. 
Furthermore , excluding ERISA-qualif ied 
pension plans from the list of property 
exempted under federal law is consistent with 
an important distinction between exempted 
property and property covered by ERISA. 
Despite the similarity between the anti-
alienation provisions of ERISA and some of 
the listed statutes, the "pensions, wages, 
benefits and payments included in the . . . 
list are all peculiarly federal in nature, 
created by federal law or related to 
industries traditionally protected by the 
federal government. In sharp contrast, ERISA 
regulates private employer pension systems." 
In re Graham, 726 F.2d at 1274. It is this 
"peculiarly federal nature" shared by the 
cited statutes that identifies and determines 
which federal statutes are to be included 
within the "other federal law" exemption of 
§ 522 and which, like ERISA, are to be 
excluded. See Matter of Goff, 706 F.2d at 
586. 
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750 F.2d at 1491. Accord, Matter of Goff, 706 F.2<? at 585; In re 
Daniel , 771 F.2d at 1361; In re White, 47 B.R. 410, 412-13 (W.D. 
Wash. 1985); In re Gillett, 46 B.R. 642, 644 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Fla. 
1985). Although the issue is not free from doubt, and while it 
would be highly desirable from a policy standpoint if Congress 
were to address the issue and not leave it to the courts to draw 
inferences from Congressional silence, this Court is inclined to 
follow the reasoning of Goff and Lichstrahl, and reject that of 
In re Hinshaw, 23 B.R. 233, 9 B.C.D. 769, Bankr.L.Rep. (CCH) 
11 69,066, 7 C.B.C.2d 323 (Bkrtcy. D. Kan. 1982). In this regard 
it is perhaps significant that Congress chose not to deal with 
the issue in the 1984 Amendments, suggesting it did not disagree 
with the interpretation given § 522(b)(2)(A) by a majority of the 
courts. This Court therefore holds that the debtors' interests 
in their retirement plans are not exempt under § 522(b)(2)(A) as 
"other federal law." 
III. 
Exemption of the Debtors' Pension Funds Under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-6(3) 
In 1981, the Utah legislature decided to "opt out" of the 
federal exemptions by enacting the Utah Exemption Act. See 
generally In re Neiheisel, 32 B.R. 146, 11 B.C.D. 32, 
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Bankr.L.Rep. (CCH) K 6 9 , 4 4 0 (Bkr tcy . D. Utah 1?983) • S e c t i o n 
78-23-6(3) provides: 
[A]n i n d i v i d u a l i s e n t i t l e d to exemption of 
the f o l l o w i n g p r o p e r t y t o the e x t e n t 
r e a s o n a b l y n e c e s s a r y for the support of the 
indiv idual and h i s dependents: 
* * * 
(3) Assets held, payments, and amounts 
payable under a stock bonus, pension, 
profit-sharing, annuity, or similar plan 
providing benefits other than by reason of 
illness or disability. 
The language of this exemption is drawn from Section 6(a)(5) 
of the Uniform Exemptions Act, which in turn was derived from 
Section 522 (d ) (10 ) (E) of the Bankruptcy Code and Section 
4-503(b)(6) of the bankruptcy bill proposed by the Commission on 
the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States. It clearly applies to 
these debtors1 retirement plans but is limited to funds 
"reasonably necessary for the support of the [debtor] and his 
dependents." What is "reasonably necessary" under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-23-6(3) is clearly a question of fact requiring a further 
evidentiary hearing. Factors which the Court may consider in 
determining what is reasonably necessary for the support of each 
debtor and his dependents will include, without limitation, the 
debtor's age, health, future earnings capacity, and necessary 
expenditures. See In re Kochell, 26 B.R. 86, 87, 9 B.C.D. 1329, 
Bankr.L.Rep. (CCH) 11 68,942 (Bkrtcy. W.D. Wis. 1982), aff *d 31 
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B.R. 139 (W.D. Wis. 1983), aff fd 732 F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1984); ^B 
re Donaghy, 11 B.R. 677, 680, Bankr.L.Rep. (CCH) % 68,049, 4 
C.B.C.2d 1099 (Bkrtcy. S.D. N.Y. 1981). 
C0NCL0SI0N 
The purpose of personal bankruptcy under Chapter 7 is 
two-fold. First, it provides a mechanism for the liquidation of 
the debtor's estate for the satisfaction of creditors' claims. 
Second, by means of the discharge and application of the 
exemption provisions, it relieves the debtor from his debt 
burdens and gives him a "fresh start. "3 The exemption 
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code are the product of much debate 
and compromise by Congress, and reflect two not necessarily 
inconsistent, but certainly different philosophical purposes. 
The first object of any exemption scheme is to provide the debtor 
with the minimum amount of property necessary to retain his 
dignity and to attempt self-rehabilitation following his 
discharge. The second purpose behind exemption laws is to set a 
ceiling on the maximum amount of property which a debtor should 
be permitted to retain before infringing on the reasonable 
9 
See Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before the House Subcomm. 
on Civil and Const. Rights, 94th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., Ser. 
No. 27, Pt. 2 at 768 (1976) (statement of Prof. Philip 
Shuchman). 
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interests of creditors in that property. 10 The unwillingness of 
Congress to provide a blanket exclusion or exemption of 
retirement funds suggests a balancing of these purposes. 
Based upon the foregoing, this Court concludes that the 
debtors' pension plan funds constitute property of their 
respective estates not excluded by operation of § 541(c)(2). The 
funds are not subject to exemption pursuant to § 522(b)(2)(A) 
under "other federal law," but are exempt to the extent 
reasonably necessary for the support of the debtors and their 
dependents under Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-6(3). 
Counsel for Deseret Federal shall prepare an appropriate 
order in the Kerr case and the trustee of the estates of Gordon 
McClean, Sr. and Gordon McClean, Jr. shall do likewise in those 
cases. The foregoing memorandum opinion constitutes the Court's 
findings of fact and conclusions of law under Bankruptcy Rule 
7052. 
DATED this 1st day of August, 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE 
10 
Id. Pt. 3 at 1658 (statement of L.E. Creel III, representing 
the Dallas Bar Association). 
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IN IKE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF CACHE 
" 478933 
JCIE m ^ \ t
 eyo 
/ CORRECTED 
vs. m \ Certificate of Sale of Real 
iABRmHaoraro^  ( Estate Under Foreclosure 
Civ i l No. 23479 
Defendant 
STATE OF UTAH, 
County of Cache M-
Sidney P. Groll 
I, . Sheriff of Cache County, State of Utah, do hereby 
certify that under and by virtue of the final judgment and decree of the said First Judicial District Court, 
heretofore duly made, rendered and entered in the above entitled cause, and of an order of sale duly issued 
therein and to me duly directed and delivered as Sheriff of said Cache County, whereby I was commanded 
to sell the property hereinafter described, or so much thereof as might be necessary, according to law, and 
to apply the proceeds of such sale towards the satisfaction of the judgment in said action, amounting to the 
( 774,550.35 ) 
sum of .........-......—«-• .~>~..-~..»——. 
Seven Hundred Seventy Four Thousand Five Hundred Fif ty end 35 /100—-prrrxx ire 
( 6810 676 89 ^ 
with interest, counsel fees, taxes, end costs of suit, amounting in all to the sum of , !.«—.!..... 
Eight Hundred Ten Thousand Six Hundred Seventy Six and 89/100— DOCEARS" 
on the Z^L day of *5L~ A. D. 19 J5SL, after due and legal notice, I sold at 
Public Auction, according to the statute in such cases made and provided, to 3&£j529SSi-55?5 
S50 000 00 
^SL^SSSSS^SL who was the highest and best bidder therefor, for the sum of J L . 1 L _ 
Fif ty-Tbousand - • ' 
l ± L : „ t ™ ^ Z DOLLARS, 
which was the highest and best sum bid, and which was the whole price paid by 35&S-l!^SSiLififfi?.— 
^&SSti^SJ!&£E&S&BL. all the right, title and interest of the said defendantS., in and to the 
real estate described in said order of sale, described as follows, to-wit: 
Beginning 2640 feet West, South 80 rods, East 50 rods, South 
80 rods, East 300 feet from the Northeast corner of the Southeast 
Quarter of Section 6, Tcwnship 14 North, Range 1 East of the 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence East 300 feet, 
thence North 300 feet, thence West 300 feet, thence South 300 
feet to the point of beginning. 
STATE OF UTAH 
(SS) 
COUNTY oj CACHE 
FILED* HORDED FOR 
ST5 III2VB5 
MICHAEL t J F.KD 
courrr RCO-JCBER 
Br DEPUTY ^A 
One And 1 further certify that the said property was soil in 
lots <ir parcels, as follows: 
Beginning 2640 feet West, South 80 rods, East 50 rods, South 
80 rods, East 300 feet from the Northeast corner of the Southeast 
Quarter of Section 6, Township 14 North, Range 1 East of the 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence East 300 feet, 
thence North 300 feet, thence West 300 feet, thence South 300 
feet to the point of beginning. 
and that the same is subject to redemption in lawful money of the United States pursuant to the statute 
in such cases made and provided. Dated at i £ S 5 j . « H 5 ! L ~ - A . . ^ J p ^ JthisdJ.#\. day 
of VS. A.D.19.??™
 SJ *"** 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT Of THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF CACHE 
?HE FEDERAL LAND DANK OF SACRAMENTO 
tABRUM BROTHERS, 
vs. 
et al . , 
?Vata>\& | CORRECTED Certificate of Sale of Real 
E s t a t e UNDER FORECLOSURE 
C i v i l No. 23479 
Defendant^ , 
STATE OF UTAH, 
' • } • County of Cache 
I, ?}Q?L]j-.f^}} Sheriff of Cache County, State of Utah, do hereby 
certify that under and by virtue of the final Judgment and decree of the said First Judicial District Court, 
heretofore duly made, rendered and entered in the above entitled cause, and of an order of sale duly issued 
therein and to me duly directed and delivered as Sheriff of said Cache County, whereby I was commanded 
to sell the property hereinafter described, or so much thereof as might be necessary, according to law, and 
to apply the proceeds of such sale towards the satisfaction of the judgment in said action, amounting to the 
( 774,550.35 ) * 
sum of —• . • ... •,.,„.l,,,l.L_.i._ 
geygn Hundred ScTenty Four Thousand Five Hundred F i f ty and 3Sf\00 TxyiZXRS 
with interest, counsel fees, taxes, and costs of suit, amounting in all to the sum of
 r ,„,. . * * 
on the day of !**£ A. D. 19J£L, after due and legal notice, I sold at 
Public Auction, according to the statute in such cases made and provided, to JMJ!g^?SiJ f i?? .0 .?5^ 
J 2 L S S 5 S 2 5 2 who was the highest and best bidder therefor, for the sum of I § L 5 9 9 J L 9 1 M 
_ Fifty-Five Thousand DOLLARS, 
which was the highest and best sum bid, and which was the whole price paid by . ? * £ . • S ^ S S L l S l ^ , . 
^JBank of Sacramento^ ^ ^ ^
 t M e ^  telcrcft rf ^ §M d r f c n d a n t s, m ^  to the 
real estate described in said order of sale, described as follows, to-wit: 
Beginning at a point East 1162.66 feet more or less along the 
state highway from a point on the O.S.L. Railroad 8.28 chains 
East of the Southwest Oomer of Section 3, Township 14 North, 
Range 1 West of the Salt Lake Base and Iferidian, said beginning 
point being the eastern most point along the state highway of 
Parcel 1 as described in a mortgage dated September 5, 1979 
recorded September 13, 1979 as Entry No. 426615, Book 256, pages 
772-775, and running thence North 149 feet, thence West 200 feet; 
thence South 149 feet; thence East 200 feet to the point of beginning. 
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And I further certify that the said property was sold in 
lots o r parcels, as follows: 
Beginning at a point East 1162*66 feet more or less along the state 
highway from a point on the O.S.L. Railroad 8.28 chains East of the 
Southwest Corner of Section 3, Tcwnship 14 North, Range 1 West of the 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian, said beginning point being the eastern most 
point along the state highway of Parcel 1 as described in a mortgage 
dated September 5, 1979 recorded September 13, -;1979 as Entry No. 426615, 
Book 256, pages 772-775, and running thence North 149 feet, thence West 
200 feet, thence South 149 feet; thence East 200 feet to the point of 
beginning. 
and that the same is subject to redemption in lawful money of the United States pursuant to the statute 
in *uch cases made and provided Dated at 
toy 
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of A. D. 19 
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CORRECTED 
Plaintiff . 
** \ Certificate of Sale of Real 
UBRUM BROTHERS, * i . . (
 E s t a t e U n ( j e r Foreclosure 
Civ i l No. 23479 
h 
Defendant 
STATE OF UTAH, 
County of Cache 
I, ^ ^ ^ L J ^ i Slicriff of Cache County, State of Utah, do hereby 
certify that under and by virtue of the final judgment and decree of the said First Judicial District Court, 
heretofore duly made, rendered and entered in the above entitled cause, and of an order of sale duly issued 
therein and to me duly directed and delivered as Sheriff of said Cache County, whereby 1 was commanded 
to sell the property hereinafter described, or so much tlicreof as might be necessary, according to law, and 
to apply the proceeds of such sale towards the satisfaction of the judgment in said action, amounting to the 
t (774,550.35 ) sum of ~ ......J. :,... .... 
Seven Hundred Seventy Four Thousand ^ive Hundred Ftfff^^ 
1 1 , i 1810 676 89 ^ 
with interest, counsel fees, taxes, and costs of suit, amounting in all to the sum of .. '.........!..Z.J. 
Eight Hundred Ten Thouaand f i x Hundred Seven^^
 ft1tg. 
on the 1$L day of J ^ J A. D. 19 J 5 L . after due and legal notice, I sold at 
Public Auction, according to the statute in such cases made and provided, to ...lS§...?^era.l.#Land..Dank 
Of .SaorameatQ. who was the hichest and best bidder therefor, for the sum of Sttll*lt:*l * 
Four Hundred Eighty Nine Thouaand Six Hundred Seventy Six §Sl.89^10^:rlx)LLATO; 
which was the highest and best sum bid, and which was the whole price paid by 2 6 & . E ^ ? 3 ^ J s i K d - . ^ ? 1 ^ 
M..QfMJSacranentO all the right, title and interest of the said defendant.?., in and to the 
real estate described in said order of sale, described as follows, to-wit: 
Parcel 1, (Cornish farm) Beginning at a point on the East line of the O.S.L. 
railroad 8.28 chains East of the Southwest corner of the Southwest Quarter of 
Section 3, Township 14 North, Range 1 West of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
and running thence North 3 55' West 20 chains; thence East .38 chains; thence 
North 3 55,' West 20 chains, more or less to the North line of the Southwest 
Quarter of Section 3; thence East 33.01 chains, more or less to the Northeast 
oorner of said Southwest Quarter of Section 3; thence North to the South bank 
of Bear River; thence Southeasterly and Southerly along said South bank of 
Bear River to a point North 87°55' East 371.75 feet from a point 12.75 chains 
South fran the Center of said Section; thence South VT55% West to a point 
33 feet East of said North and South cgntor line; thence South 168 feet; thence 
South 25°East 282 feet thence South 5 East 254 feet; thence West 1C0 feet 
to a point 1043 feet North of the South Quarter corner of said Section; tlience 
South 25 feet; thence South 45° West 160 feet; thence West 254 feet; thence 
South 288 feet; thence West 250 feet; thence South 100 feet; thence West 139 
feet to a point 521 feet North of a point 759 feet West of the South Quarter 
corner of said Section; thence South 339 feet; thence 
West 191 feet; thence 
South J49 feet; thence West along State Highway 1162.66 feet to the place of 
beginning, containing 154.84 acres, excepting any portion of the above described 
property lying within the State Highway. 
Less the following (Cornish House); Beginning at a point East 1162.66 feet 
rrpr? ot less along the state highway from a point on the O.S.L. Railroad 8—8 
chains East of the Southwest Corner of Section 3, Township 14 North, Range 1 
West of the Salt Lake Base and rieridian, said beginning point being tho eastern 
most point along the state highway of Parcel 1 as described in a mortgage 
BOOK 354 PACE546 
dated September 5, 1979 recorded Septeiifcer 13, 1979 as Entry No. 426615, Book 256, 
pages 772-775, and running thence North 149 feet, thence West 200 feet; thence South 
149 feet; thence East 200 feet to the point of beginning. 
Pare*'1 2, (Ross labrum farm, less house). 
Part of the Southeast quarter of Section 6, Township 14 North, Range 1 East of the 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian, described as follows*Beginning at a point 464 feet West of 
the Northeast corner of the Southeast quarter of said Section 6, and rurtning thence West 
2176 feet, more or less, to the Northwest c o m e r of the Southeast quarter of said 
Section 6; thence Ijuth 80 rods; thence East 50 rods; thence South 80 rods; thence 
East 97,33 rods; t h ^ e e North 471 feet; thence East 209 feet to the Section line; thence 
North 1869 feej; to h point 300 feet South of the Northeast c o m e r of the Southeast quartci 
of said SectioK 6; thence West 464 feet; thence North 300 feet to the place of beginning. 
Less the following (Ross Labrum House): Beginning 2640 feet West, South 80 rods, East 
50 rods; South 80 rods, East 300 feet from the Northeast corner of the Southeast Quarter 
A n d 1 further certify that the said property was soli* in 
lots or parcels, as follows: Three Parcels/One lot 
of Section 6, Township 14 North, Range 1 East of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and 
running thence East 300 feet, thence North 300 feet, thence North 300 feet, thence West 
300 feet, thence South 300 feet to the point of beginning. 
Parcel 4, Part of the Southeast Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of Section 6, Township 
14 North, Range 1 East of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian, described as follows: 
Beginning at a point 262 feet North of the Southeast Corner of said Section 6, and 
running thence West 209 feet; thence North 209 feet; thence East 209 feet to the East 
line of said Section 6; thence South 209 feet to the place of beginning. 
TOGETHER WITH: (a) 124 shares West Cache Irrigation Company stock, (b) 16 shares of Cub 
River Irrigation Company stock, (c) four wheel-move sprinkler irrigation systems with 
movers, sprinkler heads, wheels and appurtenances and approximately 30 feet of 6" portable 
mainline and approximately 870 feet of 8" portable mainline asfwhere is. 
and that the same is subject to redemption in lawful money of the United States pursuant to the statute 
Logan, Utah
 7 t h 
in such cases made and provided Dated at ....JL -r-**. 4 this ......: day 
of. May .A.D, 
Deputy Sheriff.... 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE 
COjmOFJACHE
 4 7 Q 9 3 6 
jn*L^^ \ L' ° ° 
_ I CORRECTER 
vs. ' \ Certificate of Sale of Real 
LABKUM BROTHERS, et ai., ( Estate Under Foreclosure 
"h 
Defendant 
STATE OF UTAH, ) C i v i l No. 23479 
County of Cache 
Sidney P. Groll 
I, Sheriff of Cache County, State of Utah, do hereby 
certify that under and by virtue of the final judgment and decree of the said First Judicial District Court, 
heretofore duly made, rendered and entered in the above entitled cause, and of an order of sale duly issued 
therein and to me duly directed and delivered as Sheriff of said Cache County, whereby I was commanded 
to sell the property hereinafter described, or so much thereof as might be necessary, according to law, and 
to apply the proceeds of such sale towards the satisfaction of the judgment in said action, amounting to the 
( 774,550.35 ) 
sum of - •—1.,rn-rirf.,.-
Seven Hundred Seventy Thousand Five Hundred Fifty and 35/100-
with interest, counsel fees, taxes, and costs of suit, amounting in all to the sum of... 
Eight Hundred Ten Thouaand Six Hundred Seventy Six and 89/100— 
DOLLARS, 
(810,676.89 ) 
r.~~TDOIXXRSt 
7th May 85 
on the day of ~ A. D. 19 ^ after due and legal notice, I sold at 
Public Auction, according to the statute in such cases made and provided, to J3^§. . .?^€^. . .^!)d. .^!^ 
J^LSiSSSSSSSS who was the highest and best bidder therefor, for the sum of 3SSSL998J& 
Tto.Hff l . foed^ DOLLARS, 
which was the highest and best sum bid, and which was the whole price paid by JS^JEEHSS^rSS?. 
«. * H * JSL^SH!5SdSL all the right, title and interest of the said defendant?., in and to the 
real estate described in said order of sale, described as follows, to-wit: 
Parcel 3 (Dairy and approximately 70 acres) 
Beginning at a point 2 rods West of the Northeast Corner of Section 6, 
Township 14 North, Range 1 East of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian and running 
thence South 47 rods; thence West 10 rods; thence South 1 rod; thence West 
18 rods; thence South 24 rods; thence West 10 rods; thence South 8 rods 
to the South line of the Northeast quarter of the Northeast quarter of said 
Section 6; thence West 118 rods; thence North 80 rods; thence East 158 rods 
to the point of beginning. 
Together with: (a) 9 shares of Cub River Irrigation Company stock, and (b) one AM Manufacturing Wheel-Move sprinker irrigation line, approximately 
1320 feet in length, with movers, sprinkler heads, wheels and appurtenances, 
Serial No. 5038, and approximately 2130 feet of 6" portable mainline as is , 
where is . 
COUNTY OF CACHE 
Fl lED&raCORDEDFOR 
Jai 5 WiiWft 
MIGilAELl i'-tEO 
COUHlYRCOO'DER 
BV DEFi/H y\ 
And 1 further certify that the said property was sol.) in ...53!®. ~~ ~ 
lots or parcels,, as follows: 
Beginning at a point 2 rods West of the Northeast corner of Section 6, 
Ibwnshlp 14 North, Range 1 East of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian and 
running thence South 47 rods; thence West 10 rods; thence South 1 rod; 
thence West IB rods; thence South 24 rods; thence West 10 rods; thence 
South 8 rods to the South line of the Northeast quarter of the Northeast 
quarter of said Section 6; thence West 118 rods; thence North 80 rods; 
thence East 158 rods to the point of beginning. 
Tbgether with: (a) 9 shares of Cub River Irrigation Ccmpany stock, and 
(b) one AM Manufacturing Wheel-Move sprinkler irrigation line, approximately 
1320 feet in appurtenances, Serial No. 5038, and approximately 2130 feet 
of 6" portable mainline, as is, where is. 
and that the samtf is subject to redemption in lawful money of the United States pursuant to the statute 
in such cases made and provided. Dated at I tliis J.Q. day 
of . _ May , A. D. 19. 
Deputy Sheriff 
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SHERIFFS DEED 
ON ORDER OF SALE 
U r i s 3 f t f c » t » » , * • * < * I * day of 5 = 2 L 
One Thousand Nine Hundred and gjfr*y-Five , between . 
Sidney P. Groll 
Sheriff of County, State of Utah, the party of the first part and 
The federal Land Bank of Sacramento 
the parti of the second part Witnessed!. 
WHEREAS, by a certain judgment and decree made and entered by the District Court of the 
***** Judicial District, in and for the County of ^dae
 ( $ t t t e ^ Utah, 
on thf ^ k day of i f f ^ \f&.—, in a ©main action then pending 
in said Court, wherein V&J&32U4SUS& 0* .Sacramento 
plaintiff . and Ivan Boyce Lafaran, Ann N.Utoin, Labium Brothers Partnership, Clair 
A.Marler, JoAnn S. Marler,_Wayne T. Marler? Itelanle M.llarler, Labium Brothers Ranch, 
' I^rim*^tha^7T2brW"fet^^ Agri-Tech Inc., 
d e M 1 ^ I c ^ w i t M ^ d e » S e 9 r ^ S ? d L c a 
Court was delivered to said party of the first part, as such Sheriff, for execution and among other things 
it was therein ordered, adjudged and decreed that all and singular the mortgaged premises described in the 
complaint in said action, and specifically described in said decree should be sold at Public Auction by the 
Sheriff of said County of .— in the manner required by law and according to the 
course and practice of said Court; that such sale be made in the said County of 2 5 ™ , 
between the hours of nine o'clock in the forenoon and five o'clock in the afternoon on such day as said 
Sheriff should appoint; that any of the parties to said action might become purchaser at such sale, and 
that said Sheriff should execute the usual certifiates and deeds to the purchaser as required by law. 
AND WHEREAS, the said Sheriff did. at the hour of SiiSS *M. on t b e - ! £ 
after due public notice had been given as required by 
law, duly sell at Public Auction, at the front door of the County Court House. to~-JteXNkJGA&X-—--. 
in said County, agreeable to said decree, the premises in said decree described, and herein-
after described, and at which said sale said premises were sold to J^§J^terali^cJLBank^of 
J^aH!!!^ for the sum of 
$55,000.00 ^ ^ ^ ^ F m y j l v ^ T t o u s a n d DOLLARS; 
the? . being the highest and best bidder ~ therefor, and said sum being the highest and best sum bid. 
AND WHEREAS, the aaid Sheriff thereupon made and issued the usual certificate in duplicate of said 
tale and delivered one thereof to Itifr Tft»fr™l I*nd Bank of Sacramento 
the aaid purchaser , and caused the other to be filed in the office of the County Recorder of aaid 
Cache _ County. 
AND WHEREAS, aix months after aaid aale hare expired without any redemption of the aaid 
premises having been made, 
NOW, THIS INDENTURE WITNESSETH. That the aaid 
Sidney P. Qroll the Sheriff afomaid. by virtue of the aaid premises 
and aaid Order of Sale and in pursuance of the Same in rach case made and provided, for and in consider-
ation of the said sum of money, to him in hand paid as aforesaid, by the aaid p»rty. . of the second 
part, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, has granted, bargained, told, conveyed and confirmed, 
and by these presents does grant, bargain, sell, convey and confirm anto the said p»«* J of the second 
part, and to ~ * L . heirs and assigns forever, all the right, title, interest and claim which the aaid 
defendant s Ivm Boyoe_ Latoin, Ann N. Latanci, Lahnp Brothers Partnership, Clair 
A Mfvplfff'i Joann S. Marler, Wayne Y. larler, Helanie It. Marler, Labnxn Brothers Rancl 
Labnm Brothers, Labron Brothers Dairy, Hymn feed and Bardware, Agri-Tech, Inc., 
Brobkffeld Products, Inc., First Security Bank of Idaho, United states ox America 
had. on the aaid2&— day of MX . 19^5 . ©f. in and to all th? 
certain lot , piece , or parcel.JBL of land, situate, lying and being in the aa id .^5^ 
County, State of Utah, and bounded and particularly described as follows, go»wit: 
Beginning at a point Bast 1162.66 feet more or less along the state highway fran 
n. point on thp Q.S.L.itenTmd R.9* ^ 1 n ° Ff "t o* the Southwest Oorner of Section 
3, Township 14 North, Range 1 West of the Salt lake Base and Meridian, said 
hfttfinniTyr jrsint y*ripg the eastern taost point along the state highway of Parcel 1 
as described in a mortgage dated September 5, 1979 recorded Septenber 13, 1979 as 
lEnfrvy w^  A<X&\fi Twfr 2fifi pngft« 77a»T7S, *nA umP^E thence North 149 feet, theno 
West 200 feet: thence South 149 feet: thence Bast 200 feet to the point of 
Beginning. 
TOGETHER with all and singular the tenements, hereditament*, and appurtenances, thereunto be-
longing, or in anywise appertaining 
TO HAVE AND HOLD, tbe said premises, with tbe appurtenances, unto the said pan_£ of 
t h e i r 
the second part. heirs and assigns forever, u fully and absolutely, as he. the said Sheriff, can 
may, or ought to. by virtue of tbe said Order and Decree, and of tbe statute in such case made and provided 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Sheriff, the said party of the first part, has hereunto set his hand the 
day and year first above written. 
Signed and delivered in tbe presence of 
Royal A. Crockett, Deputy 
SidwO- (toll 
Sheriff of GftCbe County, State of Utah. 
STATE OF UTAH, I
 M 
County of Cache ) "* 
On this 7 t h day of Novwfaer A. D. 19B5 personally appeared before 
me the within named g j g * ? P* Q p o 1 1 
Sheriff of County, State of Utah. Known to me to be the person described in and whose 
name is subscribed to the within instrument and be SlOPey—lJ£2 
.. Cache 
said 
..duly acknowledged to me that be as such Sheriff of 
RoyaltA. Crockett 
County, executed the same ^?&VX4? $ * fflTb^&CV 
Notary Public. 
Rmdu,* « * » • > . **•»» . 
My ccnmWon «pim _ 2 t l * ^ 
S H E R I F F S DEED 
ON ORDER OF SALE 
7th
 A„„t Novwber <U»3ftfostar*, *****—— "** 
One Thouaand Nine Hundred and JBgfaff-**ye
 ( ^ ^ ^ 
Sidney P. Qroll 
Sberiff of ™£H? County. Stat* of Utah, the party of the first part and 
Ihe Federal Land Bank of Sacramento 
the pattJL~ of the second part Witnesteth: 
WHEREAS, by a certain judgment and decree made and entered by the District Court of the„ 
F i r g L _ Judicial District, in and for the County of J?!£**! . State of Utah, 
on t b e _ £ ~ ~ L day of •r^ff^,.. !9f5—.. in a certain action then pending 
in said Court, wherein __-JDbltJEtta^^ 
plaintiff _ and J m J ° m J # & r ^ ^ 
A. Uarler, JoAnn S. Marler, Wayne F, liarler, lielanie M. iiarler, Labnm Brothers 
Ranch* iabrmJBrctiker^^^ Md HftTJteare, Agri-Tech I 
Biookfield Products,Inc., First Security Bank of Idaho, United States of America 
defendant 5 . _ , and of which said judgment and decree, a certified copy, with an order of sale from said 
Court was delivered to said party of the first part, as such Sberiff, for execution and among other things 
it was therein ordered, adjudged and decreed that all and singular the mortgaged premises described in the 
complaint in said action, and specifically described in said decree should be sold at Public Auction by the 
Sheriff of said County of Carhft
 m , in the manner required by law and according to the 
course and practice of said Court; that such sale be made in the said County of 9*£*!l _ , 
between the hours of nine o'clock in the forenoon and five o'clock in the afternoon on such day as said 
Sheriff should appoint; that any of the parties so said action might become purchase T at such sale, and 
that said Sheriff should execute the usual certifiates and deeds to the purchaser as required by law. 
AND WHEREAS, the said Sheriff did. at the hour of U.tP° A- M. on the..,.??0 
day of ~—~ 10^*5 .. after due public notice had been given as required by 
law. duly sell at Public Auction, at the front door of the County Court House, in * £ R & . G ! & L _ . 
m gaid County, agreeable to said decree, the premises in said decree described, and herein-
after described, and at which said sale said premises were sold to ^ 0 ^ « L I ^ O a ^ L j 2 L - . 
Sacramento _ for the sum of 
$50,000-00 Fifty-Thousand . , _— , DOLLARS; 
they . being the highest and best bidder . therefor, and said sum being the highest and best sum bid. 
AND WHEREAS, the ttid Sheriff thereupon made and tamed the naval certificate in duplicate of aaid 
aale and deUvertd one thereof to 'a* F e d e r a l L a p d **"* <* Sacramento 
the aaid pnrchaaer , and cawed the other to be filed in the office of the County Recorder of aaid 
<*** County. 
AND WHEREAS, fix months after aaid aale have expired without any redemption of the aaid 
premiaes having been made, 
NOW. THIS INDENTURE WITNESSETH. That the aaid 
Sidney P. Qrol3 . the Sheriff aforeaaid. by virtue of the aaid premises 
and aaid Order of Sale and in pursuance of the Statue in such case made and provided, for and in consider-
ation of the aaid sum of money, to him in hand paid as aforesaid, by the aaid part_X of the second 
part, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, has granted, bargained, sold, conveyed and confirmed. 
and by these presents does grant, bargain, sell, convey and confirm unto the aaid party of the second 
part, and toJ&£&£. heirs and assigns forever, all the right, title, interest and claim which the said 
defendant & J ? a £ „ B p J ^ J ^ m „ A. 
Ifarlwr, . M t m S . liftTltir, Tayn* T_Hurler, Ttel.M* y Ite-rlgr, Tarrrun Urm-hPty four*, 
LabniB .BrjDjthexs*Jj0ami.^St3m^X^^4. BftTP .ItoeflLiiPd Hardware, Agri-Tech., Inc. 
Brookfield Products, Inc., First Securitv Bank at Idaho, United States of America 
had. on the aaid 7th . day of Bay «• _ 1991 , of, in and to all th. 
certain lot , piece——. or parcel^ acx- of land, situate, lying and being in the safe?**?. , _ 
County. State of Utah, and bounded and particularly described as follows, to-wit: 
Beginning 2640 feet West. South. 80 rods. East 50 rods, South. 80 rods, East 
300 feet from the Northeast corner ot the Southeast Quarter of Section 6, 
Township 14 North, Range 1 East of the Salt Late Base and Meridian, and 
running thence East 300 feet, thence North 300 feet, thence West 300 feet, 
thence South 300 feet to the point of beginning. 
TOGETHER with all and singular the tenement*, hereditament*, and appurtenances, thereunto be-
longing, or in anywise appertaining. 
TO HAVE AND HOLD, the said premises, with the appurtenances, unto the said parti of 
the second part. th^T. . heirs and assigns forever, as fully and absolutely, as he. the said Sheriff, can 
may. or ought to. by virtue of the said Order and Decree, and of the statute in such case made and provided. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Sheriff, the said party of the first part, has hereunto set his band the 
day and ytat first abovt written. 
Signed and delivered in the presence of 
Royal A. Crockett, Depaty 
8K . Qroll 
Sheriff of P****: County. Sute of Uuh. 
STATE OF UTAH, | 
County of Cache J 
On this. 7th. 
me the within named . 
. day of 
_ & & 6 V P, QTPll-
A.D. IS§L- personally appeared before 
Sheriff of Cache County, Sute of Uuh, Known to me to be the person described in and whose 
name is subscribed to the within instrument and he g i t e V P> GTOII 
rf"ly acknowledged to me that he as such Sheriff of 
said . . .Qghg County, executed the same. 4^L<7*f'Csfip* 
Bpyal ft. 
Hyron, Utah 
Noury Public. 
Residing at . 
My commission expires 2^bl2T2*L 
SHERIFFS DEED 
ON ORDER OF SALE 
7th. . „ * Novsriber CJa« Znbtidurt, «•*««, ™ day*. 
and Nine Hnndrcd and 
Sidney P. Groll 
One Thous t a  l i f f i f f i ^ 1 ? 6 , between. 
Sheriff of QaCD^ County. State of Utah, the party of the first part and 
The Federal Land Bank of Sacramento 
the part .X_ of the second part Witnesseth: 
WHEREAS, by a certain judgment and decree made and entered by the District Conn of the 
F iTSt_ judicial District, in and for the County of Qafi&fi
 t State of Utah, 
on thf ^ t k day of J P 1 ^ '. 19S5—, in a certain action then pending 
in said Conn, wherein - ^ Feder^LJ^Oanfc .Of^aCTMnaotQ 
pontiff *and l 9 f i JssssJ^QBbLJBiLlLu Ufcxum, JLatafnJBrattesJBar^^ 
O a r l e r , JoAnn S. Marler, Wayne F. Marler, llelanie M. Marler, Labrum Brothers 
Ranee, Labnm Brothers^ Labrm Brot^gry pftflyy, Vyrim Tfrftfl pnri HaTrhmre, Agrt JIW*h Inc. 
Brob^ieTdl^raEcts" inc.*, First Security Bank of Idaho, United States of Anerica 
defendant6. , and of which said judgment and decree, a certified copy, with an order of ale from said 
Court was delivered to said party of the first part, as such Sheriff, for execution and among other things 
it was therein ordered, adjudged and decreed that all and singular the mortgaged premises described in the 
complaint in said action, and specifically described in said decree should be sold at Public Auction by the 
Sheriff of said County of -., £*&*& in the manner required by law and according to the 
course and practice of said Court: that such sale be made in the said County of & S b § . 
between the hours of nine o'clock in the forenoon and five o'clock in the afternoon on such day as said 
Sheriff should appoint; that any of the parties to said action might become purchase!!— at such sale, and 
that said Sheriff should execute the usual certifiates and deeds to the purchaser as required by law. 
AND WHEREAS, the aid Sheriff did, at the hour ciUlSB. ^L_M. on t h e J ^ _ 
^ y
 c f _"** , 19?~L... after due public notice bad been given as required by 
law. duly sell at Public Auction, at the front door of the County Court House, in lGgf t&.£ i t£ .~ -
m said County, agreeable to said decree, the premises in said decree described, and herein-
after described, and at which said sale said premises were sold to ~2k§-Eg3&a2 J^jLBan&..p_f— 
. ? ? ? 5 ^ i ? - ... - for the sum of 
$210,000.00 T ^ Hundred and Tten Thousand
 r n — DOLLARS: 
t he y . being the highest and best bidder .. therefor, and said sum being the behest and best sum bid. 
AND WHEREAS, tbe Mid Sheriff thereupon made and isroed the nsual certificate in duplicate of said 
tale and dehmed one thereof to The federal Land Bank of Sacramento 
tbe said purchaser , and canaed the other to be filed in the office of tbe County Recorder of said . 
_*£* e x , 
AND WHEREAS, aix months after said sale have expired without any redemption of the said 
premise* hairing been made, 
NOW, THIS INDENTURE WITNESSETH: That tbe said 
. . . Sidney P, QroU the Sheriff aforesaid, by virtue of the said premises 
and aid Order of Sale and in pursuance of the Statue in such case made and provided, for and in consider-
ation of tbe aaid sum of money, to him in hand paid as aforesaid, by the said partX— of tbe second 
part, the receipt whereof u hereby acknowledged, has granted, bargained, sold, conveyed and confirmed. 
and by these presents does grant, bargain, sell, convey and confirm unto the aaid party of the second 
part, and to .tte^beirs and assigns forever. all the right, title, interest and claim which the said 
defendant a^Iyap-Boyce Jflhrum, ..AmilLULsi&raa^l^ 
A. Marler, JoAnn S. Marler, Wayne ?. Iterler, llelanle H. Marler, Labnxs Brothers 
Rajick, J-ahrtziLBrothfirs^.^^ Dnirv. Hvran feed and Jartware, Agri-Tech., 
Inc., Brookfleld Products, Inc., First Security Bank of Idaho, United States of Amer 
had. on the saidJLtL- ^y o f lta£ + ,193$L-. of, in and to all th. — 
certain lot- , piece , or parcelJDL. of land, situate, lying and being in the aid Ql*£be 
County. State of Utah and bounded and particularly described as follows, to-wit: 
Parcel 3 (Dairy and approximately 70 acres) 
Bft|dMHng «t » pMn+ •> ™vte Wret nf +h» nn.rthopgt nprner of Section 6. Township 
14 North, Ranee 1 East of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian and running thence 
South 47'rods; thence West 10 rods; thence South 1 rod; thence West 18 rods; 
thence South 24 rods; thence West 10 rods; thence South 8 rods to the South 
line of the Northeast quarter of the Northeast quarter of said Section 6; 
thence West 118 rods; thence North 80 rods; thence East 158 rods to the point 
of beginning. _ -__-«-=______ 
Together with: (a) 9 shares of Cub River Irrigation Oanpany stock, and (b) 
one AM Manufacturing Wheel-Move sprinkler irrigation line, approximately 1320 
feet in length, with rovers, sprinkler heads, wheels and appurtenances, Serial 
No. 5038, and approximately 2130 feet of 6" portable mainline as is, uhere is. 
TOGETHER with all and singular the tenements, hereditamenu. and appurtenances, thereunto be-
longing, or in anywise appertaining. 
TO HAVE AND HOLD, the aaid premises, with the appurtenances, onto the said party of 
the second part. the ir j K j n a n d „^gnt forever, as fully and absolutely, as he. the said Sheriff, can 
may, or ought to, by virtue of the aaid Order and Decree, and of the statute in such case made and provided. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Sheriff, the said party of the first part, has hereunto set his hand the 
day and year first above written. 
Signed and delivered in the presence of 
Royal A. Crockett, Deputy 
Sidng> p . Qroll 
Sheriff of J*S*« County. State of Utah. 
STATE OF UTAH. ( 
County of Cache ) 
On this 7th day
 0f NgVWber A. D. 19f£L. personally appeared befort 
me the within named Sidney P. Qroll . 
Sheriff of Cache County, State of Utah, Known to me to be the person described in and whose 
name it subscribed to the within instrument and he ~ 
Sidney P. QroP . 
said v ^ ^ County, executed the same 
..duly acknowledged to me that he as such Sheriff of 
RoyaU >3W A .^Crockett 
Notary Public. 
Residing at J&nmjJDtah „ _ _ _ „ 
My commission expires Qlh *^£J%L, 
"2SB1SPD STL, - ^ ^ S A r 
Sheriff-of ^ 
W
**EREAS.
 o y _ . ^ 
, a
 »»<f Com* . ~*~~—-«B53E3L« ~~~^ - _ _ _
 e 
*• J'fcriSr"fiS-&Ui Bow*
 T t ""•*-—---___ -—~_ 
*
( tJ
* front door of tK. r> "* **** fi*e« 
%J*« and h~. . 
AND WHEREAS, the said Sheriff thereupon made and issued the usual certificate in duplicate of said 
sale and delisted one thereof to The Federal Land Bank o f Sacramento 
the said purchaser , and caused the other to be filed in the office of the County Recorder of said 
C**** County. 
AND WHEREAS, six months after said sale hare expired without any redemption of the said 
premises having been made, 
NOW. THIS INDENTURE WITNESSETH: That the said 
Sidney P. Groll 
the Sheriff aforesaid, by virtue of the said premises 
and said Order of Sale and in pursuance of the Statue in such case made and provided, for and in consider-
ation of the said sum of money, to him in hand paid as aforesaid, by the said party of the second 
part, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, has granted, bargained, sold, conveyed and confirmed. 
and by these presents does grant, bargain, sell, convey and confirm unto the said party of the second 
part, and t o — . t h e i r — heirs and assigns forever, all the right, title, interest and claim which the said 
defendant s _^Y*gJ*P7^ .^* !^„4^^ Brothers Partnership, Clair A. 
Marler, JoAnn S. Marler, Wayne F. Marler, Melanie M. Marler, labrum Brothers Ranch, 
Labron Brothers, Latoum Brothers Dairy, Hymn feed and Hardware, Agri-Tech., Inc. 
Bra^ielSProaucts, Inc.T"HrsT'5ecurlty'Bami5^^ tailed Sut«b uf America 
had. on the said £ t h ^ y
 o f May 19£L_, of> fa i n d t o , n ^ 
certain lot . piece , or parcel.**- of land, situate, lying and being in the said—jCtlGbg „ 
County. State of Utah, and bounded and particularly described as follows, to-wit: 
Parcel 1, (Cornish faun) Beginning at a point on the East line of the O.S.L. railroad 
8.28 chains East of the Southwest corner of the Southwest Quarter of Section 3, 
Township 14 North, Range 1 West of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running 
t hence North S 0 ^ ' lest 20 chains; thence East .38 chains; thence North 3°55' West 
20 chains, more or less to the North line of the Southwest Quarter of Section 3; 
t hence East 33.01 chains, more or less to the Northeast corner of said Southwest 
Quarter of Section 3; thence North to the South bank of Bear River; thence South-
easterly and Southerly along said South bank of Bear River to a point North 87°55' 
East 371.75 feet from a point 12.75 chainsSduth firm the Center of said Section; 
thence South 8^55' West to a point 33 feet East of said North and South center line; 
thence South 168 feet; thence South 25°East 282 feet thence South S'East 254 feet; 
thence West 160 feet to a point 1043 feet North of the South Quarter comer of said 
Section; thence South 25 feet; thence South 45u West 160 feet; thence Jlest 254 feet; 
thence South 288 feet; thence West 250 feet; thence South"100 feet; thence West 139 
feet to a point 521 feet North of a point 759 feet West of the South Quarter corner 
of said Section; thence South 339 feet; thence West 191 feet; thence South 149 feet; 
thence West along State Highway 1162.66 feet to the place of beginning, containing 
154.84 acres, excepting any portion of the above described property lying within the 
State Highway. 
Less tbe following (.Cornish House): Beginning at a point East 1162.66 feet m 
or less along the state highway from a point on the O.S.L. Railroad 8.28 
chains East of the Southwest Corner of Section 3, Township 14 North, Range 11 
of the Salt lake Base and Meridian, said beginning point being the eastern ma 
point along fly stf +* M a * — * of Parcel 1 a* riefyxibed in a mortgage dated 
September 5, 1979 recorded September 13, 1979 as Entry No. 426615, Book 256, 
pages 772-775, and running thence North 149 feet, thence West 200 feet; thenc* 
South 149 feet; thence East 200 feet to the point of beginning. 
Parcel 2, (Roes~Labr\in farm less houseT Part of the Southeast quarter of Se< 
6, Township 14 North, Range 1 East of the Salt Lake Base ancTBeriaian, agscru 
as follows: CSee Attached Sheet) 
TOGETHER with all and singular tbe tenement*, hereditaments, and appurtenances, thereunto bi 
longing, or in anywise appertaining 
TO HAVE AND HOLD, tbe said premises, with tbe appurtenances, unto the said part_£ e 
the second part, t h e i r — heirs and assigns forever, as fully and absolutely, as be. tbe said Sherif. ca 
may, or ought to. by virtue of the said Order and Decree, and of tbe statute in such case made and providec 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Sheriff, the said party of the first part, has hereunto set his hand th 
day and year first above written. 
-i*P^-f 
Signed and delivered in the presence of 1 Sidney P. Qroll 
Royal A. Crockett, Deputy (
 e u ^ ^ 
• / Sheriff of —y*5SE County, State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, ( 
County of Cache ) "* 
On this 7 t h day of 5°*5*!?E . A. D. 19§L_ personally appeared befon 
me the within named Sidney P. Qroll 
Sheriff of C*Che County. Sure of Utah, Known to me to be tbe person described in and who* 
name is subscribed to tbe within instrument and he :__£.—* 
said S County, executed the same. 
me tnat ne as such &nen 
Notary Public. 
Residing at Jfimil), ITfJltl 
My commission expires . Qft=l&=S?. 
